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.J . BRENNAN, .JR.

May 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE:

Iranian Hostage Agreement

At lunch Byron, Bill, John and I discussed the Iranian
Hostage Agreement. It was thought helpful to obtain a copy
of the First Circuit opinion and the briefs in that case. I
called Chief Judge Coffin who referred me to Judge McGowan of
the D.C. Circuit where another of these cases is pending.
Judge McGowan sent me the enclosed copies of the First Circuit
opinions and also the copy enclosed of a judgment order entered in the D.C. case. The opinion of the D.C. Circuit is to
follow in a few days. Judge Coffin is mailing- fne briefs in
th~case today.

W.J.B. Jr.

I

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Peter Byrne
Re: No. 80-2078, Dames & Moore v. Regan (Sec'y), Iran Agreement
Case
'iS'a"te: 06/10/81
Summary: Petr requests the Court to grant cert in
this case before judgment by the CA9. Petr argues that the
..

aw:a

•

President lacked authority to nullify judicial attachments and
suspend claims against the government of Iran and its
~

instrumentality.
Facts and Proceedings Below: Petr filed this action
on April 28, 1981 in the DC to enjoin the United States from
interfering in enforcing a judgment in an underlying suit by

(

petr against Iran, and for a declaration that the Iranian
Hostage Agreement, known as the Algerian Declarations, and
implementing regulations were void insofar as they purported to
authorize such interference because they were beyond the

~c.

constitutional and statutory powers of the President. The DC

~

granted the motion of the United States to dismiss for failure

to state a claim under Rule 12 (b) (6). It is this ruling that .,1.0

tt;_~

petrs seek to have reviewed here.
It is helpful to recall the chronology of the
relevant public events when describing the maturing of petr's

claim. The Iranian revolutionaries seized American diplomats as
hostages on November 4, 1979. On November 14, President Carter
in response issued a Presidential Order: 1) declaring a
"national emergency" within the meaning of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50

~

u.s.c.

§

1701; 2)

2.

"blocking" all assets of Iran and its instrumentalities within
the jurisdiction of the United States; and, 3) delegating his
powers to the Sec'y of the Treasury to issue regulations
~

implementing the blocking order. That same day, the Sec'y
issued regulation prohibiting, absent a license or
...........

:w:r""'t

authorization, attachments, injunctions, or judgments against

-

the Iranian property. Petrs commenced their underlying action
against Iran, and gained a prejudgment attachment against
Iranian assets, pursuant to a revocable license, on December
20, 1979.

~~

On January 19, 1981, Iran released the hostages
pursuant to an agreement with the United States (the

fo

~ ~

Declarations of Algeria). The agreement states as a purpose to

~

settle and terminate all claims between the Government of each
nation and the nationals of the other. To acheive this goal,
1/
\\ I /•
the parties established an Iran-U~ted States Claims Tribunal, , ~~
which will, with certain exceptions, arbitrate claims; its
judgments shall be binding and enforcable in the courts of
ation. The ~t~s~det;,_took to "terminate" legal
P:;?cee~ d~mesti,Q_,courts

..

~rh
~

any~

~

against Iran and its

instrument a 1 i t i e s , .:;,:o_"~n:.:u:..:l:.::.:.i:.~~~-"....:a:.:l:.:l;_a;;,.;;.t.;;;t.;;;a;.;c;.;;.h;.:;m.e...
nt s , ~nd _w
liti ation. The United States must also
transfer by July 19, 1981 all Iranian assets held in U.S.

lA... ·S .

~~ci~/

..

~ ~-

banks. $1 Billion will go directly into an account to be used ~~
to fund awards by the Tribunal; Iran agreed to maintain a
balance of $500 million in the account until all awards are

•

3.

satisfied. The same day, President Carter issued executive
orders implementing the agreement. These orders revoked all
licenses permitting persons to exercise any "right, power or

~

privilege" against Iranian assets, "nullified" all non-Iranian
interests acquired in the assets after the blocking order

went ~

into effect, and ordered all those holding blocked assets to

~1-t,. ·- ~-

. .1s ~~
transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York [th1s
due on June 19]. On February 24, President Reagan "ratified"

~leu,-~

the January 19 orders, "suspended" all "claims which may be
presented to the [Tribunal]," and provided that they "shall
have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of
the United States." Notwithstanding all this, the DC granted
petr summary judgment on its underlying claims against Iran in

-

the amount of $3.8 million on Februaruy 18.
In summary, petr intiated its underlying claims and
gained pre-judgment attachment against Iran after the entry of
the blocking order on November 14, 1979. The DC has now vacated}
petr's attachment:_:nd held, in essence, that the United States
,,

has the power to transfer the ass·ets on July 19.
State of Law: CAl, Chas. T Main Inc. v. Khuzestan
Water

&

Power Authority, No. 80-10 27 (May 22, 1981) (Campbell,

Coffin; Breyer, concurring), and CADC, American Int'l Group,
Inc. v. Iran, (decided May 22, 1981; opinion issued June 5,

--

1981) (McGowan, Mikva, Jameson [DJ]), have both held in
comprehensive opinions that 1) the President has statutory
authority under IEEPA, 50

·,

u.s.c.

§

1702(a) (1), to "nullify"

.bL

~~
I

T~~,~A.-A-/-{_

4.

attachments on Iranian assets entered after the date of the
blocking order: 2) the President has inherent authority to
settle the claims of American nationals against foreign
governments in reaching important agreements with those
governments: 3) any takings claims by creditors are premature.
su~y

Apparently no DC's have held otherwise. I will state in

l

the grounds of the CAl and CADC holdings.

~

l::v'A...~~.$

1) The I~EPA en~~ eeent, in times of

JM

national emergency, to prevent or prohibit the transfer of the

~

j

assets of a foreign governemnt, direct or compel the transfer
or withdrawal of such assets, and nullify any rights acquired
in them. 50

u.s.c.

§

1702 (a) (1). Here, the President did not

wipe out existing judicial liens retroactively, but only

-

attachments gained subject to the limitations of the blocking

----

-~-

-

-

order. When the President acts pursuant to explicit statutory
authorization, he exerc-ises all the power of the United States
regarding foreign affairs. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343U.S. 579,635-638 (1952)(Jackson, J., concurring).
A similar blocking order was upheld under the President's power ~
under the predecessor Trading With The Enemy Act in Orvis v.
Brownell, 345

u.s. 183 (1953).
suspend claims

of nationals against foreign governments. In United States v.
Pink, 315

u.s. 203 (1942), the Court upheld the settlement of

such claims pursuant to an agreement recognizing the USSR. The
President has made such settlements throughout the history of

5.

the country without disapproval by Congress. If effective, the
President's settlement is binding on a federal court. See
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801). The
passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976(FSIA),
which allows courts to entertain commercial suits against
foreign sovereigns on commercial claims without interposition
of the executive, does not abrogate the President's power to
act in a national emergency.
3) Takings claims are premature because it is not
clear that the Tribunal will give less value for the claims

.

1f wz.J.L -

I

than petrs could obtain gaining unsecured judgments against
Iran in the federal courts. No taking was acheived by the mere
nullification of attachments gained after the blocking order
was entered.
Contentions: Petr argues that the decisions below are
incorrect. It claims that the President has bargained away

;k.,~~
~_,1~4~.

their legal rights to gain release of the hostages. It argues
that the President has neither statutory nor inherent power to
achieve these "settlements." None of the cases relied on below
involve a "giveaway" of claims held by American nationals. Pink
involved only a marshalling of assets for American creditors.
Schooner Peggy involved a formal treaty ratified by Congress.
What the President has done is interfere with the exercise of
jurisdiction by the federal courts, as conferred by the FSIA.
The history of Presidential settlements of national's claims
against foreign sovereigns is irrelevant to this case occuring

]

6.

after passage of FSIA in 1976. Prior to passage of that Act
such claims could only be satisfied by international agreement;
if the President did not act there would be no recovery, so his
settlement had to bind the parties. The estimated American
claims against Iran far exceed the $1 Billion security account;
they are estimated to total $3 or $4 Billion.
The United States has yet to file today, but will
su£port

the~ited ~eJn

and urge the following accelerated

briefing schedule: briefs by June 19; reply briefs by June 23;
oral argument on June 25. Iran has filed a motion to intervene;
it supports the petn and the briefing scedule. Numerous major
banks presently holding Iranian assets and fearful of being
subjected to conflicting obligation,

have filed an amicus

brief urging the Court to hear this case on an expedited basis.
These parties all state that there are numerous cases pending
and a uniform and final decision is desireable.
Discussion: In looking into this case, I have been
suprised to find that petr's arguments on the merits are quite
weak. There seems little real argument to the
;;::ident

~tory

~Pint

that the

authority under the IEEPA to transfer

the assets and nullify post blocking order attachment orders.
Petr offers only a strained attempt to narrow the sweeping
grant of authority under IEEPA by reference to indirect
legislative history. The more diffcult question is whether the
President may suspend the claims pending in federal courts.
This is not a major loss to petrs because federal court

·.·

7.

judgments will be worth little when the assets are gone. While
the cases tend to support the President's power as part of an
international agreement to settle claims by requiring they be
submitted to arbitration this case does go somewhat beyond the

.

precedents in the sweeping nature of the claim preclusion. It
.,..,~...-.....----

--

.........

goes far beyond in the amount of money involved.
!

~-------------

would be tempted to merely affirm the judgement

below with a brief per curiam. However, given the political
importance of the issue plenary consideration may be
desireable. This will allow the Court more carefully to weigh
and state the President's inherent power to settle claims. At
this time of year, a full hearing may be no less budensome that
the preparation of a per curiam.

.JUN l 0 1981

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUP2EME COURT, U.S.

TELEPHONE . ( 202 ) 857-1000

II'!§ !J§z~~nia (! Gten/H:
~lmv. !d.'rt, ,!()()()6'

TELEX : 8Q8Z 5
CABLE ADDRESS . LADY COURT, W S H

125 BROAD STREET. NEW YOR K 10 004
ZSO PARK AVENUE . NEW Y O RK 10177
17. AVENUE M ATIGNON , 75008 P AR IS
Zl IRON MON G ER LA NE , LOND ON ECZV 8 .J B

June 10, 1981

The Honorable Francis J. Lorson,
Chief Deputy Clerk,
Supreme Court of the United States,
1 First Street, N.E.,
Room 22B,
Washington, D.C. 20543.
Re:

Dames & Moore v. Donald T. Regan and the
United States of America, No. 80-2078

Dear Mr. Lorson:
Enclosed for filing are 40 copies of a motion for
leave to file a brief and brief amici curiae. Although this
is being filed as a motion, in accordance with your telephone conversation with Mr. Mark Zirnrnett, this letter confirms that we have obtained the consent of the respondents
to the filing of the enclosed brief. Counsel for petitioner
has consented to the filing of the brief insofar as it supports the petition for certiorari, but does not agree with
our position supporting the respondents' motion for expedite d
consideration of the petition.
I enclose nine extra copies of this letter should
it be appropriate to circulate to the Conference.
Very truly yours,

(Enclosures)

No.

80-2078

RECEIVED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JUN 1 0 1981
OFFICE OF TH

~EME cou~r:~~~

·-

October Term 1980

DAMES & MOORE, a partnership,
Petitioner,

v.
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY
OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Before Judgment

MOTION TO INTERVENE AS RESPONDENT AND BRIEF IN
ACQUIESCENCE TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT
Thomas G. Shack, Jr.
Raymond J. Kimball
Gregory de Sousa
Christine Cook Nettesheim
On the brief:
John B. Beaty
James A. Stenger
Thomas D. Silverstein

ABOUREZK, SHACK & MENDENHALL, P.C.
1129 Twentieth Street, N.W.
washington, D.C.
20036
(202) 293-5900
Counsel for Intervenor
Islamic Republic of Iran
Elihu Inselbuch
E. Paul Kanefsky
GILBERT, SEGALL & YOUNG
430 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
( 212) 644-4000
Counsel for Intervenor
Atomic Energy Organization of
the Government of Iran

No.

80-2078

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term 1980

DAMES & MOORE, a partnership,
Petitioner,

v.
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY
OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Before Judgment

MOTION TO - INTERVENE -AS - RESPONDENT
The Islamic Republic of Iran (the "Government of Iran")
and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran the ("AEOI") hereby
move this Court to intervene as respondents in this matter as a
matter of right and to file the accompanying brief acquiesing in
the petition for writ of certiorari before judgment.
The Government of Iran and AEOI fully satisfy the
criteria of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) for intervention as a matter
of right.

The Government of Iran has a direct interest in this

case, because outstanding orders of attachment have been levied
against its assets and those of other Iranian entities in the
amount of some $3.5 million and because a summary judgment in
the amount of $3,788,930.79 was issued against the Government of
Iran in the underlying action.

Similarly, AEOI has an interest

in this case because the summary judgment was entered jointly
against AEOI.

In addition to its direct interest in the outcome of
'

this case, the Government of Iran has a unique interest, not
adequately represented by Secretary Regan or the United States,
emanating from the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria, adhered to by the United states and Iran on
January 19, 1981 (the "General Declaration").

While the United

States is obligated by the General Declaration (General
Principle B and •t6-9) to return to Iran by July 19, 1981, the
assets which are subject to petitioner's prejudgment
attachments, that interest is not identical to that of the
Government of Iran.

The United States' interest can fairly be

characterized as one of discharging its obligations under an
international accord which is binding on domestic courts.
Should, however, the United States fail to effect the
timely return of the Government of Iran's assets, a claim by
Iran can be lodged with the Iran-United States Arbitral
Tribunal, established by the Declaration of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims
of the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, also
adhered to on January 19, 1981 ("the Claims Declaration").
General Declration, !17; Claims Declaration, Article II, t3.

It

is the Government of Iran's assets which are not freely mobile
and which are not subject to the Government of Iran's access or
use, pending vacation of these prejudgment attachments.

Thus,

the Government of Iran's interest can fairly be characterized as
an immediate ownership interest, which is not represented by the
existing parties and it is of vital concern to the Government of
Iran that all prejudgment attachments, preliminary injunctions,
or other provisional restraints on its financial assets be
nullified, as required by the General Declaration, in advance of
July 19, 1981, in order to permit their return to Iran in
accordance with the General Declaration.

- 2 -

Finally, both the Government of

~ran

and AEOI have an

interest distinct from that of Secretary Regan and the United
States in this matter, because the summary judgment against the
Government of Iran and AEOI was entered unlawfully after the
Algerian Declarations were adhered to and ratified by President
Reagan and after Executive orders and regulations were promulgated which prohibited all further judicial proceedings with
respect to Iranian assets.

The disposition of the summary judg-

ment impacts directly on the Government of Iran and AEOI and
only indirectly on the United States, which is obligated to
nullify all judgments against the Government of Iran and Iranian
entities pursuant to General Principle B of the General Declaration.
Counsel for the Government of Iran are authorized to
state that the United States does not oppose this motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the Government of Iran and
AEOI respectfully request that this motion be granted and that
the accompanying brief be accepted for filing.
Respectfully

s ~ bmi t

ted')

~c ~ . . y
Thomas G. Shack, Jr.
Raymond J. Kimball
Gregory de Sousa
Christine Cook Nettesheim
On the brief:
John B. Beaty
James A. Stenger
Thomas D. Silverstein

ABOUREZK, SHACK & MENDENHALL, P.C.
1129 Twentieth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 293-5900

Counsel for Intervenor
Islamic Republic of Iran

Elihu Inselbuch
E. Paul Kanefsky
GILBERT, SEGALL & YOUNG
430 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 644-4000

June 10, 1981

Counsel for Intervenor
Atomic Energy Organization of
the Government of Iran
- 3 -
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80-2078

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term 1980

DAMES & MOORE, a partnership,
Petitioner,

v.
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY
OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Before Judgment

BRIEF IN ACQUIESCENCE TO PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT

QOESTION PRESENTED
Whether issues concerning the validity of implementation of the Algerian Declarations by Executive orders and
federal regulations require immediate settlement in this Court.
STATEMENT
Intervenors the Islamic Republic of Iran (the
"Government of Iran") and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
(the "AEOI") hereby acquiesce in the petition for writ of
certiorari and in the schedule for expedited briefing and
argument proposed this date by Secretary Regan and the United
States.
This case merits urgent consideration because it is
representative of the hundreds of cases against the Government
of Iran and Iranian entities involving prejudgment attachments

issued on or after November 14, 1979,

res~raining

the mobility

of Iranian assets that the United States is obligated to return
to Iran by July 19, 1981.

In addition, this case involves a

summary judgment against intervenors entered in violation of
executive orders and regulations.
Petitioner Dames & Moore obtained prejudgment attachments of some $3.5 million in funds of the Government of Iran in
the Central District of California on December 20, 1979; January
4, 1980; February 4, 1980; and May 12, 1980.

Authorization for

hese prejudgment attachments was conferred by a revocable
license.

31 C.P.R. §§535.418, 535.504, 535.805 (1980).

On January 19, 1981, the United States adhered to two
Declarations of the Government of Algeria.~/

The General Declar-

ation provides for the termination of the litigation in the
United States courts and the nullification of judicial process,
including attachments and judgments.

The United States specific-

ally agreed:
To terminate all legal proceedings in the
United States courts involving claims of
United States persons and institutions
against Iran and its enterprises, to · nullify
all · attachments · and · judgments · obtained
therein, [and] to prohibit further litigation
based on such claims ..••
General Declaration, General Principle B (emphasis added).
In addition to, and independently of, the above commitment, the General Declaration requires the return of all Iranian
assets within United States jurisdiction.
General Principle A.

General Declaration,

Paragraphs 4 through 9 of the General

Declaration obligate the United States by July 19, 1981,

~I

These are the "Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria," Jan. 19,
1981 (the "General Declaration") and the "Declaration
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran," Jan. 19, 1981.

- 2 -

to "bring about the transfer" of to "arrange for the transfer"
of all Iranian assets.:/

The General Declaration established a

security account to be funded from the returned assets in the
initial amount of $1 billion and subsequently maintained by Iran
so that the amount is not less that $500 million.
Declaration,

General

,7.

In furtherance of the United States' obligations under
the Algerian Declarations, Executive orders were issued on
January 19 and February 4, 1981, as implemented by Treasury
regulations, which, inter alia, revoke the license for prejudgment attachments, direct the transfer of assets to the Federal
Reserve Bank for retransfer as directed by the Secretary of the
Treasury, and prohibit further judicial proceedings concerning
Iranian assets.

Exec. Order Nos. 12,277-12,280, 46 Fed. Reg.

7,915-7,922 (Jan.

23, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed.

Reg. 14,111 (Feb. 26, 1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 14,333-14,336 (1981)
(to codified as 31 C.F.R. §§535.212, 535.213, 535.214, 535.218,
535.222, 535.504).
Although
obtained a

been prohibited,
~vernmen

of Iran and AEOI in the

amount of $3,788,930.79, plus interest.
Thereafter, on April 28, 1981, petitioner filed its
injunctive action seeking to prevent respondents from enforcing
the regulations requiring transfer of the attached assets.

The

district court on May 28, 1981, dismissed the complaint, vacated
all the prejudgment attachments, stayed execution on the summary
judgment, and stayed the vacation of the attachments until
July 19, 1981.

Petitioner noticed its appeal from the dismissal

of its complaint and the vacation of attachments to the Ninth
Circuit on June 3, 1981; on June 4,

~I

The commitments to transfer assets in ••4-9 of the
General Declaration are conditioned upon certain
events, all of which have occurred.
-

3 -

1980, the Treasury issued regulations

tha~

revoked a policy of

not seeking to impose criminal and civil sanctions on holders of
Iranian property who failed to comply with its ordered transfer
and directed that all Iranian funds, securities, or deposits be
transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank by June 19, 1981, 46
Fed. Reg. 30,341 (1981) (to be codified as 31 C.F.R. §§535.213,
535.214, 535.221); 31 C.F.R. §535.701 (1980); compare 46 Fed.
Reg. 14,335 (1981) (to be codified as 31 C.F.R. §535.221).
Petitioner applied to the district court on June 5, 1981, for an
order restraining enforcement of these regulations; on June 8,
the district court enjoined the transfer of assets subject to
petitioner's attachments pending the appeal in the Ninth
Circuit and restricted its stay of execution on the summary
judgment to only in stay pending appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ISSUES OF THE EXECUTIVE'S AUTHORITY TO VACATE
PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENTS OF IRANIAN ASSETS AND THE
EXECUTIVE'S OBLIGATION TO NULLIFY THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT REQUIRE -IMMEDIATE -SETTLEMENT - IN -THIS -COURT.
Intervenors acquiesce in the petition insofar as it

seeks immediate and expedited review of the Executive's authority to nullify prejudgment attachments of Iranian assets,
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C. §§1701-1706 (Supp. III 1979), as a matter of imperative
public importance that justifies a deviation from normal
appellate practice and requires immediate settlement in this
Court, within the contemplation of Sup. Ct. R. 18.~/

The

Algerian Declarations are international accords which are
binding on the United States as a matter of both international

~I

Intervenors will support the grant of certiorari in a
case naming as defendants the Government of Iran, alone
or in connection with other Iranian entities, which is
representative of the nationwide cases with provisional
restraints of Iranian assets issued on or after
November 14, 1979.
- 4 -

and domestic law.

They mandate the

retur~

of Iran's assets held

by United States banks and other persons by July 19, 1981, the
termination of legal proceedings, and the nullification of summary judgments.

To that end, the Executive has issued executive

orders and regulations, the enforcement of which petitioners
seek to frustrate and the legality and constitutionality of
which petitioners ask this Court to address in advance of the
July 19th deadline.

Because this case involves the obligations

to transfer assets and to terminate legal proceedings which must
be finally discharged within 40 days, and because the prejudgment attachment is representative of over 200 cases with provisional restraints on Iranian assets, the petition demonstrates
imperative public importance that justifies this Court's
consideration of the issues on appeal before judgment by the
court of appeals.

Immediate settlement of these issues is

necessary to provide uniform treatment by the courts throughout
the country which must address and rule on these issues within
the next month.

The standards of Sup. Ct. R. 18 are unquestion-

ably met.
II.

THIS MATTER SHOULD BE HEARD ON THE EXPEDITED
·

BRIEFING - SCHEDULE - PROPOSED - BY - RESPONDENTS~

Petitioner has invoked this Court's jurisdiction
pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

§1254(1} (1976}; Rule 18 conditions the

grant of certiorari before judgment on a showing that the issues
on appeal require "immediate settlement in this Court."

Thus,

if petitioner asks this Court to hear its appeal before the
Ninth Circuit has an opportunity to offer an intermediate
ruling, petitioner must not only show the need for immediate
review, which intervenors concede, but also facilitate immediate
review by the Court.

Nonetheless, petitioner has not proposed

an expedited briefing schedule, which would allow for resolution
of this appeal by the Court prior to July 19, 1981, or by any
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date in the near future.

It is

responden~s

who have proposed an

expedited briefing schedule, and intervenors urge this Court to
adopt that schedule as reasonably calculated to facilitate
immediate resolution by this Court and - more critically resolution by July 19, 1981.
Accordingly, intervenors join in respondents' request
that the Court require simultaneous opening briefs by June 19,
1981; simultaneous reply briefs by June 23, 1981; and oral
argument on June 25, 1981.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, intervenors request that the
petition be granted and that the Court adopt the briefing
schedule proposed by respondents.
Respectfully submitted,

Thomas G. Shack, Jr.
Raymond J. Kimball
Gregory de Sousa
Christine Cook Nettesheim
On the brief:
John B. Beaty
James A. Stenger
Thomas D. Silverstein

ABOUREZK, SHACK & MENDENHALL, P.C.
1129 Twentieth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 293-5900
Counsel for Intervenor
Islamic Republic of Iran

Cl~ ~tt--:!-/-r'-4
El1hu Inselbuch
E. Paul Kanefsky
GILBERT, SEGALL & YOUNG
430 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
( 212) 644-4000

June 10, 1981

Counsel for Intervenor
Atomic Energy Organization of
the Government of Iran
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

**********
October Term, 1980

**********
DAMES & MOORE, a partnership,
Petitioner,
vs.
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION OF
UNITED STATES TO EXPEDITE
BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Petitioner Dames & Moore files this memorandum in
reply to the Government's motion for expedited consideration
of the petition for writ of certiorari and expedited briefing
and oral argument if the petition is granted.

Petitioner joins in the request for expedited
consideration of its petition and does not oppose an
expedited briefing schedule if the Court grants review.
Petitioner, however, does oppose the Government's suggested
briefing schedule.

The Gov ernment has proposed that the Court require
the parties to file opening briefs by June 19, 1981, reply
briefs on June 23, 1981 and hold oral argument on June 25,

-2-

1981.

This schedule is unreasonable in light of the

significant constitutional issues presented that deserve the
deliberate and detailed attention of both the litigants and
the Court.

For the same reason, we strongly oppose the

Government's suggestion that this case be decided summarily.

If the Court grants certiorari, we suggest that the
Court set as a schedule for simultaneous briefing and
argument the following:
June 26, 1981 --

Opening Briefs by each
party must be filed and
served by hand on the opposing
party.

June 30, 1981 --

Reply briefs for each party
must be filed and served by
hand on the opposing party.

July 2, 1981 --

Oral argument.
Respectfully submitted,

C. S~HOWARD,
Counsel of Record,
MERLIN W. CALL,
MILES N. ROTHBERG,
WILLIAM C. SCHWEINFURTH,
JEFFREY M. HAMERLING,
TUTTLE & TAYLOR Incorporated,
Attorneys for Petitioner
Dames & Moore.

Of Counsel:
Stanley C. Fickle
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-2078
DAMES & MOORE, A PARTNERSHIP, PETITIONER
v.
DONALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENTS

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States and
the Secretary of the Treasury, urges the Court to grant the
petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment to the United
\ ~

\

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case.
The district court's decision upholds the authority of the
President to revoke licenses for attachments of assets in which
Iran has an interest, to order the transfer of these assets in
compliance with the terms of the Agreement with Iran, and to
suspend claims against Iran that may be presented to the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal.

The district court's decision

therefore is consistent with holdings of the

Co~rts

of Appeals

for the First and District of Columbia Circuits, the only two
courts of appeals to have ruled on these questions.

Although the

district court's decision in this case is correct and there is no

!
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conflict among the circuits on the question presented in the
petition, we request the court to review these questions under
the extraordinary procedure of certiorari before judgment because
of the absence of binding precedent in other circuits -particularly the Second Circuit -- that similarly establishes the
authority of the President to require the transfer of Iranian
assets held by domestic banking institutions in those circuits by
the July 19, 1981, deadline provided in the Agreement with
Iran.

A decision by this Court prior to July 19 will furnish
the orderly disposition of the more

elsewhere that involve claims against the Government
of Iran and its instrumentalities and controlled entities.
l.a.

On December 19, 1979, petitioner filed suit in the

United States District Court for the Central District of
California

against the Government of Iran, the Atomic Energy

Organization of Iran, and a number of Iranian banks that,
petitioner asserts (Pet. 5), had been nationalized by the
Government of Iran.

Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Organization

of Iran, et al., No. 79-04918 LEW (Px) (C.D. Cal.).

Petitioner

alleged that it was a party to a written contract with the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), under which it was to conduct
certain site studies for a proposed nuclear power plant in Iran.

l_)

The contract was terminated by AEOI on June 30, 1979, for

the convenience of AEOI, as provided in the contract.

In its

complaint against the Iranian defendants, petitioner alleged that

1 / Actually, the complaint states that the party to the
contract was a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner, Dames &
Moore International, S. R. 1., and that this entity had assigned
its entire interest under the contract to petitioner. For
convenience, we will regard petitioner as the party to the
contract.
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it was owed $3,436,694.30 for services performed under the
contract prior to the date of termination.
The contract with AEOI provided that if any dispute arising
thereunder could not be resolved by agreement between the
parties, the dispute would be submitted to

conciliation~

and,

if neither party was satisfied with the results of conciliation,
"the matter shall be decided finally by resort to the courts of
Iran" (Pet. 7 n.2).

In its complaint in the action against the

Iranian defendants, petitioner alleged that it had sought a
meeting with AEOI for purposes of final settlement of all matters
relating to the contract but that AEOI "has continually postponed
said

mee~ing

(Complaint,
b.

and obviously does not intend that it take place"
~27).

In its suit against the Iranian defendants, petitioner

sought to recover the $3,436,694.30 that was allegedly owing,
plus interest, on breach of contract and related theories.

The

district court issued orders of attachments directed against
property of the defendants, and property of certain bank
defendants was thereby attached to secure any judgment that might
be entered against them. __
3_1

On January 27, 1981, petitioner

moved for summary judgment against AEOI and the Government of
Iran (but not the Iranian banks).

The motion was accompanied by

affidavits attesting to the amount owing under the contract and with a
request pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) to prohibit AEOI

2 I Each party had the right to appoint one conciliator, with a
third conciliator to be appointed by the Plan and Budget
Organization of the Government of Iran. Pet. 7 n.2.
3 I Although we have not seen documents itemizing the attached
assets, we have been informed by counsel for petitioner that some
of the assets on which attachments were obtained are held by
domestic banking institutions and are therefore assets that must
be transferred by July 19, 1981.

- 4 and the Government of Iran from introducing any evidence in
opposition to petitioner's motion for summary judgment as a
sanction for AEOI's failure to comply with petitioner's discovery
requests.
On February 18, 1981, the district court granted
petitioner's motion for summary judgment against AEOI and the
Government of Iran for the amount claimed under the contract,
plus interest.

AEOI and the Government of Iran filed a notice of

appeal from this judgment on March 20, 1981.

Petitioner

attempted to execute on this judgment by obtaining writs of
garnishment and execution in state court in the State of
Washington, and a sheriff's sale of Iranian property was noticed
in Washington to satisfy the judgment (Pet.
18)._1_}

5-6; Pet. App. 15-

However, by order of May 28, 1981, as amended by order

of June 8, the district court stayed execution of the judgment
pending the appeal of that judgment by AEOI and the Government of
Iran (Pet. App. 106-107).

On May 28, 1981, the district court

also ordered that all pre-judgment attachments obtained in the
suit against the Iranian defendants be vacated and that further
proceedings against the bank defendants be stayed (id. at 107).
2.

On April 28, 1981, petitioner filed the instant suit for

declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States and
the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking to prevent enforcement of
the Executive Orders and Treasury Department regulations
implementing the Agreement with Iran in a way that would
adversely affect its separate action against the Iranian
defendants (Pet. App. 1-12).

~hose

Executive Orders and

4 / Petitioner did not obtain a pre-judgment attachment of
assets of the Government of Iran or AEOI, the two defendants
against whom judgments were entered.
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regulations generally revoke licenses for attachments of Iranian
property, prevent the acQuisition of any interest in such
property and order the transfer of the property as reQuired by
the Agreement and Executive Orders, and suspend claims that may
be presented to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Executive
Orders 12277-12281, 12294 (Pet. App. 36-54); 31 C.F.R. 535.201
(1980); 31 C.F.R. 535.213 et seQ., as amended (Pet. App. 5586).

Petitioner contended that these Executive Orders and

regulations are unconstitutional to the extent that they affect
its final judgment against the Government of Iran and AEOI,
petitioner's execution on that judgment in the State of
Washington, petitioner's pre-judgment attachments of assets of
the Iranian bank defendants, and petitioner's ability to continue
to litigate against the bank defendants, against whom judgment
had not been entered (Pet. App. 7-11).
By order dated May 28, 1981, the district court denied
petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed
petitioner's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted (Pet. App. 106-107).

By order dated June

8, 1981, the district court stated that its orders denying a
preliminary injunction and dismissing the complaint were based on
the arguments presented by the government in its motion to
dismiss and its memorandum in support of that motion (Pet. App.
161).

The government's motion to dismiss and the memorandum in
up~

the district court, are

reproduced at Pet. App. 88-105.
On June 3, 1981, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from
the order denying a preliminary injunction and dismissing the
complaint (Pet. App. 163-164), and the appeal has been docketed
in the court of appeals (id. at 162).

On June 8, 1981, the

- 6 district court entered an injunction pending appeal preventing
the federal government from requiring the transfer of Iranian
property that is subject to any writ of attachment, garnish-ment,
judgment, levy or lien issued by any court in favor of petitioner
(Pet. App. 167-168).

Petitioner now seeks certiorari before

judgment to review the decision of the district court.

3.

The decision of the district court in this case, which

is based on the government's arguments in support of its motion
to dismiss, is plainly correct.

It is also consistent with the

decisions of the First and District of Columbia Circuits, __
5_1 the
only courts of appeals that have addressed the President's
authority to revoke licenses for post-blocking order attachments
of Iranian assets, to order the transfer of Iranian assets, and
to provide for suspension of claims that may be referred to the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.

See Chas. T. Main Int'l,

Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, No. 80-1027 (1st Cir.
May 22, 1981); American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, No. 80-1779 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 1981) (opinion filed June 5,
1981) . _§___/

-

Decisions of the district courts -- including two

others in the Ninth Circuit --also have unanimously sustained
______._;;>

the authority of the President to revoke licenses for post-

to order the transfer of property
that had been subject to such attachments.

See Security Pacific

National Bank, et al. v. Government and State of Iran, No. CV 79-

j

5 I None of the losing parties in the First or District of
Columbia cases has thQS far sought review in this CoQrt or
announced its intention to do so.
6 I Copies of these opinions are attached as appendices to this
memorandum.

- 7 4661-RJK (C.D. Cal. April 30, 1981)._]_}

Blount Brothers Corp.

v. Government of Iran, Civ. Action No. C79-l4424 (W.D. Wash. May
7, 1981); Unidyne Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 80-1029A (E.D. Va. Mar. 30,

1981).~

And, finally, the Ninth Circuit

has denied a stay pending appeal in the Blount Brothers case of
an order vacating an attachment, thereby allowing that attachment
to lapse ._2_}
Ordinarily, in view of these consistent and plainly correct
rulings of the lower courts sustaining the President's
authority,lO

I we would not acquiesce in certiorari (particularly

certiorari before judgment) in a case raising these same
issues.

The government sought to sustain the President's

authority in the lower courts, as has been done thus far, and

7 I An appeal has been taken by the claimant in one of these
fOUr consolidated cases, and the government has moved to
intervene in the court of appeals ~nd for summary affirmance.
8 I Copies of these district court opinions were furnished to
the Court by petitioner in Electronic Data Systems, Iran v. The
Social Security Organization of Iran, No. 80-2035, cert. deniea
(June 8, 1981).
9 I The Ninth Circuit cited the "broad executive powers"
conferred by the International Economic Emergency Powers Act, 50
u.s.c. (Supp. III) 1701 et ~· The district court order
vacating the attachment in Blount Brothers became effective on
June 6, 1981, when the claimant did not seek further review in
this Court.
10 I In its op1n1on of June 7, 1981, the district court in
Electronic Data Systems, Iran v. The Social Security Organization
of Iran, et al., No. CA3-79-218-F (N.D. Tex.), concluded that the
President does not have authority to suspend claims that may be
referred to arbitration. The district court conceded that there
was ''ample precedent" for the Executive to settle such claims
when United States courts recognized a broad doctrine of immunity
of foreign sovereigns from suit (op. 13), but concluded
essentially that this power had been implicitly divested by
passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (op. 13-14, 2024). That conclusion is in error. See note 14, infra.
Moreover, in EDS, the claim had been reduced to judgment before
the United States entered into the Agreement with Iran, and the
district court relied in part on the existence of that judgment
(op. 24).
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thereby, it was hoped, to eliminate the necessity for review by
this Court except by way of denial of a petition for certiorari
or denial of applications for stays of orders vacating
attachments.

However, at the present time, there has still been

no decision on these questions by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.

The absence of controlling precedent in that

circuit is particularly significant, because there are more than
150 cases involving claims against Iran pending in the Southern
District of New York, and the largest portion of the financial
assets held by domestic banking institutions that must be
transferred by July 19 are in that circuit.

On June 5, 1981,

following promulgation of the latest Treasury regulations, the
Department of Justice has requested all district courts -including the Southern District of New York -- where Iranian
asset cases are pending that these courts vacate orders of
attachment prior to June 19, 1981.

That date is the date on

which the Department of the Treasury indicated that it would seek
civil and criminal sanctions against banks that did not transfer
financial assets to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as
required by the regulations.ll_)

Similarly, on June 9, 1981, the

government filed a motion in the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit requesting that court to vacate attachments in the 96
consolidated cases pending there without waiting for further
proceedings by the district court on remand.

See New England

Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission
Co., Nos. 790, 1049-1144, 1145-1224, 1225-1227 (2d Cir. April 9,

11 / See the government's Supplemental Memorandum, filed June 5,
1981, in Electronic Data Systems, Iran v. The Social Security
Organization of Iran, supra.
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1981), slip op. 2436 (retaining jurisdiction of these cases
pending remand for further proceedings).l2

I

Principles of sound judicial administration also weigh
strongly in favor of certiorari before judgment here.

There are

more than 400 cases involving claims against Iran pending in
district courts around the country.

Review by this Court, which

alone can furnish precedent that will control in all district
courts, will allow for the orderly disposition of these cases and
remove any remaining uncertainty about the validity of Executive
orders and regulations implementing the Agreement with Iran.
For these reasons, the instant case plainly is one of
"imperative public importance" req_uiring "immediate settlement in
this Court" by means of certiorari before judgment.
18.

S. Ct. Rule

If the Court grants certiorari in this case, the Department

of the Treasury will not seek to impose criminal and civil
sanctions on persons who do not transfer assets to the Federal

12 I Despite these most recent efforts to obtain a prompt
decision from the courts in the Southern District of New York and
the Second Circuit, we cannot be confident that those courts will
reach a decision within the time req_uired for the timely transfer
of bank-held assets to the Federal Reserve Bank for subseq_uent
transfer pursuant to the Agreement with Iran. Moreover, although
we believe that the decisions of the First and District of
Columbia Circuits are compelling precedent, if the Second Circuit
or Southern District should nevertheless conclude that the
President was without authority in some respects to enter into
and implement the Agreement with Iran, the government would
intend to seek immediate review in this Court in order that bankheld assets would be transferred by July 19. Because the
Southern District and the Second Circuit have not yet ruled,
there would be even less time for this Court to consider a
petition for certiorari in those circumstances than there is
here. We note as well that there has been no controlling ruling
on the merits of these q_uestions in the Ninth Circuit, although
decisions of three district courts in that circuit have sustained
the President's authority and the Ninth Circuit has denied a stay
pending appeal in one of the cases. We therefore believe that
the most prudent course involves immediate review by this Court
in the instant case, which presents the same issues.

-
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Reserve Eank by the June 1 9 deadline set f orth in the June 4
revisions of the Treasury regulations (Pet. App. 152).
4.

If the Court concludes that the petition for a writ of

certiorari before judgment should be granted, the Court may wish
to consider summary affirmance of the district court's order on
the basis of the thorough opinions of the Courts of Appeals for
the First and District of Columbia Circuits in Chas. T. Main
International, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, et al.,
and American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
supra.

For the Court's convenience, we are appending copies of

those opinions to this Memorandum.

We are also appending a copy

of the government's brief in the latter case, which fully sets
out the arguments in favor of the Presidential action challenged
here.ll_)

Although the questions presented are indisputably of

major public importance because of the number of claimants and
cases affected, and plainly require immediate resolution, we
believe that these questions are not particularly difficult and
that the attached materials furnish a fully adequate basis on
which to decide them.

See S. Ct. Rule 23.1.

Petitioner obtained attachments of assets of the Iranian
bank defendants after November 14, 1979, when President Carter
issued Executive Order 12170 (44 Fed. Reg. 65729) freezing
Iranian assets in this country.

After issuance of that Executive

Order, pre-judgment attachments of Iranian assets could only be
obtained by means of a license obtained from the Treasury.
C.F.R. 535.201, 535.203, 535.310 (1980).

31

The Department of the

Treasury issued a blanket license for judicial proceedings with

13 / See also the government is memorandum in support of its
motion to dismiss the complaint in the district court (Pet. App.
90-105).
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respect to Iranian property, including pre-judgment attachments
(31 C.F.R. 535.418, 535.504(a) (1980)), but entry of a final
judgment was expressly barred by the regulations (31 C.F.R.
535.504(b)(l) (1980)).

However, such orders and licenses were

explicitly made revocable at any time (31 C.F.R. 535.805
(1980).

Thus, petitioner was on notice when it obtained its pre-

judgment attachments that the license for such attachments could
be revoked at any time.
183, 187 (1953).

See also Orvis v. Brownell, 345 U.S.

Thus, no unfairness to petitioner resulted when

the President revoked these licenses and the district court
ordered the attachments vacated.

As explained in the opinions of

the First and District of Columbia Circuits, the President's
actions revoking the license for attachments and rendering those
attachments of no legal effect were plainly authorized by the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

No lower

court decision has taken a contrary position.
The First and District of Columbia Circuit opinions also
amply sustain the power of the President to settle claims against
Iran by providing for arbitration of those claims, particularly
in the context of the grave international crisis resulting from
the seizure of American hostages.

See also 22 U.S.C. 1732.l1_}

Under Executive Order 12294 (Pet. App. 52), petitioner's claim
against Iran is only suspended pending its presentation to the
Claims Tribunal; its claim need not be dismissed outright.

If

that Tribunal determines that it does not have jurisdiction of

14 / Petitioner's contention that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act implicitly divested the President of his authority
to settle claims is in error for the reasons given by the First
Circuit in its Charles T. Main opinion, at 20-21. That Act dealt
with the question of immunity to suit, not
whether the
plaintiff in a suit against a foreign sovereign has stated a
claim on which relief could be granted.

- 12petitioner's claim, the claim may be react i vated in district
court (Executive Order 12294, Section 3).

If the Tribunal

determines that petitioner should recover on its claim, that
determination operates as a discharge of Iran's obligation only
upon full payment of the award (ibid., Section 4).

Thus,

petitioner's claim in district court would be preserved if the
award were not paid.
Hence, the President has provided a reasonable and fully
ade~uate

means for resolving claims against Iran and, consistent

with the purposes of IEEPA, has assured the presence of funds to
pay arbitration awards out of the Iranian assets that were frozen
on November 14, 1979.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for
a writ of certiorari before judgment should be granted, and the
judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

WADE H. McCREE, JR.
Solicitor General
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
June 11, 1981 Conference
Supplemental List

(

1.

Motion by the Bank Markazi
Iran to Intervene

2.

Motion by Sperry Corp., et al.
to file an amici brief

3.

Petr's response to SG's motion
to Expedite

No. 80-2078
DAMES

&

MOORE

v.
REGAN, Sec. of Treasury,
et al.
SUMMARY:
a resp.

The Bank Markazi . Iran seeks leave to intervene as

Sperry Corp and Sperry World Trade, Inc. seek leave to

file an amici brief.

Petr concurs in the SG's request for expedition,

but proposes a different schedule.
CONTENTIONS:

(1)

·------

Bank Markazi Iran is the central bank of Iran

and holds and regulates the monetary reserves and currency of Iran.
At the time of the blocking order, Bank Markazi held over $3 billion
in its New York branch and various commercial banks throughout the
United States.

Bank Markazi argues that it is a real party in interest

1/A preliminary memorandum was prepared and circulated
June 10, 1981.

on
I

- 2 -

because most of the assets to be transferred on July 19 are its
assets.

Bank Markazi also · claims standing to intervene because

it was a party to a companion case in the DC.

The DC considered

the companion case at the same time as it considered the case that
is now before the Court.

Therefore, Bank Markazi' s failure to

formally move to intervene in this action before the DC should not
be determinative.
(2)

Sperry seeks leave to file an amici brief because it has

also filed suit against Iran and obtained a prejudgment writ of
attachment against Iranian assets in this country.

Petr consents

to the filing of the amici brief.
(3)

Petr joins in the request for expedition.

However, petr

suggests that the briefing schedule prop'o sed by the SG "is unreasonable
in light of the significant constitutional issues presented."
suggests the following

Petr

~chedule:

June 26 - opening briefs filed and exchanged
June 30 - reply briefs filed and exchanged
July

DISCUSSION:
remedy.

2 - oral argument

(1)

Intervention in this Court is an extraordinary

Intervention will normally be granted "only for the most

imperative of reasons and where one's interests may otherwise be
lost."

Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice, 5th Ed. page 436.

Although Bank Markazi is clearly interested in this litigation,
its interests are not directly at stake.

If the Islamic Republic

of Iran is allowed to intervene (see preliminary memorandum), Iran
should adequately present and protect its bank's interests.

Such

..

·~;,

.

- 3 arguments that Bank Markazi wishes to raise that differ from the
arguments advanced by Iran 'may be presented in an amicus brief.
(2)

Sperry's motion to file an amici brief should be grar.ted.

The Court is usually liberal in accepting timely amici briefs.

(3)

The only difference between the schedule proposed by the

petr and the schedule proposed by the SG is that petr advances the
due date for the initial briefs from June 19 to June 26.
between opening briefs and reply briefs (4 days)

The time

is the same as is

the time between reply briefs and argument (2 days).
Although the issues are important, petr should be sufficiently
familiar with the issues to file a meaningful brief by June 19.

The

major advantage of the SG's schedule is that it will allow for argument and possibly resolution before the July 4 weekend.

(

6/11/81
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June 11, 1981 Conference
Supplemental List
No.

80-2078

DAMES

&

MOORE

v.

1.

Petition for Certiorari

2.

Motion of the SG to Expedite

3.

Motion of Islamic Republic
of Iran, et al. to Intervene

REGAN, Sec. of the Treasury,
et al.
SUMMARY:
(80-2035)

Unlike the Electronic Data Systems Corp., Inc. petn

considered last week, this petn squarely raises the issue

of whether the President may vacate attachments on Iranian funds and
transfer said funds to the Central Bank of Algeria on July 19.

The

SG, while defending the President's authority, does not oppose the
petn and requests that the petn be expedited in order than an opinion
may issue before the end of the Term.

The SG has proposed an expedited

schedule which the Court may wish to adopt.
In addition, Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization of the

(

government of Iran seek leave to intervene as resps.

-

2 -

On Nov. 4, 1979, the

BACKGROUND:

American Embassy in Tehran · was seized ' and its personnel were held
as hostages.

On Nov. 15, 1979,

Pre~ident

Carter, acting under the

International Economic Emergency Powers Act ( IEEPA) , 50 U.S~ C.
§§1701-1706, issued regulations that, inter alia, blocked the removal
or transfer of Iranian assets in the United States except according
to the terms of licenses accompanying the blocking order or later
·issued pursuant to it.

See 31 C. F. R. Part 535 (19 80) (this order is

hereafter referred to as "the blocking order") •
importance is 31 C.F.R. §535.203(e)

Of particular

(1980) which states:

Unless licensed or authorized pursuant
to this part any attachment, judgment, decree,
lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process is null and void with respect to
any property in which on or since the effective
date there existed an interest in Iran.
In Dec. 1979, petr filed a suit in the DC (Central District
of California) against Iranian government agencies to collect
approximately $3,500,000 in unpaid invoices.

On Dec. 20, 1979,

Jan. 4, 1980, Feb. 4, 1980 and May 12, 1980, the DC issued prejudgment writs of attachments against Iranian assets.

On Feb. 18, 1981,

the DC entered a final judgment for $3,788,930.79 plus interest in
favor of petr.

In March two superior courts in the State of

Washington issued writs of execution and garnishment in enforcement
of the DC's judgment.

Apparently a sheriff's execution sale of

certain Iranian property in Washington has been noticed.
Meanwhile, on Jan. 21, 1981, President Carter issued a series

1/
of executive order implementing the Algerian Declarations.-

(

These

1/These declarations signed by Warren Christopher on Jan. 19,
1981,-set forth the agreements between the United States, Algeria
and Iran which led to the release of the hostages. The declarations
are set forth as Exhibit D at pages 21 through 35 of the appendix to
the petn.

-

3 -

Executive Orders (Nos. 12,279, 12,280, 12,281) nullified attachments on Iranian property in the Unite'd States.

They also required

persons holding such assets to transfer the assets to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and provided that persons who transferred
the assets would not be held liable for such actions.
On Feb. 24, 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12,294.

This Order ratified the Executive Orders issued by

President Carter and "suspended" all claims against Iranian assets.
The Order and the regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department
implementing the order require that all claims be presented to the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal provided for in the Algerian
Declarations.

In furtherance of the Algerian Declarations, the

United States apparently intends to tran'sfer some $4 billion of
Iranian assets to the Central Bank of Algeria on or before July 19,
1981.
Petr felt that the United States' acts were interfering with
its prosecution of petr'· s claims and therefore filed a second action
in the DC.

Petr requested:

(1) a preliminary and permanent injunc-

tion enjoining the government from interfering with petr's actions
again?t Iran; and (2) a declaratory judgment that the Algerian
Declarations and the Executive Orders and regulations purporting
to implement the Declarations, to the extent that they authorized
interference with petrs' actions, were beyond the constitutional
and statutory powers of the President and therefore void.
Petr moved for a preliminary injunction and the government
sought dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be gran ted.

On May 28, the DC denied the motion for a pre-

..

·~

.

- 4 liminary injunction and granted the government's motion to
dismiss.

Petr filed a notice of appeal to the CA 9 on June 3

and on June 8, the DC granted petr

a stay prohibiting the

government from transferring, pending appeal, any Iranian assets
which are subject to a writ of attachment, garnishment, judgment
or lien in favor of petr.
On June 10, petr filed the petn for

prejudgment writ of cert

at bar.
Both the CA 1 and the CADC have considered the President's
authority to suspend claims against Iranian assets and to transfer
those assets out of the country and both courts held that the
President has such authority.

Chas. T. Main International, Inc.

v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, ·

F.2d

(CA 1, May 22,

1981) and American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran,

F.2d

(CADC, June 5, 1981).

opinions explaining their judgments.

Both courts issued lengthy

However, the claimants in

those actions have yet to seek review in this Court.
In another case in the DC for the

C~ntral

District of California,

Security Pacific National Bank v. Government and State of Iran,
No. Cv. 79-4661-RJK (CD Cal., Apr. 30, 1981), Judge Kelleher
apparently held that the IEEPA authorized the vacation of attachments and the dismissal of pending claims.
Perhaps the most important action is pending in the CA 2.

New

England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and
Transmission Co., Nos. 1049, et al., consists of some 96 consolidated
cases in which the government seeks to have attachments vacated.
I

The CA 2 has yet to render its decision.

..

-

5 -

Finally, as the Court knows, the DC for the DC of Texas

(

has enjoined the government, from transferring Iranian assets that
are subject to writs of attachments issued before the blocking
I

order of Nov. 15, 1979.

The case is preseritly before the CA 5

and the Supreme Court has denied a petn for prejudgment review.
Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Social

Secu~ity

Iran, No. 80-2035, cert denied June 8, 1981.

Organization of

In the case at bar

the initial lawsuit was filed, and the writs of attachment issued,
after the blocking order.
PETR'S CONTENTIONS:

Petr recognizes that a prejudgment writ

will only issue "upon a showing that the case is of such imperative
public importance as to justify the deviation from normal appellate
practice and to require immediate settlement in this Court."

(

Petr

argues that the case presents novel and fundamental questions of
\...._.,.

law going to the core of the separation of powers set forth in the
Constitution.

Furthermore, time is truly of the essence because:

(a) by June 19, all Iranian assets must be transferred to the Federal
Reserve Bank; and (b) by July 19, the government will transfer these
assets out of the country.
Basically, petr argues that the President does not have the
authority either pursuant to statute or pursuant to his inherent
power over foreign affairs to compromise the legal rights and property
interests of private citizens, particularly where as here the citizens
have pursued judicial proceedings authorized by Congress.

This

requires a determination of (a) what the Executive Orders and
regulations really do;

(

(b) the authority conferred on the President

by IEEPA, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and possibly the

..

-

Hostage Act of 1868, 22

6 -

u.s.c.

§1732 (1976);

inherent power to control foreign

aff~irs;

(c) the President's

and (d) the nature of

petr's interest affected by the Executive Orders and regulations.
THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO EXPEDITE:

In order that the govern-

ment can meet its obligation to transfer the assets by July 19, the
SG requests that the Court expedite its consideration of the petn.
The SG acquiesces in the grant of the writ and suggests that, if
the Court does not summarily affirm, the Court adopt an emergency
briefing schedule.

The SG suggests the following schedule:

June 19 - 3:00 p.m. - Opening briefs by each party
filed and served by hand on
opposing parties
June 2 3 - 3: 0 0 p.m .. - Reply briefs by each party
filed and served by hand on
opposing ' parties

June 25

- Oral argument

To facilitate such a schedule, the SG recommends (a) that the Court
immediately announce its decision on scheduling; and (b) that the
requirement for printing the briefs and the joint appendix be
temporarily lifted and the appendix and briefs be accepted in typewritten form.
The SG explains that in order to comply with the July 19 deadline,
the government will need at least seven days after this Court's
opinion (assuming it is favorable to the

g~vernment)

to settle the

numerous pending cases and arrange for the transfer.
IRAN'S MOTION TO INTERVENE:

The Islamic Republic of Iran and

the Atomic Energy Orgnization of Iran (AEOI) seek leave to intervene
as resps because:

(1) the assets in issue belong to Iran;

(2) petr's

..

- 7 underlying judgment is against AEOI; and (3) Iran's interests differ
from the government's.

Iran alleges that the judgment against

AEOI was entered unlawfully after the Algerian Declarations were
agreed to and after President Carter issued Executive Orders
implementing the Declarations.

Iran has an immediate ownership

interest in the assets and will be the beneficiary of the transfer
of the assets.

The government, on the other hand, merely wishes

to make a good faith effort to comply with the Declarations.

Iran

suggests that its presence as a resp is essential to insure that
the Court is presented with a complete picture of the Iranian assets
controversy.
Iran and AEOI have tendered their brief in·acquiescence to
the petn for cert.
DISCUSSION:

The government does not oppose the motion.
1.

Merits.

This petn presents truly novel issues.

The Executive Orders and the regulations in issue require that
private citizens release their claims to certain Iranian assets in
this country and forego judicial remedies at least temporarily in
favor of their resolution by an internation tribunal.

Even assuming

that the President clearly had the authority to promulgate these
changes, their scope mandates an opinion from this Court.
however

Furthermore,

clear the outcome, the issues are fairly complex (the CADC's

opinion covers 46 pages and the CAl's opinion covers 25 legal-size
pages).

This Court's interpretation of (a) the Executive Orders

and the regulations;

(b) two or three statutes authorizing the

President to decide particular issues of foreign affairs;

(c) the

scope of the President's inherent power - over foreign affairs; and

(

~

(d) the nature of petr's interest in the Iranian assets will control not

only the 400 Iranian assets cases but will also establish the ' guidelines

- 8 for numerous future cases. As the country becomes increasingly involved
in international business and affairs, the federal courts can expect
to be called upon to resolve conflicts between citizens, the government and foreign ·countries.

Petr compares the importance of this

case to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343

u.

S. 579 (1972).

While this may be an overstatement, the case does appear to deserve
plenary consideration.
2.

Expedition.

The July 19 deadline for the transfer of

assets presents a very real emergency.

The loss of the funds will

irreparably harm petr and petr is powerless to avoid that harm.
The government must either transfer the funds or face an international
crisis.

Theoretically the government and Iran could agree to extend

the deadline but considering the relationship between the two

(

countries, this is merely wishful thinking.

Now that the controversy

is squarely before the Court, the Court has a responsibility to
resolve it before July 19.
As the novelty, importance and complexity of the issues presented appear to rule out summary affirmance or reversal, the adoption
of the SG's proposed schedule appears reasonable.

The complexity of

the issues suggests that a further reduction in briefing time would
not be productive.

However, as all parties are familiar with the

issues and have the benefit of the opinions by the CA 1 and the CADC,
they should be able to prepare meaningful briefs within the time
allotted.
The Court may wish to tentatively schedule argument for July 25.
This will allow preparation for argument· and should the Court subsequently determine that argument is not warranted, the argument
date can always be vacated.

..

/

- 9 -

3.

Intervention.

Although intervention in this Court is a

remedy seldom invoked and rarely -grant'e d (see Stern

&

Gressman,

Supreme Court Practice, 5th Ed., pages 433-438), the Court may
wish to grant Iran and AEOI leave to intervene.
are parties to two parallel cases below.

The intervenors

However, petr chose to

seek cert on the action against the government.

Iran and AEOI's

interests in the action differ fundamentally from the government's.
The government may · wish to adhere to the Algerian Declarations but
it has not real interest in the assets.

Iran has an immediate

ownership interest in the funds, regardless of the legality of the
Declarations.

Furthermore, if Iran and AEOI are allowed to intervene,

as far as American law is concerned, they will be bound by the
Court's decision.
Should the Court determine not to grant the motion to intervene,
Iran and AEOI should be allowed to file an amici brief.
CONCLUSION:

The novelty, importance and complexity of the

issues presented recommend that the Court grant the writ and give
the case plenary consideration.

The July 19 transfer date recommends

that the Court adopt the abbreviated briefing schedule proposed by
the SG.

Iran's and AEOI's unique interests in the litigation and

the advantages inherent in binding them to the Court's decision
suggest that they be granted leave to intervene as resps.
To facilitate consideration, this office in conjunction with
the Clerk's office has presumed to prepare alternate proposed orders
which are attached to the memorandum.
6/10/81
\ .........,.,.

Schickele

PJC

,.

I

'

PROPOSED ORDER IN:
Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, et al.,
No. 80-1078
The Motion of Islamic Republic of Iran and the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran for leave to intervene as. a party
respondent is denied.
(or granted}
The petition for a writ
of certiorari is granted. The motion of the Solicitor General
for an expedited schedule is granted. The parties shall
exchange and file opening briefs by 3:00 p.m. on June 19, 1981
and any reply briefs shall be exchanged and filed by 3:00 p.m.
on June 23, 1981. Oral argument is set for June 25, 1981 at
10:00 a.m.

OR

(

The motion of Islamic Republic of Iran and the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran for leave to ' intervene as a party
respondent is denied.
(or granted}
The petition for a writ
of certiorari is granted. The motion of the Solicitor General
for an expedited schedule is granted. The parties shall
exchange and file opening briefs by 3:00 p.m. on June 19, 1981
and any reply briefs shall be exchanged and filed by 3:00 p.m.
on June 23, 1981.
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JAMES E. PATTERSON,
Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

NO. 80-6657

HANS J. SCHACHT, OTIS J.
ABERNATHY, JAMES LEWIS,
RALPH JOHNSON, NEIL
GUNTER, WESLEY BOYD HINCHEY,
KENNETH GORDON, THEODORE
FRANKEL, and THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA,
Appellees-Respondents,

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

William E. Hoffmann, Jr.
TROTTER, BONDURANT, MILLER
& HISHON
2200 First National Bank Tower
Atlanta, Georgia 30383
(404) 688-0350
Attorney for Appellee-Respondent
Theodore G. Frankel

IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE UNITED STATES
JAMES E. PATTERSON,
Appellant-Petitioner,

v.
HANS J. SCHACHT, OTIS J.
ABERNATHY, JAMES LEWIS,
RALPH JOHNSON, NEIL
GUNTER, WESLEY BOYD HINCHEY,
KENNETH GORDON, THEODORE
FRANKEL, and THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA,

NO. 80-6657

Appellees-Respondents,
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
Appellee-Respondent THEODORE G. FRANKEL {hereinafter
"Frankel") respectfully moves this Court to Dismiss the Appeal
of Appellant-Respondent JAMES E. PATTERSON (hereinafter
"Patterson"), on the ground that the Appeal is not made in
conformity with the Rules of this Court and on the further
ground that the Appeal is frivolous and incomprehensible.
Rule 12 requires an Appeal to be docketed not more
than 90 days after the entry of the judgment appealed from.
The judgment appealed from in this case was entered on December
29, 1980 and the case was not docketed in this Court until
April 9, 1981, a total of 101 days after the entry of
judgment.

The Appeal, therefore, should be dismissed as not

timely filed.
If this Appeal is treated as a Writ of Certiorari, it
is untimely under Rule 20.

Rule 20 requires that the Writ be

applied for within 60 days of the judgment sought to be
reviewed and this time limit may not be extended for more than
30 days.
Rule 15 has to do with the form of the Jurisdictional
Statement filed with the Court.

Section .l(a) requires that

all questions be presented in a short and concise manner
without unnecessary detail.

Patterson's jurisdictional

statement is long, rambling and at times unintelligible.
Section .l(b) requires a list of parties within the
Jurisdictional Statement if the parties are not listed in the
caption.

Patterson is inconsistent with the list of parties in

his various

captions~

it is not clear who the parties are.

At

least one "party" Jeffrey Smith was not a party below.
Section .l(e) requires a concise statement of the grounds
alleged for jurisdiction.

Patterson's alleged grounds for

jurisdiction are rambling, unclear

a~d

unintelligible.

Since the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia is a party, Patterson failed to
comply with Rule 28 by failing to serve the Solictor General,
Department of Justice.
There are numerous, less serious violations of · the
Rules of this Court.
Aside from violations of the Rules of the Court,
Patterson's Appeal is frivolous, incoherent, unintelligible,
and not subject to a rational response.
For the foregoing reasons, Frankel respectfully
requests this Court to dismiss Patterson's Appeal, and if the

-2-

Court should deem Patterson's filing to be a Petition for
Certiorari, that this Court deny the Petition.
This

/tJtP

day of June, 1981.

William
Attorney fo
pellee-Respondent
Theodore G. Frankel
OF COUNSEL:
TROTTER, BONDURANT, MILLER
& HISHON
2200 First National Bank Tower
Atlanta, Georgia 30383
(404) 688-0350
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I, William E. Hoffmann, Jr., do hereby certify that I
have this day served the within and foregoing pleadings by
mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record in an envelope
properly stamped and addressed as follows:
James E. Patterson
1004 Vernon Street
LaGrange, Georgia 30240
Robert J. Castellani, Esq.
Attorney
Room 428
U. S. Courthouse
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

u. s.

John M. Taylor, Esq.
Lewis, Hunnicutt, Taylor & Daniel, P.C.
304 Church Street
P. 0. Box 1027
LaGrange, Georgia 30240
Steven E. Fanning, Esq.
Attorney-at-Law
32 South Court Square
P. o. Box 220
LaGrange, Georgia 30263
Linda R. Birrell, Esq.
Ga. Assistant Attorney General
132 State Judicial Bldg.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
Mr. Jerry Willis
P. o. Box 508
LaGrange, Georgia

30241

Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
This

~

day of June, 1981.

No. 80-2078
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

DAMES & MOORE, a partnership,
Petitioner,
vs.
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents,
and
BANK MARKAZI IRAN, THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF IRAN and THE ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION
OF IRAN,
Intervenors.

MOTION OF 26 IRANIAN BANKS, DEFENDANTS
IN DAMES & MOORE V. ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION
OF IRAN, TO INTERVENE

1/
The movants, 26 Iranian commercial banks- which are all
named parties defendant in the underlying Dames & Moore action
described in the petition for certiorari herein, move for leave

1/
- Bank Melli Iran, Industrial Credit Bank, Industrial and Mining
Development Bank of Iran, International Bank of Iran, Agricultural
Development Bank of Iran, Bank of Tehran, Agricultural Cooperative
Bank of Iran, Bank Bazargani Iran, Bank Bimeh Iran, Bank Iranshahr,
Bank Dariush, Bank Kar, The Bank of Iran and the Middle East, Bank
of Omran, Bank Pars, Bank Rafah Kargaran, Bank Sakhteman, Bank Sanaye
Iran, Bank Sepah, Bank Shahryar, Banque Etebarate Iran, Development
and Investment Bank of Iran, Distributors Cooperative Credit Bank,
The Foreign Trade Bank of Iran, Iranians' Bank, and Mortage Bank
of I ran.

to intervene in the present case, scheduled for argument before
this Court on June 24.

Statement
The 26 moving bank defendants were among the 30 Iranian
defendants named by petitioner in Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, No. CV-79-04198 LEW (Px), brought in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
in 1979.

Among the other named defendants in this underlying action

was Bank Markazi Iran, whose motion to intervene in the present case
has already been granted by this Court.

Like Bank Markazi Iran, the

moving bank defendants were among the parties whose assets were
attached pursuant to writs issued by Judge Waters.
In the underlying Dames & Moore action, the moving bank defendants challenged subject matter and personal jurisdiction, as well
as the propriety of the writs of attachment issued against their
assets.

And, following the Algerian Declarations, they argued to

Judge Waters the validity and applicability of the Declarations and
ensuing executive orders.

The present action against Secretary Regan

and the United States was commenced by Dames & Moore on April 28,
1981.

While the moving bank defendants, like Bank Markazi Iran, were

not technically parties in the present action, because of its clear
implications for their interests and position, fourteen of the moving
bank defendants -- those who had been served with process in the
underlying action -- were granted leave by Judge Waters to participate in the

litigation~

and they did in fact participate below.
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Argument
TH E MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD BE GRANTED
The 26 moving bank defendants were all named as parties
defendant in the underlying Dames & Moore litigation and have
participated at every stage in the proceedings.

Judge Waters

ruled that the moving bank defendants were subject to the jurisdiction of the District Court and made their assets subject to
attachment.

Later, in the related action brought by Dames &

Moore against Secretary Regan and the United States, the court
vacated the attachments against property of the moving bank defendants and stayed proceedings in the underlying action.

The

moving bank defendants will be directly affected by this Court's
determination of the present action.
Moreover, although the present action is the only Iranian
assets litigation now before this Court, the Court's decision
will control proceedings in over 100 other suits in which the
moving banks or similarly situated Iranian commercial banks were
named as defendants and had their assets attached.

These include

several in which the issues now before the Court have been ruled
upon.

The moving bank defendants briefed and argued the appeals

in the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Second
Circuits, and were heard earlier this month in the Iranian assets
proceeding before United States District Judge Kevin T. Duffy in
New York.
In the present action, the Court has already granted the
motion of Bank Markazi Iran to intervene.

The moving bank de-

fendants are similarly situated, being co-defendants of Bank
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Markazi Iran in the underlying action and would be equally
affected by t his Court's determination.

Moreover, unlike

Bank Markazi Iran and other i ntervenors, the moving bank
defendants actually participated in Dames & Moore's suit
against Secretary Regan and the United States, through the
filing of their own brief.
Conclusion
We urge the Court to grant this motion to intervene.

We

are prepared to meet the briefing schedule set by the Court and
to present oral argument on June 24.
Respectfully submitted,

Daniel P. Levitt
Michael S. Oberman
Greg A. Danilow
Alan R. Friedman
Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Soll
Attorneys for 26 Iranians Banks
919 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 688-1100

Robert A. Seefried
Allan s. Hoffman
Seymour, Seefried & Hoffman
1901 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036
(202) 452-1711
Local Counsel
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WASHINGTON, D .

c.

20036

(2021 661-0666

BY HAND

*MEMBER DISTRICT or COLUMBIA BAR

Mr. Alexander L. Stevas
Clerk of the United States Supreme Court
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C.
20543
Re:

Dames & Moore v. Donald T. Regan, et al.,
No. 80-2078

Dear Mr. Stevas:
In connection with the above-referenced matter, we
respectfully lodge copies of the following two opinions:
(1) the Opinion filed June 11, 1981 by Judge Duffy of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in The Marschalk Company, Inc. v. Iran National Airlines
Corp., et al. [79 C1v. 7035 (CBM)]; and (2) the Memorandum
Opinion and Order and Judgment filed June 7, 1981 by Judge
Porter of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas in Electronic Data Systems Corporation,
Iran v. The Social Secur1ty Organization 9f the Government of
Iran, et al • . (No. ~A3-79-218-F).
We are providing copies of this letter to counsel of
record for the United States and for intervenors the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Bank Markazi.
Very truly yours,
TUTTLE & TAYLOR

c.

S.J.,.-k- H~

By
C. Stephen Howard
Attorneys for Petitioner
Dames & Moore
CSH:cb
Enclosures
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80-2078 Dames

&

M.o ore v. Regan and the United States

This brief memo for the file is dictated to record
my initial impressions of CADC's opinion in the American
International Group and Pfizer cases.
CADC's judgment order, entered May 22, and
followed on June 5 with its opinion, (i) vacated all
outstanding attachments and prejudgment restrains (the
attachments having been obtained pursuant to revocable
licenses); (ii) remanded the cases with instructions to stay
further proceedings; and (iii) denied the government's
request to vacate the award of partial summary judgments.
Following seizure of the hostages, and on November
15, 1979, the President - acting under the International
Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), issued regulations
blocking the removal or transfer of Iranian assets except
according to the term of licenses.

Apparently a general

license was issued authorizing judicial proceedings against
Iran, with some exceptions.
CADC's opinion (p. 9) contains an excerpt from an
affidavit by Secretary Haig that warned, should the courts
refuse to free the Iranian assets "the whole structure of
the agreements may begin to crumble, and there could be set
in motion a series of

~ctions

and reactions that would have

serious consequences have both for the claimants and for the
"'

,,

2.

foreign policy of the United States".
Haig's entire statement.

I would like to see

I wonder what serious consequences

could result, since we now both the hostages and the assets.
We made the agreement under the most lawless sort of
coercion and blackmail.

In the private world, it would be a

nullity • ..,.
~~".'

-.

Part II of CADC's opinion involved a request that

the cases be remanded to the District Court.

It is

presently irrelevant.
,:

•

Part III addresses, and rejects, the argument that
the agreement with Iran - not having been approved by the
Congress - violated the separation of powers doctrine.

~ If

indeed IEEPA can fairly be read as authorizing the President
to do what he has done, there would be no violation.

The

question I would like to have examined carefully by my
clerks is whether IEEPA does so authorize the President.
·':;t;"y,tll; ''

.i!:,fi'

Suppose, to take a hypothetical, that Libya had

seized Billy Carter (his beer formula and all), and that in
order to free his brother, the President declared an
emergency, and agreed to the release of all Libyan assets in
the United States - with American claims to be resolved by a
three party tribunal composed of a KGB agent, a North
Vietnamese commissar and Jane Fonda?

If the Act gives a

President power as broad as he exercied where 53 hostages
were involved, and where an argument can be made that the
agreement was not wholly irrational if Congress had

I

'

'•'t,

. (.\

!

3.

authorized such action, where does this power end?

Who has

authority to determine whether an emergency did in fact
exist?

Who has authority to decide whether the ransom - in

this came release of $4 billion of Iranian assets - was fair
and reasonable in the circumstances?

Putting it differently

does the President have an absolute, unreviewable right to
do what Carter did?*
r'

Part IV holds that the President had authority to
revoke licenses issued that permitted prejudgment restraints
(attachments) upon Iranian assets.

The President vacated

the attachments and -pursuant to §1702(a) (1) of IEEPAnullified the judgments in those cases.

I suppose if IEEPA

is valid, revocation of the licenses would be valid also.
It is said that the licenses were revocable.

I suppose we

should check that.

*My fiypotnetical may not be too good an example. From what
one reads in the press, President Carter would have been
glad to leave Billy in Libya - indefinitely.

'·

4.

·~

Part

v holds that the President also had authority

"to suspend the claims of appellees (all American claimants
against Iran).

The opinion, at this point, is talking

primarily about President Reagan's Executive Order 12294 of
February 24, 1981.

That order stated that "all claims which

may be presented to the Claims Tribunal [are] suspended ••• "

,,
,,.'>;

eilr.·
...!i ·.r
.·~·
. ... l::.'
<.
:'C"
:·
.

CADC emphasized that the President did not order

r

litigation suspended or that the power of the courts
consider claims be suspended.
respect to the claims only".

Rather, "he acted with
Therefore, no action was taken

to modify or affect the jurisdiction of the courts, only the
"substantive rule of law" was modified by the order.

p. 24 • .

Putting it differently, CADC said:
"We are persuaded that the difference between
modifying federal court jursidction and
directing the courts to apply a different
rule of law on appeal is a meaningful one."
p. 25

The opinion repeatedly emphasized that the order •;'
"modified the law" - I suppose by suspending the claims so
that the assets could be freed.

See pp. 26-27.

;*'~'''

In sustaining the President's power to do
CADC noted that there was "only suspension, not
cancellation", and that the President "has provided an
alternative

fo~urn

capable of providing meaningful relief".

CADC accordingly "concluded that the President did possess

',,

s.
such inherent power". p. 27. ' It should be noted here that
the court's decision was based on inherent power, and not on
IEEPA.

In reaching this conclusion, CADC expressed

agreement with CAl.

See fn. 15, p. 27,28.

lf?f~:~~·~r~:

Without reading the cases, I have no basis for

~
'

i!

agreeing or disagreeing with CADC - except a high level of
skepticism.

This does seem to me to be a rather

extraordinary view of presidential power:

t

that a President,

.,;t

~; i

after declaring some emergency - not necessarily an IEEPA
~

emergency - may by executive fiat change substantive law.

Suppose there were a federal statute that expressly forbade
a President from doing what has been done in this case.

I
..

would hardly think any President, by virtue of inherent
power, could suspend the operation. A first reading
CADC's opinion on this issue leaves me less than
enthusiastic.

'

I would like enlightenment

Part VI considers the "taking issue", concludes
that it is not ripe, that there has been no taking up to

"

this point, and that there may well be a right to sue in the
Court of Claims - probably under the Tucker Act.
I would like for a clerk to develop a memorandum
on this issue.

Pages 37-42 of CADC's opinion are relevant.

The memorandum should state exactly what CAl and CADC have
said with respect to compensation, and should recommend what
we should say or hold on this issue. One can predict with a

-{\

i
~-

6.

fair degree of certainty that once the Ayatollah gets the
assets out of the United States, there will be substantial
shortfalls in the settlement of just debts.
CADC may well be right in concluding that the
taking issue is not before the court if we should hold that
the President had the power to free the attached assets,
return them to Iran, and commit American creditors to
present their claims to a stacked tribunal - with no
provision in the agreement or any present order (as I
understand it) for recovery from the United States of unpaid
just claims.

* * *
I add one further question:

Is it not true that

~

Congress enacted all of the relevant statutes to protect and
greserve the rights of

u.s.

citizens against foreign

governments where assets were subject to the jurisdiction of
our courts?

If so, do these statutes also authorize a

President to use the power granted to endanger - if not
nullify

such rights?

What does the legislative history

reveal?

L. F. P. , Jr.

ss

' '

l

~,~.

.'
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This brief memo for the file is dictated to record
my initial impressions of CADC's opinion in the American
International Group and Pfizer cases.
CADC's judgment order, entered May 22, and
followed on June 5 with its opinion, (i) vacated all
outstanding attachments and prejudgment restrains (the
attachments having been obtained pursuant to revocable
licenses): (ii) remanded the cases with instructions to stay
further

proceedings~

and (iii) denied the government's

request to vacate the award of partial summary judgments.
Following seizure of the hostages, and on November
15, 1979, the President - acting under the International
Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) , issued regulations
blocking the removal or transfer of Iranian assets except
according to the term of licenses.

Apparently a general

license was issued authorizing judicial proceedings against
Iran, with some exceptions.
CADC's opinion (p. 9) contains an excerpt from an
affidavit by Secretary Haig that warned, should the courts
refuse to free the Iranian assets "the whole structure of
the agreements may begin to crumble, and there could be set
in motion a series of actions and reactions that would have
serious consequences have both for the claimants and for the

.

.

2.

foreign policy of the United States".
Haig's entire statement.

I would like to see

I wonder what serious consequences

could result, since we now both the hostages and the assets.
We made the agreement under the most lawless sort of
coercion and blackmail.

In the private world, it would be a

nullity.
Part II of CADC's opinion involved a request that
the cases be remanded to the District Court.

It is

presently irrelevant.
Part III addresses, and rejects, the argument that
the agreement with Iran - not having been approved by the
Congress - violated the separation of powers doctrine.

If

indeed IEEPA can fairly be read as authorizing the President
to do what he has done, there would be no violation.

The

question I would like to have examined carefully by my
clerks is whether IEEPA does so authorize the President.
Suppose, to take a hypothetical, that Libya had
seized Billy Carter (his beer formula and all), and that in
\

order to free his brother, the President declared an
emergency, and agreed to the release of all Libyan assets in
the United States - with American claims to be resolved by a
three party tribunal composed of a KGB agent, a North
Vietnamese commissar and Jane Fonda?

If the Act gives a

President power as broad as he exercied where 53 hostages
were involved, and where an argument can be made that the
agreement was not wholly irrational if Congress had

'

'

'

3.

authorized such action, where does this power end?

Who has

authority to determine whether an emergency did in fact
exist?

Who has authority to decide whether the ransom - in

this came release of $4 billion of Iranian assets - was fair
and reasonable in the circumstances?

Putting it differently

does the President have an absolute, unreviewable right to
do what Carter did?*

Part IV holds that the President had authority to
revoke licenses issued that permitted prejudgment restraints
(attachments} upon Iranian assets.

The President vacated

the attachments and- pursuant to §1702(a} (1} of IEEPAnullified the judgments in those cases.

I suppose if IEEPA

is valid, revocation of the licenses would be valid also.
It is said that the licenses were revocable.

I suppose we

should check that.

*My hypothetical may not be too good an example. From what
one reads in the press, President Carter would have been
glad to leave Billy in Libya - indefinitely.

4.

Part V holds that the President also had authority
"to suspend the claims of appellees (all American claimants
against Iran).

The opinion, at this point, is talking

primarily about President Reagan's Executive Order 12294 of
February 24, 1981.

That order stated that "all claims which

may be presented to the Claims Tribunal [are] suspended ..• "
CADC emphasized that the President did not order
litigation suspended or that the power of the courts to
consider claims be suspended.
respect to the claims only".

Rather, "he acted with
Therefore, no action was taken

to modify or affect the jurisdiction of the courts, only the
"substantive rule of law" was modified by the order.

p. 24.

Putting it differently, CADC said:
"We are persuaded that the difference between
modifying federal court jursidction and
directing the courts to apply a different
rule of law on appeal is a meaningful one."
p. 25

The opinion repeatedly emphasized that the order
"modified the law" - I suppose by suspending the claims so
that the assets could be freed.

See pp. 26-27.

In sustaining the President's power to do this,
CADC noted that there was "only suspension, not
cancellation", and that the President "has provided an
alternative forum capable of providing meaningful relief".
CADC accordingly "concluded that the President did possess

5.

such inherent power". p. 27.

It should be noted here that

the court's decision was based on inherent power, and not on
IEEPA.

In reaching this conclusion, CADC expressed

agreement with CAl.

See fn. 15, p. 27,28.

Without reading the cases, I have no basis for
agreeing or disagreeing with CADC - except a high level of
skepticism.

This does seem to me to be a rather

extraordinary view of presidential power:

that a President,

after declaring some emergency - not necessarily an IEEPA
emergency - may by executive fiat change substantive law.
Suppose there were a federal statute that expressly forbade
a President from doing what has been done in this case.

I

would hardly think any President, by virtue of inherent
power, could suspend the operation. A first reading of
CADC's opinion on this issue leaves me less than
enthusiastic.

I would like enlightenment from my clerk.

Part VI considers the "taking issue", concludes
that it is not ripe, that there has been no taking up to
this point, and that there may well be a right to sue in the
Court of Claims - probably under the Tucker Act.
I would like for a clerk to develop a memorandum
on this issue.

Pages 37-42 of CADC's opinion are relevant.

The memorandum should state exactly what CAl and CADC have
said with respect to compensation, and should recommend what
we should say or hold on this issue. One can predict with a

6.

fair degree of certainty that once the Ayatollah gets the
assets out of the United States, there will be substantial
shortfalls in the settlement of just debts.
CADC may well be right in concluding that the
taking issue is not before the court if we should hold that
the President had the power to free the attached assets,
return them to Iran, and commit American creditors to
present their claims to a stacked tribunal - with no
provision in the agreement or any present order (as I
understand it} for recovery from the United States of unpaid
just claims.

* * *
I add one further question:

Is it not true that

Congress enacted all of the relevant statutes to protect and
preserve

~he

rights of

u.s.

citizens against foreign

governments where assets were subject to the jurisdiction of
our courts?

If so, do these statutes also authorize a

President to use the power granted to endanger - if not
nullify - such rights?

What does the legislative history

reveal?

L.F.P., Jr.
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80-2078 Iranian Case
At the Conference scheduled for June 18 we have a

request from the Second Circuit to receive certification of
questions in the above case.

This is styled No. 80-2126

Iran National Air Lines v. Marschalk.

The papers include a

very long list of lawyers and the names of parties whom they
represent.
Both Peter Byrne, Sally and I have reviewed this
list with some care.

We find no company in which there is

any stock ownership problem.

But United Virginia Bank is

listed among the clients of Coubert Bros. as party to a case
against Industrial Credit Bank of Iran - I suppose this is
one of the cases pending in CA2.
In a talk this afternoon with Bob Buford, general
counsel for UVB, I find that there is no problem.

UVB, to

the extent of $4,000,000 was in a consortium of bank that
lent several hundred million dollars to Iran or some
government agency there.

UVB was not one of the lead banks,

but merely took a relatively small participation in the
loan.

But UVB has been paid in full, and Bob thinks that

only the lead banks retain a pecuniary interest in the case.
We discussed the possibility of a claim being made in the
event Iran wins, to reinstate the loan - i.e. to return the
$4,000,000 that in fact is owned by UVB.

.,

·,.

Bob says no such

2.

claim has been made, none is expected and he thinks it is
wholly improbable that any such claim can or would be
asserted.
In short he saw no reason to notify me of any
interest of UVB, and sees no reason why I should not
participate.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss
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FILED

JUN 1'7 1981
No. 80-2078

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,
CLERK

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1980

DAMES & MOORE, a Partnership, Petitioner,

v.
DONALD T. REGAN, ET AL., Respondents.

On Petition for Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

MOTION TO PARTICIPATE AS AMICUS CURIAE
AT ORAL ARGUMENT AND FOR AN ENLARGEMENT
OF TIME FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Electronic Data Systems Corporation Iran ("EDS")
respectfully moves this Court for leave to present oral argument as amicus

curia~/ in this case pursuant to Rule 38,

subdivisions 3, 4 and 7 of the Rules of this Court, and, for
this purpose, for an enlargement by ten minutes of the time
set for oral argument.
This Court granted certiorari in the instant case
which presents three expansive questions of extraordinary
national importance involving some of the most serious

*/ EDS will file a motion for leave to file a brief amicus
curiae together with the accompanying brief in this case,
pursuant to Rule 36 of this Court, by 3:00 p.m. on June 19,
the time established by this Court for the simultaneous
filing and exchange of briefs.
EDS is a subsidiary of E.D.S. World Corporation,
whose parent is Electronic Data Systems Corporation.

--

- 2 questions as to the allocation of powers among the co-equal
branches of our tripartite form of government ever to be
submitted to this Court.~/
EDS seeks this leave solely to present argument on
a position, different from that of any of the parties, on
the principles that should be applied to the broad questions
now before the Court in this case.

Those questions compre-

hend two specific issues which neither Dames & Moore nor
any other litigant, other than EDSi has any direct interest
in placing before this Court -- but which have critical
constitutional ramifications:
1.

The power of the Executive to nullify or

negate a pre-freeze attachment of funds held in custodia
legis; and
2.

The power of the Executive to nullify or

"suspend" an effective and enforceable judgment, secured
after full trial on the merits and prior to the Algerian
Declarations.
These specific questions constitute critical
aspects of the grave constitutional issues already before
the Court and thus Petitioner submits that this Court's task

*/
1. Whether the President has statutory or
!nherent constitutional authority to settle legally
enforceable claims of American citizens against foreign
states, agencies, and controlled entities pending in
United States courts and nullify judgments of United
States courts adjudicating such claims?
2. Whether the President has statutory or
inherent constitutional authority to nullify attachment
liens and judgment liens imposed by process of United
States courts on property of foreign states, agencies,
and controlled entities to secure or satisfy legally
enforceable claims and judgments of American citizens
and to order the transfer of such property out of the
reach of process of United States courts?
3. Whether Presidential action substantially
diminishing or destroying the value of legally enforceable claims of American citizens against foreign states,
agencies, and controlled entities is an unconstitutional
taking of property?

-

3 -

would be facilitated by argument directed to these specific
issues.
The facts of EDS' case which both Iran and the
Government have recognized as "unique" in their successful opposition to EDS' June 3, 1981 certiorari petition
(No. 80-2035), are that EDS "was one of the very few claimants that instituted suit and obtained attachments prior
to the November 14, 1979 blocking order, and was one of the
few claimants that obtained a judgment against Iran, albeit
after the blocking order."~/

The Government pointed out

that the "vast bulk of the over 400 Iranian cases involve
suits filed, and attachments obtained, after November 14,
1979, and have not gone to judgment" (id.) - - a concession
that aptly and clearly demonstrates that only EDS has an
adequate stake to address the complete ramifications of
the position asserted by the Government.
As a result of these "unique" facts, EDS has
an interest in addressing the consequences of the sweeping
issues now before the Court.

More importantly, this "unique"

position is not represented by the record of the case now
before the Court.
Both as a matter of fundamental fairness to EDS
~nd

to assure that the Court is fully apprised of the

constitutional effects of adjudicating the potentially
sweeping questions presented in Dames & Moore, EDS respectfully requests an opportunity to be heard.~/

*I
Memorandum of Federal Respondents in Opposition, June,
T981, at 7 n.8, in Electronic Data Systems Corp. Iran v.
Social Security Organization of Iran, No. 80-2035, cert.
denied (June 8, 1981); see Iran Brief in Opposition~ne 3,
1981, pp. 7, 13-14.
**/ It is respectfully submitted that adequate presentation
of this position would necessitate 10 additional minutes
to be allocated to EDS for oral argument.

- 4 Dated:

--

June 17, 1981

'i1u-..o W: L~· ~

Thomas W. Luce, III
Counsel of Record
M. David Bryant, Jr.
Eugene Zemp DuBose

Hughes & Hill
1000 Mercantile Dallas Building
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Electronic Data Systems
Corporation Iran
Of Counsel:
Monroe Leigh
Michael Sandler
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1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
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**********
DAMES & MOORE, a partnership,
Petitioner,
vs.
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED
STATES . OF AMERICA,
Respondents.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTIONS
OF INTERVENORS FOR TIME FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
AND DIVIDED ORAL ARGUMENT

C. Stephen Howard
Counsel of Record
Merlin w. Call
Raymond c. Fisher
Miles N. Ruthberg
William C. Schweinfurth
Jeffrey M. Hamerling
TUTTLE & TAYLOR Incorporated
609 South Grand Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90017
( 213) 683-0600
Attorneys for Petitioner
Dames & Moore
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Stanley C. Fickle
University of Indiana
Law School
Bloomington, Indiana 47401
(812) 337-7272

NO. 80-2078

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

**********
October Term, 1980

**********
DAMES & MOORE, a partnership,
Petitioner,
vs.
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.

/

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTIONS
OF INTERVENORS FOR TIME FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
AND DIVIDED ORAL ARGUMENT

Petitioner Dames & Moore does not oppose (1) the
Motion of Intervenor-Respondent The Islamic Republic of Iran
for Leave to Argue or, Alternatively, for Divided Argument or
(2) the Motion of Intervenor Bank Markazi Iran for
Englargement of Time for Oral Argument and for Divided Oral
Argument, provided that Petitioner is allowed equal
additional time in order to respond to the oral argument of
the Intervenors, both of whom will argue against Petitioner.

-2-

The overall allocation of time suggested by Bank

Markazi~/ is acceptable to Petitioner.
Dated:

June 17, 1981
Respectfully submitted,

E~~rH~~~

Counsel of Record,
MERLIN W. CALL,
RAYMOND C. FISHER,
MILES N. ROTHBERG,
WILLIAM C. SCHWEINFURTH,
JEFFREY M. HAMERLING,

TUTTLE & TAYLOR Incorporated
Attorneys for Petitioner
Dames & Moore.
Of Counsel:
Stanley C. Fickle

~I Petitioner Dames & Moore

50 minutes

Intevenor Bank Markazi

10 minutes

Intervenor Islamic Republic
of Iran

10 minutes

Respondent United States

30 minutes

,....
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I, Eldon V.C. Greenberg, a member of the Bar of this
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Elihu Inselbuch, Esq.
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430 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Leonard B. Boudin, Esq.
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky &
Lieberman, P.C.
30 East 42nd Street
New York, New York 10017
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
is true and correct.

Executed on June 17, 1981, at Washington, D.C.

Eldon V.C. Greenberg
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REQUIREMENT OF A JOINT APPENDIX

C. Stephen Howard
Counsel of Record
Merlin w. Call
Raymond C. Fisher
Miles N. Ruthberg
William C. Schweinfurth
Jeffrey M. Hamerling
TUTTLE & TAYLOR Incorporated
609 South Grand Avenue
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NO. 80-2078

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

**********
October Term, 1980

**********
DAMES & MOORE, a partnership,
Petitioner,
vs.
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.

MOTION TO DISPENSE WITH THE
REQUIREMENT OF A JOINT APPENDIX

Pursuant to Rule 30.7, Petitioner Dames & Moore
hereby moves to dispense with the requirement of a joint
appendix and to permit this case to be heard on the original
record and the Appendix filed with the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari before Judgment.

Petitioner and the Government have concluded that the
Appendix to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari before
Judgment, filed June 10, 1981, already includes all materials
which either party believes should be included in a Joint
Appendix.

Rule 30.1 provides that such materials, once

-2produced in the original Appendix, need not be reproduced
in a Joint Appendix.

Accordingly, Petitioner moves to

dispense with the Joint Appendix.

Petitioner has been authorized to state that the
Government and Intervenor Bank Markazi Iran support this
motion and that Intervenor Islamic Republic of Iran does not
oppose it.

For the above reasons, Petitioner respectfully
requests the Court to grant this motion to dispense with the
requirement of a Joint Appendix.

Dated:

June 17, 1981

Respectfully submitted,

c . >br&-- lbd;NWit
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Counsel of Record,
MERLIN W. CALL,
RAYMOND C. FISHER,
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TUTTLE & TAYLOR Incorporated,
Attorneys for Petitioner
Dames & Moore.
Of Counsel:
Stanley C. Fickle
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Leonard B. Boudin, Esq.
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky &
Lieberman, P.C.
30 East 42nd Street
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
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Executed on June 17, 1981, at Washington, D.C.
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JUN 18 1981
Mr. Alexander L. Stevas
Clerk of the
United States Supreme Court
l First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C.
20543

OntCt Of "fHE. CLc1\K
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

Re:

Dames & Hoore v. Donald T.
Regan, et al., No. 80-2078

Dear Mr. Stevas:
In connection with the above-referenced case, we
respectfully lodge 20 copies of the Memorandum Opinion and Order
issued by Judge Gesell in Kamran Mashayekhi and Claudia l1ashayekhi
v. Iran, and Iran National Radio and Televis1on, Clv. Act. No.
79-2039 (D.D.C. June 10, 1981).
We are providing copies of this letter and the Hemorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record for the petitioner, the
United S±ates, and intervenors, the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran and Bank Markazi.
Very truly yo urs,
ABOUREZK, SHACK & MENDENHALL, P.C .
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Thomas D. Silverstein
Counsel for the Islamic
Republic of Iran
TDS/psl

~

Enclosures

...

IN 'l'HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

CUUln·

FOR TilE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KAMRAN HASHAYEI<HI
and CLAUDIA HASHAYEKHI,

)
)
)
)
}

Plaintiffs,

v.

)

Civil Action No. 79-2039 ,

)
)
)
)
)
)

IRAN, and
IRAN NATIONAL RADIO AND
TELEVISION,
Defendants.

FILE 0
JIJ~i 101981

l1.EMORANDUM
This is a civil action for damages brought pursuant to
the Foreign Sovereign Inununities Act ("FSIA").
The issue now presented on defendants' motion to
dismiss is whether an Iranian citizen can invoke that Act to
recover money allegedly due him under his former employment
contract with an instrumentality of the Iranian Government
for work done in the United States.

The motion to dismiss

attacks the jurisdiction of tne Court and asserts, in the
alternative, that defend~nts are i~une from suit.
Plaintiff Kamran Mashayekhi!/ formerly worked as Bureau
Chief of the Washington, D. C., office of Iran National
Radio and Television, now known as Voice and Vision of the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
operated

a~

National Radio and Television

part of the Iranian Bureau of Information under

a budget established by the government.

It performed

informational and propaganda services from the United States.
As an arm of the Iranian government it developed radio and
television coverage of activities in the United States and
transmitted the material for use in Iran on the nationally
controlled radio and television network.

Dissemination in

Iran was effected in accordance with official policy.

!/

On

The claim of co-plaintiff Claudia Hashayekhi, an American
citizen and wife of Kamran Mashayekhi, was severed on he~
unopposed ..1otion by Order of the Co urt en April 22, 1981.
The severance was without prejudice to prosecution of her
claim through arbitration pur s uant to the Algerian Accord s
agreed to by the Unite d States and Iran. No provi s ion of
the Accords relates directly to Kamran Mashayekhi's claim.

occasion, the agency made available to American media
materi a l s fro m I r an.

\'Vith the fal1 of the Shah, plaintiff's

employment ceased and he went into hiding in this country.
His claim is for salary, benefits, and advances not
reimbursed.

To protect his position, he allegedly

appropriated from Voice and Vision two violins and other
valuable musical

instrlli~ents,

at least some of which he now

admittedly holds as security.

Voice and Vision has

counterclaimed for these items.
This case arises in the context of the Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the United
States of America and Iran, signed by the two nations in

L

I'

1955.

This Treaty has never been abrogated and has remained

in effect.

21

Under the FSIA, passed· by Congress in 1976,

what \vere then "existing international agreements" remained

f

I.

I
j

~alid

and superior to the FSIA wherever the

te~ms

concerning

inununity contained in the previous agreement conflict with
the FSIA.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976);

at 17-18, reprinted in {1976]

u.s.

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487

Code Cong. & Admin. News

6604, 6616.
Defendants contest federal jurisdiction, asserting that
this Court has no jurisdiction because the plaintiff is a
citizen of a foreign state suing defendants who both are
foreign entities, and the common law contract claim finds no
basis in any particularized grant of federal jurisdiction.
Relying on the reasoning of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in its recent decision in
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, C.A. No. 80-7413
(2d Cir., filed April 16, 1981), defendants contend that the
limited jurisdiction of the federal courts, as set forth in
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, does not extend
to claims such as the one presented here.

y

Although the

The treaty is printed at 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. 3853.
The continuing validity of the treaty has been recognized by
numerous courts revi e wing suits between citizens of the two
nations.

... . .

I
I
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FSIA appears to grant jurisdiction to the federal courts to
hear claims like those of plaintiff, see 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)
(1976), it is clear under the reasoning of Verlinden that
the Act cannot grant jurisdiction beyond those circumstances
for which there is some underlying consti tut.ional basis on
which that grant can rest.

Diversity, of co~rse, is not

available as a constitutional basis for the jurisdiction,
because all of the parties are foreign.

The issue, then, as

the Verlinden decision recognized, is whether this case in
some way "arises under" the laws of the United States.
Court finds that it does.

The

As the Second Circuit noted in

Verlinden, slip op. at 9, there are occasions on which the
national interest is sufficiently ·Strong to compel USe of a
federal rule of decision rather than state law, and in such
a situation there is federal jurisdiction.
Trust Co. v. United States, 318

u.s.

Cf. Clearfield

363 (1943).

That is

the si t'-.1ation here, where the heightened tensions beb1een
the two nations involved and the existence of hundreds of

.

suits have created an exceedingly strong federal interest in
consistent interpretation of the Treaty of Amity and its
immunity provisions as they are read in the light of the
FSIA.

Although this case is for breach of contract, the

meaning of the Treaty is at the core of any decision and the
strong federal interest in the interpretation of the Treaty
and the resolution of these numerous disputes is sufficient
to ground federal court jurisdiction.
Turning to the merits, defendants argue that the limited
waiver of immunity in Article XI of the Treaty of Amity does
not apply in this case and that plaintiff's claim is thus
barred.
11

In particular, defendants contend that the

enterprises" . for which immunity is waived under the Treaty

are only those \vhich are privately owned and controlled and
engaged in corn.TUcrcial activity for eco11omic gain within the
United States.

··

In support of this interpretation, defendants

... .
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have engaged in a careful analysis of the language of the
Treaty itself, and also have submitted a wide variety of
documentary evidence, including material dra\vn from
negotiating documents, governmental statements made in
connection with this and similar treaties, analyses by
commentators, and, perhaps most important, recent statements
by the United States that reflect the government's-present
interpretation of immunity under the Treaty.
Upon reviewing the material presented and the argumepts
of counsel, the Court agrees with defendants that the
governmental, not-for-profit nature of the activities of
Iran and of Voice and Vision fall within the scope of
aciivities for which . Iran and its instrumentalities have
retained immunity.

Neither Iran nor Voice and Vision has

waived its immunity by virtue of its activities under the
terms of the Treaty of Amity

~nd

that immunity will be

recognized, thus making it necessary to grant defendants'
motion to dismiss.
At oral argument, counsel for Voice and Vision made it
clear that its protective counterclaim for the return of the
musical instruments will not be pursued if plaintiff's claim
is dismissed on the grounds of immunity.
Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint
is granted.

The complaint is dismissed, without prejudice

· to all parties pursuing relief in other forums if they so
choose.

The counterclaim is withdrawn.

SO ORDERED.

~/

./ /J-4-:- .

~
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uNITEo STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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IN TilE UNI'l'ED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KAMRAN NASHAYEKHI
and CLAUDIA MASHAYEKI-II,

)

y
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

v.
IRAN, and
IRAN NATIONAL RADIO AND
TELEVISION,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 79-2039=

.Ju:·l 1 o ISS 1

ORDER

JAMES F. DA\'EY,. C:c:rl'

For the reasons set forth in the Court's Hemorandwn
filed this day, defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint
is granted.

The complaint is dismissed, without prejudice

to all parties pursuing relief in other forums if they so
choose.

The counterclaim is

~ithdrawn.

SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

June

/C) ,

1981.
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ORDER LIST
THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 1981
ORDER IN PENDING CASE
A-1046
(80-2078)

DAMES & MOORE V. REGAN, SECRETARY OF TREASURY, ET AL.
The joint application for a waiver of
the page limitation of the parties' briefs
on the merits addressed to the Chief Justice
and referr e d to the Court is granted.
The motion of petitioner to dispense with
printing th e joint appendix is denied.
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June 18, 1981 Conference
List 3, Sheet 4
Motion to Intervene

No. 80-2078

(

DAMES & MOORE

v.
REGAN, Sec. of Treasury
SUMMARY:

Twenty-six Iranian commercial banks, named party

defendants in the _companion action brought by Dames & Moore (petr)
in the DC, request leave to intervene as resps.
BACKGROUND:

The 26 banks were among the 30 Iranian defendants

named by petr in Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,
No. CV-79-04198 LEW (Px) , DC for Central Ca.

In this action the

banks challenged subject matter and personal jurisdiction as well
as the propriety of the writs of attachment.

Following the Algerian

Declaration and the ensuing executive orders, the banks argued their
validity.

..

- 2 Petr commenced a separate action in Apr. 1981 against the
Sec. of the Treasury and the government only.

The DC considered

the new case in conjunction with petr's other cases.

Petr sought

a prejudgment writ only on its action against the government.
INTERVENORS' POSITION:

The 26 banks argue that they, like the

Bank Markazi Iran which was granted leave to intervene, have a substantial interest in the underlying assets.

Not only were their

assets attached by petr but this case will decide the validity of
the attachments in over a hundred other cases.

The banks should

be allowed to intervene to protect their interests.
The banks also argue that their participation in petr's actions
before the DC gives them a particular familiarity with this action
which .may be helpful to the Court.
DISCUSSION:

Stern & Gressman's Supreme Court Practice, 5th Ed.,

page 436 suggests that "only for the most imperative of reasons
and where one's interest may otherwise be lost will the Court entertain a motion to intervene in pending proceedings before the Court."
In this case, the banks' interests in particular assets are
not in issue.

The issue is the President's autbority to vacate

writs of attachment lodged against the assets.

The President's

authority will be ably defended by the government and by Iran
and its central bank, the Bank Markazi Iran, which have been gran·ted
leave to intervene.
Thus, there does not appear to be a critical need to allow
the 26 banks to intervene.

However, should the Court be inclined

to bring as many interested parties into the litigation as possible,
the inclusion of the 26 banks will not broaden the issues presented
in the

c~se.

I

..

-

3 -

In light of the abbreviated schedule adopted in this case,

(

the Court may wish to anno\.mce its decision on the motion as soon
as a decision is reached.
There is no response.
6/16/81

Schickele

PJC

('-.J
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June 18, 1981 Conference
Supplemental List
No. 80-2078
DAMES

&

1.

Motion to Dispense with the
Requirement of a Joint
Appendix

2.

Motion to Participate as
Amicus at Oral Argument

3.

Motion for Leave to File
Amicus Brief

MOORE

v.
REGAN, Sec. of Treas., et al.

SUMMARY:
appendix;

( 1)

Petr requests leave to dispense with a joint

(2) Electronic Data Systems Corporation Iran requests

leave to present oral argument as amicus curiae; and (3)

Danie~,

Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall request leave to file an amicus brief.
All three requests were received on June 17.
CONTENTIONS:

(1)

Petr requests leave to dispense with the

requirement of a joint appendix because the Court has the original

record and the appendix to the petn for writ contains all the material:

(_

that both parties believe should be included in the joint appendix.

..

- 2 -

The government joins in the request and the intervenors either
support or do not oppose the
(2)

motion~

Electronic Data Systems Corporation Iran (EDS) requests

leave to present oral argument as an amicus.

EDS would like 10

minutes in which to argue the legality of the President's action
from the perspective of a claimant that has a pre-blocking order
writ of attachment.
(3)

Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall (DMJM) seek leave

to file an amicus brief.

DMJM had several contracts with Iranian

entities and has filed lawsuits against them.

DMJM suggests that

its amicus brief may be helpful to the Court because DMJM's contracts
had different forum selection clauses and DMJM has an actual final
judgment in its favor against an Iranian entity.

DMJM believes

that all parties would agree to the filing of an amicus brief but
time did not permit the gathering of their approvals.
DISCUSSION:

(1)

Rule 30.1 provides that if the items that

compose the joint appendix "have already been reproduced in a jurisdic
tional statement or the petition for certiorari complying with Rule
33.1 [they) need not be reproduced again in the joint appendix."

Here

the appendix to the petn contains all the materials and the Court
also has the original record.

Requiring a separate joint appendix

would not provide the Court with more information and may make it
difficult for the parties to comply with the abbreviated briefing
schedule adopted in this case.
(2)

EDS, an amicus, argues that its position is unique because,

unlike most claimants, it obtained a writ of attachment before the

(

President froze Iranian assets in the United States.

EDS seeks leave

-

(

3 -

to present its position in oral argument.
deny the request for several reasons·.

The Court may wish to

First, there is the need

to limit the number of counsel that will argue this case.

Second,

EDS's concern is not subject to the extreme time limitation that
this case presents.
writ.

EDS attempted to obtain a prejudgment petn for

This was denied in part because the Iranian assets subject

to EDS's writ of attachment will not be transferred out of the
country in July.

(EDS v. Soc. Sec. Org. of Iran, No. 80-2035, denied

June 8, 1981).
(3)

DMJM's amicus brief is timely, relatively short and may

be helpful to the Court.

No party will be prejudiced by the accept-

ance of the amicus brief.
There is no response.

(
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Supplemental List
Joiht Application for Waiver of
Page Limitation Presented to the
Chief Justice and Referred .to the
Court.
(Heretofore Denied by
Justice Rehnquist)

No. 80-2078

(

DAMES

&

MOORE

v.
REGAN, Sec. of Treas., et al.
CONTENTIONS:

The parties request waiver of the page limitation

for briefs (Rule 33).

Because the briefs were in prefaration and were

not submitted to the printer until the evening of June 17, the
parties could not represent with certainty the exact length of the
briefs.

However, the parties feel that there is a substantial likeli-

hood that the briefs will exceed the limit (65 pages) and request that
this be allowed "because of the importance and complexity of the
issues in the case, and because of the extraordinary time constraints
in preparing and printing the briefs."

The intervenors do not oppose

the application.

(~

..
,_./

- 2 DISCUSSION:

(

After Justice Rehnguist denied the application,

petr merely tendered a cover letter requesting that the application
be resubmitted to the Chief Justice.

The two-page application

simply states that the brief may be oversized and suggests that
the importance of the case and the time deadlines makes the extended
brief reasonable.
Neither the importance of a case nor an abbreviated briefing
schedule nor a combination of these factors should result in a per se
allowance of an oversized brief.

Particularly in a case such as this

where the Court is also subject to time pressures, the Court should
not be required to wade through an oversized brief unless it is clear
that the issues could not be presented in less pages.

As the

application fails to articulate which issues require an expanded

(-_;

discussion, the Court might deny the motion.
A denial of the motion might result in some slippage of the
briefing dates or the acceptance of Xeroxed briefs pending the
printing of the briefs.
There is no response.
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June 19, 1981

BY HAND
........... --Mr. Francis J. Lorson
Deputy Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
One First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C.
20543
Re:

j'Vl

)

)

Dames & Mo~re v. Donald T. Regan, et al.,
Supreme Cobrt of the United States,
Docket No. 80-2078

Dear Mr. Lorson:
As you know, on June 16, 1981, Baker & McKenzie, on
behalf of plaintiffs in 25 of the approximately 150 actions in
the Southern District of New York, moved pursuant to Rule 38.7 of
the Rules of this Court for leave to permit Lawrence w. Newman, a
partner in our firm, to present oral argument before this Court
on June 24, 1981 in respect of claimants' right to compensation
for the taking of their claims and attachments against Iran.
Pursuant to your request, enclosed as Attachment l is a
statement listing all parent companies, subsidiaries (except
wholly owned subsidiaries) and affiliates of each plaintiff in
the 25 actions, as described in Rule 28.1 of the Rules of this
Court.

Mr. Francis J. Lorson
Deputy Clerk
June 19, 1981
Page 2

The Court should be aware that plaintiffs in 17 other
actions in New York have joined in our moti o n a nd amici brief.
Accordingly, we also are enclosing, as Attachment 2, a Rule
28.1 statement for those other plaintiffs.

Yours ver~

M~urrows
MB:hpl
enclosures
cc: All Counsel of Record

Sedco, Inc.

Sedco, Inc.

Sediran Drilling
Company

Sediran Drilling
Company

Sediran Drilling Company v. NIOC,
79 Civ. 6ll6 (RJW)

Sediran Drilling Company v. NIOC,
79 Civ. 6ll7 (TPG)

Reading &
Corporatio
Reading & Bates
Exploration Co.

Sedco, Inc.

Cor~ra_ti_

Sedco International,
S.A.

Reading &
Reading & Bates
Corporation

Reading & Bates Corporation and
Reading & Bates Exploration Co. v. NIOC,
79 Civ. 6035 (GLG) ·

Sedco International, S.A. v. NIOC,
79 Civ. 6ll5 (WCC)

Reading &
Corporatio

Reading &
Corporatio

Reading & Bates
Exploration Co.

Reading & Bates
Drilling Co.

Reading &
Corporatio

PLAINT
PARE

Reading & Bates
Corporation

PLAINTIFF

Reading & Bates Drilling Co. v. NIOC,
79 Civ. 6034 (CSH)

Reading & Bates Corporation and
Reading & Bates Exploration Co. v.
National Iranian Oil Company ~'NIOC"),·
79 Civ. 4421 (KTD)

CASE CAPTION

RULE 28.1 STATEMENT IN DAMES & MOORE v. DONALD

Williams Brothers
International Corp.

Williams Brothers
International Corp.

Sedco, Inc., as
Assignee of Iran
Marine Industrial
Company

Otis Engineering
Corporation

Williams Brothers International
Corp. v. NIOC, 79 Civ. 6196 (LPG)

Sedco, Inc., as Assignee of Iran
Marine Industrial Company v. NIOC,
79 Civ. 6279 (LPG)

Otis Engineering Corporation v. NIOC,
79 Civ. 6484 (R WS)

PLAINTIFF

Williams Brothers International
Corp. v. NIOC, 79 Civ. 6195 (LPG)

CASE CAPTION

Hallibur

.. .-...

Sedco, I

The Wil
Compan

The Wil
Compa

PLAIN
PA

Readin
Corl?or

Enserch

The Wil
Compan

Houston Contracting
Company

IMCO Services
(U.K.) Ltd.

Ingersoll-Rand Co.

lra no-Reading &
Bates, S.S.K.

Enserch Service
Company of Iran

Williams Brothers
International Corp.

Houston Contra«.>ting Company v. NIOC,
79 Civ. 6489 (MEL)

IMCO Services (U.K.) Ltd. v. NIOC,
79 Civ. 6525 (LPG)

In~ersoll-Rand

Co. v. NIOC and
National Iranian Gas Co. ("NIGC"),
79 Civ. 6867 (RW&)

Irano-Reading & Bates, S.S.K. v.
NIOC, 79 Civ. 6831 (VLB)

Enserch Service Company of Iran v.
NIGC and NIOC, 80 C iv. 560 (WC C)

Williams Brothers International Corp.
v. NIOC, 80 Civ. 1099 (LPG)

~

•...

Ingersol
Compa

Hallibu

Sedco,

Sedco,
Houston Contracting
Company

Houston Contracting Company v. NIOC,
79 Civ. 6488 (GLG)

Hallibu

PL
P

Halliburton Limited

PLAINTIFF

Halliburton Limited v. NIOC,
79 Civ. 6485 (R WS)

CASE CAPTION

Enserc

Tair Lt
Enserc

Shirazi

Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.

Enserch Corporation

Tair Inc.
Intair<ril Ltd.

Shirazi v. Bank Markazi Iran,
80 Civ. 6117 (RO)

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Ministry of Mines and Light Industry
of the Gov't of Iran, World Express Co.,
Ministry of Tourism of the Gov't of
Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran,
81 Civ. 0283 (CLB)

Enserch Corp., Tair Inc. and
Intairdril v. NIOC, Islamic Re public of
Iran and lran<rlntairdril, S.S.K.,
81 Civ. 292 (LWP)

,. r.

B.A. T.
Limite

NONE

Sedco,

Houston Contracting
Company

Houston Contracting Company v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A. and Bank Tejarat,
80 Civ. 3441 (LPG)

Raythe

PLAIN
PAR

Compagnie Francaise
de Prospection
Sismique

PLAINTIFF

Compagnie Francaise de Prospection
Sismique v. NIOC, 80 Civ. 1980 (ADS)

CASE CAPTION

Brown & Root, Inc., Brown & Root, S.A. and
Brown & Root International Limited v.
Government of Iran, Civil Actioo No.
RS0-2961 (U.S. D. Ct. Maryland)

CASE CAPTION

Hallibur

Hallibur

Brown & Root
Internati mal
Limited

.. ~.

Hallibu

PLAIN
PA

Brown & Root, S.A.

Brown & Root Inc.

PLAINTIFF

Brown & Root, Inc., Brown & Root, S.A. and
Brown & Root International Limited v.
Government of Iran, Civil Action
No. RS0-0360 (U.S.D. Ct. Western
District Virginia)

CASE CAPTION

Hallibur
Hallibur

Brown & Root, S.A.
Brown & Root
International
Company

........

Hallibur

PLAIN
PAR

Brown & Root, Inc.

PLAINTIFF

Phillip Morris Incorporated v.
Government of Iran (Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran) and Iranian
Tobacco Company, 81 Civ. 0238 (VLB)
and 81 Civ. 0315 (LPG)

CASE CAPTION

Phillip Morris
I nccrpora ted

PLAINTIFF

r~
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Phill
Incc

PL
P
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Phillip Morris Incorporated (continued)

CASE CAPTION

PLAINTIFF

... . ....

PLAI
PA
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Offsrore International S.A.

American International Gro~, Inc.

American International Group, Inc.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
79 Civ. 6696 (GLG)

. .-.

C.V. S
Co., I

South
Resou
The O

NONE
Inter-Act Corp.

Offsoore International S.A. v.
Iran Pan American Oil Company,
et al., 79 Civ. 6483 (HFW)

NONE
Advanced Computer
Techniques Corp.

Advanced Computer Techniques Corp. and
Inter-Act Corp. v. Information Systems
Iran Organization, et al., 80 Civ.
0031 (LWP)

NONE

PLAI
PA

Esphahanian

PLAINTIFF

Esphahanian v. Iranian's Bank,
79 Civ. 6188 (VLB)

CASE CAPTION

Petrol

Repub
Corpo
Trade
Bank

Seahorse, Inc.

Republic National
Bank of New York

Seahorse, Inc. v. The Government of
Iran and Iranian Pan American Oil
Company, 80 Civ. 3933 (CBM)

Republic National Bank of New York
v. Bank of Tehran, et al., 79 Civ.
6371 (GLG)

r.

PLAI
P

Petrol

PLAINTIFF

Eastman Whipstock,
Inc.

CASE CAPTION

Eastman Whipstock, Inc. v. The
Government of Iran and Oil Services
Company of Iran, 80 Civ. 4932 (EW)

.,

NON~ -

NONE

Sou~he

McCullough &
Company, Inc.

Westinghouse
Electric Corporation

Westinghouse
Electric Corporation

Offshore International S.A.

Lockheed Corporation

McCullough & Company, Inc. v. The
Government of Iran and The Ministry
of Pests, Telegraph, and Telephone,
an Instrumentality of the Government
of Iran, 80 Civ. 0406 (R WS)

Westinghouse Electric Corporation v.
State of Iran, et al., 80 Civ. 0838 (LWP)

Westinghouse Electric Corporation v.
State of Iran, et al., 80 Civ. 0989 (HFW)

Offshore International S.A. v.
National Iranian Oil Company,
80 Civ.l744 (HFW)

Lockheed Corporation v. Government
of Iran, The Iranian Ministry of
War, The Iranian Air Force, The
Iranian Military Industries
Organization, and Iran Aircraft
Industries, 79 Civ. 6606 (WK)

Lockhe

Resour
The Of

NONE

Republ
Corpor
Trade
Bank

Republic National
Bank of New York

Republic National Bank of New York
v. Gicafour, Inc. et al.,
80 Civ. 1680 (VLB)

Republ
Corpor
Trade
Bank

PLAI
PA

Republic National
Bank of New York

PLAINTIFF

Republic National Bank of New York
et al. v. National Iranian Gas Co.,
et al., 80 Civ. 1679 (VLB)

CASE CAPTION

(Consortium) Joirt Venture S.A.
Enterprises, Jan De Nul and
Dragomar, S.p.A. v. Brown & Root
International, Ltd., Brown & Root
and The Natiooal Iranian Navy, the
Iranian Ministries of Defense, The
Government of Iran, et al.,
80 Civ. 0791 (PNL)

Lockheed Corporatioo (continued)

CASE CAPTION
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Jan De Nul and
Dragomar, S.p.A.
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6/21/81
80-2078 Dames & Moore v. Regan and U.S.
MEMORANDUM TO FILE
This memo is dictated as an aid to memory.

limited to the "taking" issue.

I have read the parties'

opening briefs and several of the amici briefs.
briefs have not yet been

It is

received~

Reply

nor have the memos I

requested from my clerks.
Among the briefs I have read, petitioner's is the
most helpful on the taking issue.

See also amici briefs

filed on behalf of Electronic Data Systems by Steptoe &
Johnson, and on behalf of Flag, Inc., by Covington &
Burling.

This memo is a brief, incomplete and unstructured

series of notes based primarily on petitioner's brief.
I am not at rest on the principal issues presented
by the present case:

(i) whether under the relevant

statutes, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA) (the sucessor statute to the Trading with the Enemy
Act), and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), the
President had the authority to enter into the Algiers
Agreement, and (ii) whether under his implied powers under
the Constitution the President had the authority - as
summarized by the SG's brief:
"(1) To terminate all legal proceedings
in the United States courts involving claims

·.~

-

'

2.

of United States persons and institutions
against Iran and its state enterprises: (2}
to nullify all attachments and judgments
obtained therein: (3} to prohibit all further
litigation based on such claims, and (4}
bring about the termination of such claims
through binding arbitration." (SG's brief, p.
7}, that I believe is a quotation from the
Algiers Agreement itself.
I view these questions as serious indeed, and
doubt that either the statutes or the Constitution were
every intended to confer this extraordinary power on a
President - apparently without review by Congress or the
courts, according to the SG.

Yet, for whatever reasons, two

Presidents now have approved the Agreement and its
provisions.

Moreover, Secretary Haig has filed an affidavit

that - in strong language - advises us that the foreign
policy of the United States would suffer "serious
consequences" if we fail to up hold the agreement.

I may

join such a judgment in the interest of our country, and
under the special circumstances that prevailed at an
election time with two Presidents - perhaps for different
reasons sharing responsibility and concurring.

I would

hope, however, if the Court so decides, that Congress acts
to restrict presidential power at least to the extent of
requiring congressional approval - as is true with respect
to all treaties.

* * *

3.

If the Court's judgment should be to affirm, my
view at this time - rather strongly - is that I could join
such a judgment only if we made clear (or at least left
clearly open) the taking question, and held that the Court
of Claims under the Tucker Act may entertain taking cases.
If the Court's opinion is not entirely clear to this effect,
I will write separately perhaps saying that my understanding
of the holding (unless it is categorically to the contrary)
is that the taking issue remains and may be litigated.
Petitioner's brief p. 33-43, is persuasive.
Footnote 32 (p. 34) recognizing that the taking
issue may not be ripe, and reserves its Fifth Amendment
claim if any of these events occur:
"(1) Petitioner is denied the opportunity to
present its claims to the arbitral tribunal;
(2) petitioner establishes that its rights
before the tribunal are demonstrably inferior
to its rights to obtain redress in federal
courts; or (3) petitioner's claim is
adjudicated by the tribunal but its recovery
is less than the amount it would have
obtained by proceeding on its judgment (and
attachment of Iranian assets) in federal
court".

In WJB's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
(March 24, 1981), that I joined, he said:
"When one persons is asked to assume more
than a fair share of the public burden, the
payment of just compensation operates to
redistribute the economic cost from the
individual to the public at large."

4.

I said the same thing in Agins.
point in Armstrong v. U.S., 364

The Court also made this

u.s.

40, 49.

If there ever was a case where a relatively small
group of Americans would bear the burdens of the Algiers
Agreements, this is it.

No one disputes that its purpose

was to resolve what Carter declared to be a major foreign
policy crisis and the citizens who benefitted specifically
were the hostages, their families and friends.*
In a word, in the event of any of the
contingencies occurring that are mentioned in fn. 32 (see
above}, the citizens who seem liley to suffer are American
creditors of Iran.

The petitioner in this case, like

several hundred other identifiable creditors, had valid
liens on assets that clearly were within the in rem
jurisdiction of United States courts.

Indeed, under the

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, there may have been in
personam jurisdiction also.

As the SG acknowledges the

agreement effects a change in the "substantive law" of the
United States to the disadvantage of these creditors.

The

SG is compelled to make this argument, as he relies on it
for his further argument that the agreement does not

*See brief of Flag, Inc., that points out the adverse
consequences of the agreement even for the hostages - who
are deprived, apparently, of the right to bring damage
suits.

,

.. "'

·~

il-

•

'

j

•

5.

violate the separation of powers by removing the
jurisdiction of federal courts.

I therefore conclude

without difficulty that the nullification of petitioner's
attachments, judgment and judgment liens constitutes a
taking of property.

It is clear that a valid attachment

lien, at least, is a property interest.
v. Radford, 295

u.s.

See Louisville Bank

555, 601-602: Armstrong v. United

States , 3 6 4 u . S . 40 • *
Petitioner argues that enforcement of the Iranian
Agreement should be enjoined because no one can tell whether
"just compensation" will be paid for the "taking" (p. 4042).

The agreement, as I understand it, falls considerably

short of requiring enough money in the escrow fund to cover
all American claims (this should be made clear in any
opinion that I write).

The agreement does provide, however,

that Iran will pay American creditors for any deficiency in
the payment of valid claims by arbitration.

I pause here to

say that, as presently advised, I do not know whether the
agreement permits American courts subsequently to determine

*If I write, as I expect to, my opinion should address the
effect of revocation of the license issued by the Secretary
of Treasury to obtain attachments (brief p. 37-39).
Reservation of the power to revoke is irrelevant to my view,
but we should address it.

6.

whether a clain is valid and also whether there has been a
"short fall" in its payment.

I am inclined to think that

the agreement leaves this exclusively to the Tribunal:

it

provides that decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and
binding everywhere.

Despite these reservations, I do not think an
injunction is indicated if we sustain the validity of the
agreement, and if - and only if - we make clear that a
remedy exists against the United States in the event of a
short fall.
As presently advised, I would hold that a remedy
does exist in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act.
pp. 42-43 of petitioner's brief.

See

Section 1502 is not

applicable for various reasons, including the fact that the
agreement is not a treaty.

A treaty does not become valid

until it has been approved by the Senate.

* * *
The Algerian Agreement would be null and void
under the most elementary principles of law and fairness in
any domestic controversy.

It was not an agreement that

resulted from voluntary bargaining.

Iran, correctly

characterized by President Reagan as a country controlled by
"barbarians", had kidnapped American citizens and held them
for well over a year.

Not only were our citizens kidnapped

but they were being held under conditions equivalent to

·'.

7

0

imprisonment potentially serious to their physical and
mental health.

Nor were these ordinary citizens (though

this would make no difference with me) ; they were diplomats
and diplomatic staff.

Finally, they were under constant

threat of execution by the criminals who held them.
In short, this was no "agreement" at all.

The

United States acted under coercion of the most barbarous
kind.

Such an agreement has nomore validity under

international law than a private agreement being examined in
our courts.

I know little about international law, but the

International Court of Justice at the Hague has decided that
the Iranian crime was a continuing violation of
international law.

I therefore would conclude - were it not

for President Reagan's approval of it and Secretary Haig's
representation to us - that the agreement is null and void,
and we should proclaim this to the world.
hostages.

We have the

I am not sure that any Iranian funds are still

held in the United States, as they were transferred - as I
understand it - to the Bank of England.

I would assume,

however, that Great Britain would recognize international
law also, and that British courts would follow our judgment
invalidating

this coerced document.

In sum, in almost any

other circumstances, I would hold that our country is not
bound.

Yet, apparently such a holding, in the special

circumstances of this case, would seriously damage the

8.

broder interests of the

u.s.

I may therefore affirm on this

issue.

L.F.P., Jr •
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TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Peter Byrne

DATE:

June 21, 1981

RE:

No. 80-2078, Dames & Moore v. Regan, Sec'y

Question Presented
Does the President have power to "settle" the claims
of American nationals against foreign sovereigns?
I

There are, of course, no statutes or Court cases that
directly control the question of whether Presidents Carter and
Reagan

had

the

power

to

"suspend"

petr's

suit

for

damages

against Iran and require petr to submit to the adjudication of
an international arbitral tribunal.

Courts and Congress speak

about the Presidents power's to act in foreign affairs in only
the

broadest

terms.

Indeed

there

is

so little precise

legal

anticipation or precedent for this action that characterization
of what the President has done is crucial.

The President acted primarily to secure the release
of

American

hostages.

In

return

for

this,

he

took

steps

to

allow Iran to recover Iranian assets held in American banks and
to settle American claims against Iran in a forum acceptable to
Iran. Seen this way, the President has bartered the rights of
private

American

concerns

to

compel

adjudication

of

valid

claims in the courts of the United States to gain the public
benefit of the return of the hostages. This is one aspect of
the situation.
It can algp fairly be said,
the

interpretation

acted . to

provide

too

strenuously,

that

-----~- ""-'-

some

concerns who had valid,

althought the SG urges

compensation
but

for

the

President

American

practically unenforceable

has

private
claims

against an unfriendly and radical foreign sovereign. Under this
interpretation,
American

pre-judgment

creditors

were

Sovereign Immunities Actl,

1

1

attachment

unlawful

of

because

Iranian
of

assets

the

by

Foreign

but the President's blocking order

1 Paul Smith has explained this relevance of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in his memorandum. The
basic point is that the President could have left the
American creditors in a worse situation if he had never
taken any action with respect to the Iranian assets or the
creditors'
claims.
Indeed he might,
to release the
hostages, have merely transfered the blocked Iranian
assets out of the country. While this might have been
politically unpopular or could constitute a "taking" which
the United States would have to compensate, there can be
little debate that the President had the power under the
International Economic Emergency Powers Act ( IEEPA) to
accomplish this result. T?. e question whether the President
had the additional power 1to settle\\ the creditors' claims
should be addressed with awareness-of this possibility.

marshalled

the

Iranian

assets,

prevented

them

from

being

removed from the country, and gave him a substantial bargaining
chip

to

secure

Iranians.

The

some

settlement

of

American claims

from

President rationally could have concluded

the
that

the chance of gaining a judgment from the tribunal, backed by
the $1

billion settlement

fund,

was

better

than

the

greater

certainty of getting a full judgment from a federal court that
might not be enforced. While this interpretation provides only
a

partial

truth,

it

should

be

kept

in

mind.

The

Algerian

Declarations concluded a number of outstanding issues between
the two countries and brought a measure of order out of chaotic
circumstances.2
The question of the power of the President to settle
the petr's claim should be distinguished from the power of the
United

States

to

settle

petr's

claim

-

and

the

question

of

whether the settlement will violate the Fifth Amendment if petr
does not receive just compensation. The case of United States
v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103

(1803) would seem to give the

United States power by Treaty to barter a national's claim. In

2 The Algerian Declarations also arranged the return
of Iranian assets held in the overseas branches of
American banks and in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
minus the satisfaction of various loans~reviously extended
to Iran by American banking syndicate/: The SG represents
that these arrangements have worked very well so far: $3.7
billion has been paid to the banks, another $1.4 Billion
has been placed in escrow. Brief for United States at 7,
n. 8. The SG wishes the Court to see that American
interests have received already substantial economic
benefit from the Agreement. The Banks have supported the
Agreement in litigation.

that case, Americans who had been commissioned by the President
as privateers had lawfully captured

~

French vessel and had won

a condemnation in the District Court, affirmed in the Circuit
Court, when the United States concluded a Treaty with France
promising

the

restoration

of

ships

captured

but

not

yet

condemmed. The Court held that the Treaty, as the supreme law
of the land had altered prior law and that the judgment below,
not being final,

must be reversed.

The Court wrote,

[I]f the

nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens,

it is

not for the court, but for the government, to consider whether
it be a case proper for compensation. Id. at 110. In the modern
context of the Takings Clause and the Tucker Act, I would read
this statement as meaning that the government has the power to
extinguish a lawful claim recognized in Court,

even if it is

liable for compensation.
Thus,

?

~

:~

the

question

that

must

be

addressed

is

not
:?

whether the United States has the power to settle the claims qy

Tr; _::f ,- but whether

J •..J.Executive

~

..

Agreement.

powers:

has

the

without

the

consent

.:::

.
analys1s
of

the President has the powe-;-;;-;-d: - :o by
Th;

qu:_,st!:_on

President
of

the

the

is

power

Senate?

one
to
The

of

act

separation
in

this

touchstone

of

regard
for

any

.
. "'Youngstown S h eet & Tu b e Co.
Pres1'd ent1al
power 1s

v • Sawyer , 3 4 3 U • S • 57 9 ( 19 5 2 ) .
Youngstown held that President Truman lacked inherent
power to seize the nation's steel mills to continue production
during a strike during the Korean conflict, when Congress had
rather

explicitly

rejected

the

idea of

giving

the

President

C9

such

power.

Justice

Black's

opinion

for

the

Court

attention to the President's enumerated powers:
authority,

directs

his executive

his status as commander-in-chief, and his power to

see that the laws are faithfully executed. In my view, however,
the lasting lesson of Youngstown is that the President's power
to

~

take

particular

positions

of

the

steps

other

must

be

branches.

examined
The

in

light

Constitution

of

the

allocates

powers among the branches, particularly between the President
and the Congress, only in general

terms.

Determining whether

the President has a certain power depends in large measure on
the attitude of the Congress toward his exercise of that power.
This

analysis

is

presented

most

directly

by

the

opinion of Justice Jackson, who established three categories of
Presidential power. First, where the President acts pursuant to
an express or implied authorization of Congress, he possess all
the power that the United States itelf possesses." Id. at 63536. Second, where he acts without any authorization or denial
of

such

by Congress,

"congressional
sometimes,

at

we are

inertia,
least

as

in a

"zone of

indifference
a

practical

or

matter,

twilight",

where

quiessence
enable,

if

may
not

invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In
this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events rather than on abstract theories of law."
Id.

at

636.

Finally,

incompatible with

when

"the

the expressed or

his power is at its lowest ebb, for

President

takes

measures

implied will of Congress,
then he can rely only on

his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers

of Congress over the matter."

Id. Understandably,

the parties

have argued over into which category ' the Iran Agreement should
be

placed;

accordingly

after

addressing

President's power to settle individual claims,
statutes

drawing

Preliminarily,
might

more

it

his

act

should

precisely

be

into

be

one

noted

understood

or

that
as

directly

I will turn to

another

Jackson's
a

the

category.
categories

continuum with

the

first and third categories forming the poles.
The same sensitivity to the actual relation between
President

and

Frankfurter.

He

Congress
stressed

informed
that

the

"the

opinion
content

of

of

Justice

the

three

authorities of government is not to be derived from abstract
analysis." Id. He denied the power to the President in the case
at

hand

because Congress

had

specifically concluded

that

he

lacked the power. But, he wrote:
"In
short,
a
systematic,
unbroken,
executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by
Presidents who have
also sworn
to
uphold
the
constitution, making as it were such exercise of
power part of the structure of our government, may be
treated as a gloss on "executive Power" vested in the
President by §1 of Art. II." Id. at 610-611.
This observation can be profitably employed as an elaboration
of Justice Jackson's second category.
II
Assuming Congress has neither authorized nor denied }
authority to the President to settle claims of Americans, does
he have inherent authority. The SG argues that he does, and the
CAl and CADC, with some qualification agreed. The President has

~

_____________ ___________________

settled the claims of nationals with foreign
_.'- nations since the
~------~--'-

earliest days of the Republic;

he has extinguished the claims

in return for lump-sum payments. J.B. Moore was able to say in
1905:

"It would be a work of superogation to attempt to cite

all the cses

in which the Executive of the United States has

settled individual claims against

foreign governments without

reference to the Senate." Moore also noted that arbitration had
repeatedly

been

employed.

Moore,

and

Treaties

Executive

~
~

Agreements, 1905 Politcal Science Q. 385. Professor Henkin has

~

their interests, as distinguished from those of the nation as a

observed

that

the

President

has

"sometimes

disposed of

the

~ ~ la ims of citizens without their consent , or even without
yf ~~~~consulation with them, usually without exclusive regard for
whole."

Henkin,

Foreign

Affairs

(1972). Finally, the Restatement

and

the

(Second)

Constitution

262

of Foreign Relations

Law § 213 (1965) states as black letter law that "The President
may waive or

settle

a

claim against

a

foreign

state

for

an

injury to a United States national, without the consent of such
national."
While these establish that the President customarily
has settled claims and that such settlements are effective in
international

law,

the

question

remains

whether

such

~n

executive agrement is binding in a United States court. Th1s
-----~---Court seems to have held that they are. InVOni ted States v.

-

Belmont,

301

settlements

U.S.

324

collateral

(1937),
to

the

Litvinov

Court,

in

Agreement

construing
by

which

the
the

United States recognized the Soviet Union, seemed to equate the

I {.1
]

agreement in force of law with a Treaty.
"Plainly the external powers of ~he United States are
to be exercised without regard to state laws or
policies ••.. And while this rule in respect of
treaties is established by the express languge of cl.
2Ar t. VI, of the Constitution, the same rule would
result in the case of all international compacts and
agreements from the very fact that complete power
over
international
affairs
is
in
the
national
government and is not and cannot be subject to any
curtailment or interference on the part of the
several states." Id. at 331.
To

be

sure,

this

language

is

not controlling

here,

because

there is no question of state law superceding federal, but the
Court 1 s

acceptance

furtherence of

of

the

executive

the President 1 s

agreement,

power

concluded

to establish

in

diplomatic

relations, supports the notion that the President had power to
enter into the Algerian declarations, and that that agreement
is as binding as the treaty in Schooner Peggy.
Pink,

315

u.s.

particularly

the

President 1 s

In United States v.
Court

considered more

203

(1942),

the

power

to

settle the claims of nationals by an executive agreement.

In

that case, the United States was assigned by the Soviet Union
assets

of

private

Russian

companies

that

the

USSR

had

nationalized; the United States would settle claims of American
nationals
settlement

agaist

the

agreement

Soviet
as

part

Union
of

the

with

these

agreement

countries entered into normal relations.

funds.
by which

This
the

The court noted that

this settlement was a method of iemoving "objections" raised by
Soviet nationalization of american assets in Russia.
effect to the agreement the Court stated:

In giving

Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as
settlement of claims of our nationals ... certainly
is a modest impolied power of the President who is
the • sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations. • United States v.
Curtis-Wright Export Corp., [299 u.s. 304,] 320.
Effectiveness in handling the delicate problems of
foreign relations requires no less. Unless such a
power exists, the power of recognition might be
thwarted or seriously diluted. No such obstacles can
be placed in the way of rehabilitation of relations
between this country and another nation, unless the
historic conception of the powers of the President in
the conduct of foreign affairs [cite to J.B. Moore
article
discussed
above]
is
to
be
drastically
revised.
It was the
judgment of
the political
department that full
recognition of
the Soviet
Government required the settlement of all outstanding
problems including the claims of our nationals.
Recognition
and
the
Litvinov
Assignment
were
interdependent. We would usurp the executive function
if we held that the decision was not final and
conclusive in the courts." Id. at 220-230.
Concurring,
President's

J~e

control

-

Frankfurter
of

stated

flatly,

"That

the

-..,....

foreign

relations

includes

the

settlement of claims is indisputable." Id. at 240.3

3 The views of Learned Hand in an analogous case are
well worth noting:
"The constitutional power of
the President
extends to the settlement of mutual claims
between a foreign government and the United
States, at least when it is an incident to the
recognition of that government; and it would be
unreasonable
to
circumscribe
it
to
such
controversies.
The
continued
mutual
amity
between the nation and other powers again and
, again depends upon a satisfactory compromise of
/ mutual claims; the necessary power to make such
compromises has existed from the earliest times
and been exercised by the foeeign offices of all
civilized nations." Ozanic v. United States, 188
F.2d 228, 231 (CA2 1951).

''

The

parties

attempt

to distinguish

Pink

and

it

is

helpful to examine their arguments with care. Petr argues that
Pink nd Belmont are only Supremecy CLause cases, holding that
an Executive Ageeement preempts contrary state law. Pet Brief
at 19-20. But, if the Agreement preempts state law, it must be
because it

is federal

law.

Stating that the agreement is law

necessarily implies that the President had power to acheive it.
Petrs are incorrect in arguing that the Litvinov Agreement did
not involve settlement of the claims of American creditors; the
President

there

was

marshalling

assigned

Russian

assets

to

satisfy the claims of American creditors for the expropriations
of the communist regime. While it is true that the acts before
the

Court were

claims

at

less

the

marshalling

than

their

face

rather

than

value,

the

a

settlement

reasoning

of

of
the

Court approved the entire process of settlement. It could well
be argued that the Li tvinov Agreement was a better deal than
the Algerian Declarations, that the former

agreement obtained

much larger payments to creditors than the present.

But this

objection involves only the question of whether the settlement
is

a

"taking",

a

question

we

believe

is

separate

from

~

question of the President's power to settle.
CADC
Belmont

declined

essentially

to

because

rest
the

its
cases

decision
too

the

on

Pink

blithely

vague Presidential powers. American Int'l Group v.

and

~

accepted CJ!II}(:.

Iran, Slip

Op at 17. Rather, it chose to rest its decision on the history
of Executive settlement agreements acquiesced in by Congress.
But, in reaching this decision, the court again looked to Pink

and

Belmont,

proposition
consent of
This

noting

that

that

the

to

do

lend

support

President need ' not seek

the Senate for

reluctance

"they

the

and

all such settlements."

rely

squarely

on

~k

and

Id.

33.

Belmo® is

understandable. The case were decided in the shadow of a world
crisis when

the

authority of

the President and our

alliance

with the Soviet Union each seemed vi tal to national welfare.
The cases, while

I

think correctly decided,

seem unconcerned

with balancing power among the branches and are deferential to
the President to a degree inapposite to contemporary attitudes.
The cases are lax in identifying the source of the President's
power.

To

a

large

extent

they

seem

to

suggest

that

the

President has some plenary authority over the field of foreign
affairs conferred by

the necessities of foreign diplomacy.

A

contemporary court rightfully is reluctant to embrace the old
idea

that

foreign
executive

the

President

affairs,

the

particularly

agreements,

constitution's

is

"sole

as

regards

potentially

explicit

Treaty

organ"

in

a

of

nation

power,

conflict

power,

in

making

with

the

requiring

the

participation of the Senate. Pink might be read as placing the
President's power to make settlements in J. Jackson's category
3, where the Presdient has inherent power to act regardless of
the

Congress's

opposition.

CADC

relied

on

the

history

of

Congressional acquiessence to bring their holding into category
2.

the

President's

power

to

settle

claims

is

strong.

As

noted

above, the President has exercised his power since early times
without general disapproval from Congress. As CADC noted, the
Congress

disapproed

the

particular

settlement

made

by

the

President of $105 million in claims against Czechoslovakia for
$20.5 million.

In that case the President held manny millions

in Czech gold as a bargaining chip. Thus,

it may be

inferred

that Congress could have disapproved of the Algerian Agreements
if it had chosen to do so.
I

believe

that

the

holding

of

this

case

can

be

further narrowed. As noted, Pink addressed only the President's
power to make settlements incident to his acknowledged power to
recognize foreign governments.4 The making of settlements has
been recognized by the Court only as an incidental power to the
effectuation of an object within the scope of the President's
lawful authority.

I think that in this case the Court need go

no further. As Paul Smith will have discussed, Congress in the
so-called

Hostage

Act,

22

u.s.c.

1732,

§

placed

upon

the

President the duty to "use such means, not amounting to acts of
war,

as

he

may

think

necessary

and

proper

to

obtain

or

effectuate the release". I tend to think that the President may
use

,..

his

recognized

incidental power

~

-~

to settle

the

--

claims

of

american nationals to acheive an object which Congress clearly
............

~

......

has authorized. This approach would provide a narrow foundation

-------4

This
power
appears
to
be
included
in
the
President's enumerated power to "receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers." Art. II, sec. 3.

for affirming the President's power by bringing the case almost
into J. Jackson's category 1.
conferred any new power

It would not hold that Congress

to the President in the Hostage Act,

but merely that they authorized him to use

such power

as he

possessed to accomplish a proper end. Also, it does not set up
the power to enter settlements on an independent basis where
the President can without compunction enter settlements in any
international

context;

the

reach

of

the

power

need

not

be

addressed. As of now, I would hold thusly.
III
Petr 's

strongest

argument

that

the President

lacks~

Act~

power is that Congress in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities

tf'n'-

(FSIA),

u.s.c.

28

§§

1330, 1602, et seg., places petr's

claim,:s/,1#

unambigously in federal court for a judicial determination free
from

political

history of
FSIA

is

intereference.

Presidential settlements

unimportant.

Congress,

According

which

has

The

prior

President

directed

to

is

that

now

this
to

theory,

the

passage of

in conflict

federal

the

courts

with
have

jurisdiction over the matter, and with the courts, because he
is interfering with their Article III power by depriving them
of

jurisdiction over these claims.

In my view,

this argument

mischaracterizes the President's acts and overstates the scope
of the FSIA.
~-----"""'"?'

The FSIA granted
entertain

suits

sovereigns

involving

between

jurisdiction to federal
American

commercial

citizens

disputes.

It

and
also

courts

to

foreign
sought

to

place these suits more in the ordinary course of business and

'r--

remove

them

federal

from

courts

sovereign

politics

to

make

defendant

was

by
the

for

the

decision

entitled

to

a

first

time

whether

directing

the

defense

of

foreign
sovereign

immunity. Prior to this, the State Dep't had issued an advisory
letter

to

the

court

concerning

immunity,

which

was

almost

always followed. Foreign nations were wise to this and sought
to bargain with

the State Dep't

to obtain

immunity.

The Act

established a legal test for sovereign immunity and directed it
to

govern

unless

an

existing

agreement

between

the

foreign

nation and the U.S. was to the contrary.
Petr
Congressional

argues

primarily

intent to remove

that

the

FSIA

the Executive

from

evinces

a

commercial

disputes, by depriving him of the sovereign immunity decision
and allowing private litigation in federal court rather
the

nation

to

nation

settlements

historically had engaged in.

This

that

the

argument reads

than

President
the statute

too broadly. First, the FSIA does not address in any terms the
President's power to settle claims as part of an international
agreement. No decision about sovereign immunity is involved in
this case.

It must

be doubtful

that Congress would oust the

President from a customary power only by implication. Second,
that petrs have a judicial remedy does not go to the Pesident's
power to act for the general welfare. Petrs would have itfhat
the

President

settles

claims

only

to

confer

a

benefit

on

private Amercians, but as the Pink stresses and Schooner Peggy
illustrates, the President may settle privte claims to remove
obstacles

to the acheivement of

a public accord

rather

than

merely

to

recover

funds

for

private

parties.

Finally,

the

intent behind FSIA seems to have been , to depoliticize "ordinary
legal

disputes"

when

one

party

was

an

entity

government,

because

particpants

in

(1976),

not

to cabin the President's authority

public

crises.

litigated

of

a

foreign

"foreign state enterprises are every day

commercial

The

activities",

examples

without

of

H.R.

cases

94-1487,

that

to deal
could

given

interference

executive

at

1-2
with

now

be
the

in

legislative history include: contrct litigation over delivered
goods or the sale of land, or a tort suit when an American is
struck

by

an

extraordinary

embassy

car.

situations

Id.

such

I

find

nothing

as

presented

of

these

by

directed

to

the

taking

of

held

that

the

hostages by a renegade nation.
Judge
Executive

Duffy

in

one

attempting

was

juri sdici ton confer red on

oust

to
them

cases
federal

courts

by Congress when he

from

directed

that these claims be brought before the Tribunal. This holding
is

irresponsible.

The President does not assert any power

to

-------------~~-----~-----------------characterization

of

his

separation of powers.

actions

as

such

ill

serves

the

Presumably it would not be argued that

the President had ousted the court from jurisdiction if he had
settled
analysis

these

claims

should

be

by

no

receiving

different

a

lump

because

sum

he

The

has

agreement to arbitrate backed by an escrow fund.
The
jurisdiction of

President's
the

courts

order
but

the

does

not

the

?

claims.

If he has "taken" anything

but a chose in action.

In my view,

it is not judicial power,
it is folly for a federal

court to willfully characterize what the President has done as
an unconstitutional incursion on Art III power. A significant
underlying question in this case is the role of the judiciary.
It seems to me broadly that the question of whether to make an
agreement of the type at issue here is a political question. If
Congress doesn't like it it can say so;

if

the People don't

like it they can vote. The proper role for the judiciary is not
to

second

guess

the

judgment

of

the

President

that

this

agreement was a proper response to difficult events, when the
Congress

has

been

silent.

However,

the

judiciary

has

a

significant role to play in seeing that individual rights are
not washed away in the attempt to secure a public benefit. This
role is most properly exercised in regard the "taking" question
rather than in the question of the power of the President. The
judicary should not say that the political arm cannot act, but
should state that the political arm must pay for
rights

they

employ

to

acheive

their

aims.

the private
This

allows

discretion, but protects the individuals rights.
In

summary,

I

would

hold

that

the

President

acted

pursuant to the Hostage Act and exercised his tradtiional power

.,,

to settle claims.''

..------

PS 06/22/81

I

To:

Mr. Just i ce Powell

From: Paul Smith
Re:

No. 80-2078, Dames & Moore v. Regan--Statutory Issues

There are three different statutes that have some
relevance

to

this

case:

the

Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), 50
"Hostage Act,"

International

u.s.c.

§

Economic

1701 et seq., the

22 U.S.C. § 1732, and the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act, 28

u.s.c.

§

1602 et seq.

The first two are

possible sources of congressional authorization of the Iran
Agreement.

The third may indirectly support the President's

power to void the attachments by making
void ab initio on immunity grounds.

those attachments

I will treat each act

in turn.
I.

The IEEPA

;

L. •

The
concluded

that

First

Circuit

and

the

this

statute,

passed

DC

in

Circuit

1977,

both

gives

the

President the power to vacate the attachments entered under
licenses issued by the Secretary of the Treasury after the
initial "blocking" of the Iranian assets.
accept

the

Government's

argument

that

They refused to

this

statute

also

authorized the "suspension" of the cases pending in American
courts and transfer of those cases to the Tribunal.

These

holdings appear to be correct.
A.

The Statute
The IEEPA was passed in 1977 to provide standards

for Presidential regulation of economic matters in times of
emergency

that

fall

short

of

actual

war.

time, the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50

Prior

u.s.c.

to

that

App. § S(b),

applied both to wartime and to other emergencies declared by
the

President.

It

gave

the

President

somewhat

broader

powers over foreign assets, including the power to seize and
vest those assets.

The Trading With the Enemy Act is now

limited

to

in

effect

wartime,

and

the

IEEPA

"does

not

include

the power to vest, i.e, to take title to foreign

property."

H.R. Rep. No. 95-459, p. 15 (1977).

(:/ /£.Ef'A-

Instead, the emphasis is on regulation of assets
-1

during a short period of actual emergency.

The President is

empowered to
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void,
prevent
or
prohibit,
any
acquisition,

j.

holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or
dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege
with
respect
to,
or
transactions
involving, any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest

In

the

exercise

of

these

powers,

the

totally free of congressional control.

emerge:~, an~~nsult
so.

50 U.S.C.

specifying

§

the

1703 (a).
reasons

President

He must transmit a
his

action

and

Id., § 1703(b).

Congress

the

concurrent
id.,

§

resolution

an

with Congress prior to doing

for

terminate

not

mus~eclare

He

actions to be undertaken.
may

is

full
the

report

specific

In addition, the

President's

actions

by

a

under

the National Emergencies Act,

1622(b), as long as

it specifies in the resolution

that it wishes to terminate Presidential authority under the
IEEPA, id., § 1706(b).
The purpose of the IEEPA was to restrict the broad
grant of authority to the President in the Trading with the
Enemy Act,

which had been used by Presidents in many non-

emergency situations to regulate trade.
for

"regulation

of

international

Congress saw a need

economic

transactions,"

House Report at 10-11, in times of emergency,
for

the

kinds

of

seizures

and

but no need

distributions

of

enemy

property that are possible in wartime under the Trading with
the

Enemy

Act.

It

also

sought

to

ensure

emergencies invoked would be short-term and real.
B. Voiding the Attachments

that

the

1-hfw- ~

~~ a.c,l;;;,.,.

':t •

~~-"IE6///I_, ~. I..J.~~ ~:
Using

these

powers,

in

November

of

1979

the

President blocked removal of the Iranian assets and ordered
that no attachment be entered on them unless licensed by the
Government.

The

President

ultimately

did

license

attachments on these assets, but he also issued a regulation
stating that "the provisions of this part and any rulings,
licenses,

authorization,

instructions,

issued thereunder may be amended,
any time."
of

the

conditioned
this

modified,

31 C.F.R. § 535.805.

attachments,
at

least

authorization.

including

orders,
or

forms

revoked at

Thus it appears that most
those

in

this

implicitly on possible
Another

or

category

of

case,

were

revocation of
cases

involves

attachments entered prior to the initial invocation of the
President's IEEPA powers.
The Act is easier to apply to the first category of
attachments.

As

in

the

First

Circuit

case,

petr

here

obtained its attachment under license from the government,
after "the assets were within the President's control, under
the umbrella of his IEEPA powers."
it is much easier

to argue

Id., at 10.

that petr

"could

Therefore,
[not]

obtain

such an interest in the blocked assets as would later hamper
the President in disposing of them."

Id.

The argument is

that the President clearly could bar all future attachments
against the funds after the entry of the blocking order and,
if

so,

could

allow

such

attachments

subject

to

possible

voiding at a later date under the President's IEEPA powers.

5.

In his decision from the Southern District of New
York, Judge Duffy takes the contrary view, arguing that the
attachments,
President
impose
While

once

could

entered,

not

attachments
this

view

were

void.
could

is

In
only

not

property

rights

his

view,

be

revoked

illogical,

it

the

that

the

license

to

prospectively.

seems

less

than

compelling in light of the case law under the old provisions
of the Trading with the Enemy Act.
Orvis v. Brownell, 345
order

entered

under

the TWEA.

blocking

by

order

u.s.

the

The principal case is

183 (1953), involving a blocking

government

against

The Court previously had
did

not

prevent

state

which were then necessary in order
over the Japanese defendants.
held

that

such

prerogatives

of

Japanese

an
the

that

attachment

to obtain

this

orders,

jurisdiction

However, in Orvis, the Court

attachment
federal

held

assets

could

not

government

(the

with respect to these assets under the TWEA.

narrow

the

"Custodian")

The attachment

did not constitute a "transfer," because to so interpret it
would

be

to

"ignore

the

express

conditions

consent [to the attachment] was extended."

on

which

Id., at 187.

As Judge Duffy's opinion demonstrates,
ways

to distinguish Orvis.

the

there are

It did not involve the formal

voiding of an attachment--merely the vesting of the property
itself

by

the

Government.

here was more explicit

And

the

blocking order

issued

in its authorization of attachment

orders--and therefore less clear on any conditions.

But the

"'

basic

thrust

of

attachment may

the

be

case

allowed

supports
against

the

government:

blocked

assets,

.

an

but

it

does not destroy the power of the government to regulate the
assets

under

the

order--at

least

power

fairly

may

statute
where
be

allowing

the

preservation

implied

in

initial

of

the

this

terms

blocking

governmental

of

the

license

granted.
disregarding

Even

conditional

the

licensing

argument, there is support in the language of the IEEPA for
the view that the President may nullify any attachment of
foreign property--even those entered prior to the emergency.
The Act authorizes the President to "nullify .•• any holding
of,

br

exercising any right,

power,

with respect to •.. " foreign property.

or

privilege

This would seem to

include the power to "nullify" attachments.

This reading is

reinforced by tT President's apparent power to "direct and
compel ..• transfer ..• or exportation of" foreign property.
Such

a

transfer

attachment.

would

have

the

effect

of

"voiding"

an

In the present case, the Court need not rely on

this more general Presidential power,

but choice of such a

rationale

other

might

have

an

effect

on

pending

cases

involving pre-emergency attachments.
C. Suspending the Pending Court Cases
The
attachments.
favor

of

Iran
It

Agreement

ordered

adjudication at

did

more

"suspension"
the tribunal.

than
of

void

court

existing
cases

in

The question thus

7•

becomes

whether

such

an action can be , brought within the

statutory authorization of the IEEPA.

Judge McGowan in the

CADC case and the majority in the CAl case, refused to find
such

an

terms

authorization

of

the

in

the

However

Act.

admittedly
the

broad

Government

and

vague

makes

this

argument, and was able to convince Judge Breyer of the CAl,
who wrote a concurring opinion.

Judge Breyer's theory was

that the President has the power to "regulate,
••• or prohibit ...

... nullify,

[the] exercising [of] any right, power,

or privilege with respect to ..• any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest; by
any person

• • • subject to the
50

States."

u.s.c.

§

jurisdiction of
For

1702(a) (1) (B).

the United

him,

a

lawsuit

against Iran (leaving aside any question of attached assets
in the U.S.)

is the "exercising" of a "right" with respect

to "property" in which a foreign national has an interest by
a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
If so,

the President is authorized to regulate or nullify

such a lawsuit.
It

seems

clear

that

the

statutory

made to fit

the order issued in this case.

because

property

the

involved

need

not

terms
This

itself

be

can
is
in

be

true
the

United States, as long as someone subject to United States
jurisdiction
property.

is

seeking

to

exercise

a

right

to

that

But there are a number of reasons why it probably

is not fair to read the statute this broadly.

First, it is

H.

clear

that

authorize

Congress

meant

Presidential

lea~t

(at

regulation

of

principally)

to

Here,

the

assets.

question is not regulatio j n of assets--merely the validity
of a lawsuit by an American company suing a foreign entity.
The word

property apparently

was

intended

to

refer

to

a

tangible thing--since the IEEPA grew out of the TWEA, which
was concerned with the disposition of enemy assets left in
the

United

broad

States.

power

to

transact ions,
IEEPA,

he

it

is

foreigner.

While
regulate

goes

proper

IEEPA gives

all

pretty

authorized

The

the

to

forms

far

to

stop

a

the

of

say

international

that,

person

distinction

is

President

under

from

the

suing

analogous

to

a

the

distinction between jurisdiciton in rem and jurisdiction in
The

personam.
Americans

President

seeking

to

can

obtain

control

a

a

but

res,

res,

and

control

cannot

prevent

Americans from suing foreign countries altogether.
Second, it seems odd to allow the President to use
this statutory authority to benefit the "enemy" and injure
----------~---

Americans.
which

The Act grew out of an earlier one,

sought

assets,

as

to
well

ensure
as

received a fair share.

that

to

enemies

ensure
Here,

that

could

~

the TWEA,

Twe-.14
~ -1-r:J

withdraw

~?:.HJkJ-

not

American

?~

creditors

however, a "ransom"

a ... ~ .. c.~. ··1.

is being

"paid" by means of a sacrifice of the rights of Americans to
file

a

lawsuit.

President

to

authorization

do
in

Whatever
this,
the

I

the constitutional power of
think

IEEPA.

it

is

Perhaps

unfair
this

is

to
why

find

the

an

the SG

J~

Y.

makes

only

a

perfunctory

argument

for

the

view

that

the

President's suspension of the claims was authorized by the

-

Act.

SG's Br. at 53.

If I am correct in my interpretation

of the IEEPA, the voiding of the attachments was authorized,
but

the

suspension of

the court cases

themselves must be

justified on other statutory or constitutional grounds.

II. The "Hostage Act" {

Jft,S)

-

The SG also makes a short argument for

the view

that the President's actions are authorized by the Hostage

--

Act, a statute passed in 1868 in response to the actions of
other countries in detaining naturalized American citizens.
The statute states that when a foreign government detains an
American and refuses a demand

for

release,

"the President

shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he
may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the
release."

22

u.s.c.

§

The

1732.

argument

is

that

this

constitutes a delegation of power to the President to deal
with hostage-taking by foreign governments, and that such a
broad delegation is permissible in the foreign affairs area.
It
face,

seems

clear

to me

applied to these facts.

citizen of the United States
liberty

by

government."

or
Id.

under

the

that

the

statute,

on

its

It requires only that "any
[be]

unjustly deprived of his

authority

of

any

foreign

One could argue that the statute should

be limited to situations in which governments have refused

.LU.

for~ign-born

to recognize the naturalization of
Americans

persons as

{the problem in 1868 in Great Britain).

Zemel v. Rusk,

But in

381 U.S. 1 {1965), the Court suggested that

this statute might apply to illegal imprisonments more like
the present one--those undertaken in the early days of the
Castro regime.
"statutory

Id., at 15.

obligation"

to

The Court cited the President's
take

"necessary

and

proper"

actions as one reason for denying Americans access to Cuba
in the first place.
The
statute
chosen

can
by

Id.

question
be

the

said

therefore

to

becomes

authorize

President

in

this

the

particular

two

1868.

possible

interpretations

of

what

this

response

case--suspending

court cases brought by American citizens.
be

whether

pending

There appear to
Congress

did

in

One might argue that Congress did not authorize the

President to take any actions that were not already within
his constitutional powers, and merely sought to ensure that
he would take some action.

The statute, after all, merely

states that the President "shall use such means ... as he
may think necessary and proper" to seek the release of the
imprisoned

persons.

And

the

sponsor

of

the

language

ultimately adopted, Senator Williams of Oregon, stated that
his

main

concern

was

Congressional Globe,
also

id.,

Constitution

at
and

·,

presidential

pt.

4333
other

5,

at 4330

{President
federal

inaction

at

{July 22,
must

laws).

act

the

time.

1868).

See

within

the

Alternatively,

as

Judge McGowan stated in his concurring opinion in the CADC
case, the statute may be viewed as an authorization to the
President to take any action within the power of the federal
government

a

as

authorization.

whole,

without

further

statutory

This certainly was the view of the opponents

of the bill, who saw it as a vague and broad license to the
There

President.

is

also

support

for

this

view

in

the

statements of Senator Williams, who called on the Senate to
rely on the judgment of the President concerning what action
was

appropriate,

impossible

to

id.,

meet

at

these

4333,

and

argued

international

that

problems

allowing the President discretion to tailor

the

it

was

without

remedy to

the natur'e of the particular country involved, id., at 4359.
My view is that the Hostage Act does provide some ) 7a.u.L.scongressional authorization to the President in this case by

----------~-------------------------------·

authorizing him to undertake some actions that might not be
within the power of

the President absent any statute.

other

my

words,

--------

it

is

view

that

the

existence

of

In
this

statute does lessen the separation-of-powers problem in this

.

..__

case by bringing the President's actions within the first of
Justice

Jackson's

-

in

Youngstown--where

President acts with legislative authorization.

the

Of course,

the legislative authorization here is extremely vague,

and

very old as well, and thus is not necessarily as convincing
as a more specific and more recent statute.

But the Hostage

Act can be used at least to indicate general congressional

~"i

~~~-<
~r

.L~.

acceptance of wide Presidential discre,tion in the face of
hostage problems.

And very general delegations of power to

the President in foreign affairs have been validated in the
past.

u.s.

United

States

v.

304, 320 (1936).

Curtiss-Wright

Export Corp.,

299

If so, the Hostage Act can be used to

fill the gap in the IEEPA identified above--authorizing not
only the voiding of the attachments but also the suspension
of

the court cases

themselves.

This

interpretation would

allow the Court to avoid deciding whether the President has
a general power to take such an action in an emergency that
does

not

involve

Jla~L,

~

congressional ~ ~

hostages--without

;1u:_

authorization.

Unless

the

Court

is

convinced

the~

that

limitations in the IEEPA impliedly prohibit more extensive~~

actions affecting the court claims under
this

is

the

rationale

I

would

the Hostage

advocate--at

least

as

alternative holding in addition to a constitutional one.
III.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

Judge

Duffy

indication

held,

from

that

it

Congress

foreign governments are

commercial

to be handled

an

is relevant

affirmative

claims

against

judicially,

and not

~------'-------------------------------

compromised by the President.
footnote,

Br.

at

26,

n.

19,

Second,

the SG argues

in a

that the Act helps his cause

because the attachments voided by the President were already
illegal.

The

.:

argument

is

that

Iran

had

not

waived

~ ~

~
1-o'~·

First, petr argues, and

constitutes

that

an

n...c-

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
to this case in two distinct ways.

Act,~

its

~~4.41

.J::Jo

immunity

with

respect

to

pre-judgment

.......~~~--

----------

required by the Act.

...

...._..

-

attachme.vts,

as

The first argument will be handled by

Peter in the context of his constitutional discussion.

The

second I will discuss here.
I have already argued that the Preside rrr has the
power

under

the

IEEPA to void

the

attachments

entered

by

courts under licenses issued after the initial blocking of
Iran's

assets.

additional

reason

attachments.
involving
IEEPA

This

Its

FSIA

by

would

why

the

main

significance

attachments

powers

argument

President

entered

the

prior

President.

constitute

could
would

to
In

the

an

void

these

in

cases

be

invocation of

those

cases,

the

President may only be able to void the attachments if they
were void ab initio under the FSIA.
The
immune

from

question

of

whether

pre-judgment

Iranian

attachment

entities

depends

on

are
the

interpretation given to the relevant FSIA provisions and to
the Treaty of Amity between the
passed

in

1976,

-

provides

that

two countries.

"the property of

The Act,
a

foreign

state •.. used for commercial activity in the United States,
shall not be

immune from attachment prior to the entry of

judgment ..• if--(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived
its immunity
portion
immunity

of
by

II

28

u.s.c.

the

Act

the

foreign

§

requiring
state.

1610(d).
an
In

This is the only

"explicit"
the

present

waiver

of

case,

it

would be difficult to argue that Iran has explicitly waived

immunity from pre-judgment attachment.

The relevant portion

of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Art. XI, ,, 4, states:
of either High Contracting Party,
including
corporations,
associations,
and
government a encies and instrumentalities, which
is publ1cly owned or con ro e
s a , if it
engages in commercial, industrial, snipping or
other business activities within the terri tor ies
of the other High contracting Party, claim or
enjoy, either for itself or for _its property,
therein from taxation, su1t, execution of
judgm§..nt o..E._ other J..iaQj.li ty towhi.ch pr iva±ely
owned~d
controlled -enterprises are subject
tnerein.
-------

~enterprise

As several courts have noted, this language does not contain
anything approaching an explicit reference to pre-judgment
attachment.

~,

E-Systems,

Inc.

v.

Islamic Republic of

Iran, 49l F. Supp. 1294, 1301-1302 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Behring
International,

Inc.

v.

Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F.

Supp. 383, 393 (D.N.J. 1979).
There is, however, one possible way for plaintiffs
to get around this problem.
existing

international

The Act preserves

agreements,

28 U.S .C.

§

~

in effect
1609,

and

those agreements probably need not -\interpreted according to
the standards established in the Act itself.
1~55

Tr~ of _Ami~y

Thus, if the

can fairly be interpreted as effecting

an 'implied
....... waiver of,..._.., immunit~~ from pre-judgment attachment,
that

waiver

would

still

be

in

effect--despite

requirement of an explicit waiver.

§

1610's

The argument would be

that the Treaty implied a waiver in its reference to "other
liability

to

which

:

privately

owned

and

controlled

.L::>.

enterprises are subject."
be

viewed

Treaty

as

a

meant

form

for

of

If a pre-jud,g ment attachment can
"liability,"

Iranian

assets

it

to

may

be

be

treated

that
just

the
like

those of private firms.
The lower courts are split on this issue.
Behring

supra,

International,

at

395

Compare

(Treaty

waives

immunity) with E-Systems, supra (rejecting this view because
waivers of
with

immunity are not

respect

to

inferred lightly and a waiver

pre-judgment

attachments

contravened the normal practice in 1955).

would

have

I lean toward the

view that pre-judgment attachments are not among the forms
of "liability" that clearly fall within the statutory terms.
The Government raises a separate argument for the
view that many of the attachments entered were invalid.
at

n.

26,

immunity

19.

of

It

any

argues

kind

that

with

the

respect

Treaty

to

only

Iranian

Br.

waives

commercial

entities--relying on the Treaty's reference to enterprises
that "engage[]

in commercial, industrial, shipping or other

business activities within the territories of the other High
Contracting Party."
immune
goods

as
in

a

se:r~

In its view, the Iranian Army would be
-t

non-commercial

America.

The

entity,

Government

even
also

if

it

argues

purchases
that

this

limited waiver still controls despite the possibly broader
language

of

the

FSIA

waiving

immunity

relating

to

"commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign

state."

This

argument

~~

seems-A a

little

strained,

.Lt:>.

since

the

distinction

between

commercial

governmental entities engaged in commerce

entities

is hard

and

to draw

and not really required by the Treaty or the Act.
Perhaps the best thing to do with these questions
is to state that they are an added reason for

the Court's

recognition of Presidential power to void the attachments.
If

the

requisite

waiver

of

immunity

was

absent,

these

attachments had no legal validity.
One remaining argument must be addressed in this
context.

In an earlier

President's

actions

attachments
immunity.

in

case,

Judge

blocking

themselves

the

constituted

Duffy

held

assets

and

a

waiver

that

the

licensing
of

Iran's

New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power

and Transmission Co.,

502 F.

Supp.

120,

131

(SONY 1980).

The court read the IEEPA as authorizing the President,

in

his regulation of foreign assets

to

in time of emergency,

strip a foreign sovereign of any immunity with respect to
those assets.

It also found an intent to take this action

in the general 1979 order issued by the President blocking
Iran's assets.
it

is

far

I

find this argument unconvincing.

from clear

that

First,

in the 1977 IEEPA the Congress

meant to allow the President this extraordinary power only
one

year

after,

over

foreign

the

courts.

in the 1976 FSIA,

it

transferred control

immunity issues from the State Department to
Moreover,

there

is

no

explicit

language

affecting Iran's immunity in the President's blocking order,

·,

7

and one would expect

something specific before finding

intent on the part of the President to waive immunity.
McGreevey,

The

u.s.

Iranian Crisis and

Law,

2 N.W.

an
See

J.

of

Int'l Law and Business 384, 407-10 (1980).

Summary
The
President's
thing,

IEEPA

action

attachments

was

President's

power

See

v.

Orvis

authorize

in

appears

it

voiding

that

the
the

license

conditional,

and

did

to control

Brownell.

the

assets

Moreover,

assets in time of emergency.
authorization

any

the

attachment

For

one

enter

the

restrict

the

to

not

the

for

attachments.

the

nullification of

Congressional

authorization

provides

under
Act

the

IEEPA.

appears

against

to

foreign

The IEEPA does not constitute
of

the

President's

action

in

suspending the court cases.
The Hostage Act of 1868 probably should be read as
authorizing the President to take any legal actions within
the power of the federal government as a whole, when he is
seeking

to

obtain

the

release

detained by foreign governments.

of

citizens

If so,

wrongfully

this can help to

justify the suspension of the court cases.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,

along with

the Treaty of Amity, probably renders the attachment legally
void ab initio--although there
this issue.

..

is a split

in authority on

I would not infer a "waiver" of this immunity

in the President's blocking order and subsequent licensing
of attachments.

''tftjj- /'k ~"~~HI~}
LFP/lab 06/22/81

Rider A,,pg. 2

Case ~~

Iranian

~~

The President extinguished property

'/tt~t-J

right~

private American citizens in order to obtain release of the
hostages.

He agreed in the Declarations of

s~"'"f

Algie ~.

terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts

~

involving claims of United States persons and institutions
against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all
attachments and judgments obtained therein, and to prohibit
all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring
about the termination of such claims through binding
arbitration."

(Decl.)

This action was taken pursuant to a

"finding" made by the President under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50

u.s.c.

(Supp. III)

170l(a), that there was an "extraordinary threat • • • to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States."

Thus, for purposes only unrelated to the claim of

petitioner and other American citizens similarly situated,
the President acted for a public purpose.
I think it clear that this use of private claims
of citizens for a public purpose may effect a taking of
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment •

.•

;

lo
•

LFP/lab 06/22/81

Rider A, pg. 3

Iranian Case

The government disposes of petitioner's "taking"
argument in little more than two pages of its 66-page brief.
The argument is said to be "without merit".

The President

is said to have the power "to settle claims against Iran by
providing for their submission to arbitration".

And, "[i]f

there are insufficient funds in the escrow account, the
Tribunal's awards may be enforced "in the courts of any
nation in accordance with its laws".

Br. 64, 65.

One would have thought that the government of the
United States would be sympathetic, rather than hostile, to
assuring the ultimate payment of all just claims if - as
seems entirely possible - payment in full is not made under
the procedures required by the Declarations of Algiers.
Apart from what the Constitution may require, private
citizens with valid claims normally would expect their
government, in circumstances such as these, voluntarily to
assure that valid claims are fully paid at the expense of
the Treasury of the United States if this should become
necessary.*

I therefore find the Government's position

singularly insensitive to what many would view as at least a
moral obligation.

SEE FOOTNOTE PAGE 2.

2.

*It approaches a high level of naivete to rely on
the recovery "in the courts of any nation" if there are
insufficient funds in the escrow accounty. Even if this
means that petitioner may sue Iran or its instrumentalities
in the courts of the United States for any shortfall, this
would assume the presence here of assets to attach - an ·
unlikely prospect indeed. In view of the demonstrated
hostility that exists in Iran toward the United States, and
the 16th century fanaticism of its rulers, it is irrational
to predicate any legal decision on the assumption that Iran
would leave assets in the United States if there is any
possibility of suits for deficiency judgments.

NOTE TO GREG:
I am under the impression that the Agreement
expressly states that all claims against Iran are
extinguished. The SG repeatedly claims the power to
"settle" these claims which - if it means anything - is to
settle them finally without full payment. I do not want you
to interrupt your dral€, out when you have the opportunity,
let me know what you think the SG is talking about in saying
that deficiency claims may be enforced in courts of any
nation.

-,
''

':"

''
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TO MY CLERKS
In view of the "flood" of filings here in this
case, including petitions to intervene and for permission to
file amici briefs, I have been concerned whether there was
any "recusal" problem.
We need not worry about amici briefs, as the
settled practice ever since I have been here is that one
does not disqualify because of amicus briefs.

Otherwise, a

Justice deliberately could be knocked out of any case.
There is no problem with Dames & Moore, as there
are no "et als" except on the government's side.

~
·~~~

We have,

lf'

€:,,

however, granted several petitions to intervene as parties.
I have tried to keep up with these, and check the parties.

~.·./

But with the pressures to move ahead with this
case, and the multiplicity of papers and briefs filed, I
would like the three of you who have worked on this case to
double check me.

The only possible recusal that came to my

attention was United Virginia Bank.

Its general counsel

advises me that the bank has been paid off in full and has
no interest in the case.
As no conflict has come to my attention, I will
'" "'

sit tomorrow and attend the Conference.

If you should

.,. "
.<1":

·,,

•t
'l••

"~

2.

discover some party we have not previously identified, I
would, of course, recuse myself from the decision.

L. F. P. , Jr.

ss

',

J::'i

_!.,

OF"F"ICE OF" THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF" THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D . C .. 20543

June 22, 1981

Memorandum to the Conference
Re:

Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of
the Treasury, et al., No. 80-2078

In the above-entitled case to be argued on
Wednesday, June 24, 1981, Mr. Leonard Boudin informed
the Clerk's Office today that he will be unable to
argue because he was admitted to a New York hospital
late Thursday evening with a heart infection and a
103° temperature. His physician refuses to release
him.
Mr. Eric M. Lieberman will argue in his stead.
Respectfully submitted,

td/~~
Alexander L. Stevas
Clerk

0$2078G

GREG-POW

GM 06/22/81

DRAFT:

No. 80-2078:

Dames & Moore v. Regan

5

Justice Powell, memorandum.
This memorandum addresses

the question whether

petitioner has a legal remedy in the Court of Claims under
the Tucker Act,
President's

28 U.S.C.

actions

effect

property for public use.
Act

remedy is

ripe

§1491,

for

a

in the event that
taking

of

10

the

petitioner's

The availability of the Tucker
adjudication,

and

must be answered now rather than later.
such a remedy is available to petitioner.

I

in my view it
I conclude that

15

2.

The

President

used

legal

claims

of

private

American citizens and enterprises in order to obtain the
release
legal

of

the

hostages.

proceedings

He

agreed

"to

terminate

in the United States courts

20

all

involving

claims of United States persons and institutions against
Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments
and

judgments obtained therein,

to prohibit all further

25

litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the
termination of such claims through binding arbitration."
Declaration

of

the

Government

Popular Republic of Alergia,

~1 Iranian

and

Democratic

and

Petitioner's attachment

in

30

and its breach-of-contract claim against

Iranian

terminated

,I B.

the

assets is among the attachments nullified by

this agreement,
Iran

of

instrumentalities

United

States

is

courts

among

and

the claims

submitted

to

arbitration.
I

think

it clear

that

this public use of

the

private claims of petitioner and other American citizens
and entreprises may effect a taking of private property
within

the

Petitioner's

meaning

of

the

Just

breach-of-contract

Compensation
claim

Clause.

represents

a

35

3.

interest, 1

property

which

will

be

diminished

if,

for

40

example, petitioner is denied the opportunity to present
to

claims

the

Claims

if

Tribunal;

petitioner

establishes that its rights to redress before the Claims
deme~-e-a:-'&l:y-

Tribunal are

inferior to its rights in United

States courts; or if the Claims Tribunal awards petitioner
an

amount

that

falls

demonstrably

short

of

a

45

fair

~

satisfaction of its claim.2

Petitioner contends that the

"\
order

of

another

attachment
property

it

obtained

interest

which,

President already has taken.
of

diminution

accompli shed,~·

and

are

upon
by

.. But the
J

Iranian assets
nullification,

or

not

the

pr-ecise manner and

inconsequential,

whether

is

for

50

"however

intended

by

the

President, a diminution of petitioner's property interest
will entitle petitioner to just compensation.
be

~he

disputed

~-------President's

It cannot

actioif were
1\

unrelated to legal claims such as petitioner's.

- .

-

largely

55

Rather,

the President acted in the national interest;' of obtaining
the

hostage's

crisis.

But

freedom
the

and

burden of

resolving
his

an

actions

international
falls

upon

the

relatively few citizens and enterprises with legal claims.

60

4.

The

Just

Compensation

Clause

applies

in

these

circumstances, for it "was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole."
(1960).

u.s.

Armstrong v. United States, 364

40, 48-49

65

See Gray v. United States, 21 Ct.Cl. 340, 3420343

(18886); 3 ;

cf.

Agins

v.

City of Tiburon,

447 U.S.

255,

260-261 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,

u.s.

438

The

~-

~

~.,y
&;!~
II" . ~

~
~~

104, 123-124 (1978).
Government

"taking" argument is
that

for

for

claim

the

Id.,

same

at 65.

that

"without merit."

petitioner's

said
"unaffected,"

contends

petitioner's

Brief 64.

breach-of-contract

the President "simply" has
to

be

heard

And if the funds

in

a

70

It is

claim

is

"provide [d]

different

forum."

in the escrow account are

75

#-~~·
~

~
}~

'I- ~A')
~r~

insufficient to satisfy the awards of the Claims Tribunal,
it

is

said

that

petitioner

may

enforce

the

Tribunal's

award "'in the courts of any nation in accordance with its
laws.'"
Algeria.

at

64-65,

quoting

the

Declaration

of
80

5.

I would have thought that the Government of the
United States would be solicitous to assure the payment of
just claims if, as seems to me entirely possible, payment
in full
the

is not made under

Declaration

of

the procedures established in

Algeria.

Apart

from

what

the

85

Constitution requires, citizens and enterprises with valid
claims

normally

circumstances

would

such as

expect

these,

the

Government,

voluntarily to assure

in
that

they are fully paid at the expense of the Treasury of the
United

States

if

I

necessary.

find

the

Government's

90

possi tion singularly insensitive to what many would view
as at least its moral obligation.

Furthermore,

I cannot

rely as the Government urges on the "right" given by the
Declaration to recover "in the courts of any nation"
insufficient

funds

are deposited

if

in the escrow account.

95

Even if this means that petitioner may sue Iran and its
instrumentalities in United States courts for a shortfall,
the prospect that Iranian assets will be
country

is

demonstrated
hardly

highly
hostility

rational

to

unlikely.

In

toward

the United

predicate

our

found

view

in

of

Iran's

States,

decision

this

on

it

is
the

100

6.

assumption that Iran would leave assets in this country if
there

is

any

possibility

of

suits

for

deficiency

judgments.
possibility ....gxist.s,

that

the

105

President's actions will effect a taking of petitioner's
private property for a public use.

That possibility makes

ripe for adjudication the question whether petitioner will
have a remedy at law in the Court of Claims under the
Tucker

Act,

u.s.c.

28

§1491.4

I

would

have

serious

110

reservations about the constitutionality of a Presidential
power that could effect a taking of property for which the
property holder had no remedy against the United States.
That the

!:aot-~n.t..:.e£ - ._1:18

taking in this case is yet

~

speculative is ineeRsQqueat:-i-a1, for "there must be at the
time

of

provision

taking
for

'a

reasonable,

obtaining

certain

and

Reorganization Act Cases,

419

u.s.

102,

124-125

quoting Cherokee Nation v.

Southern Kansas R.

U.S.

also Cities

641,

659

McGrath, 342

(1890);

u.s.

330,

see

335-336

(1952);

Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438

adequate

Regional

compensation.'"

Rail

(1974),

Co.,

Service Co.

135

v.

Duke Power Co. v.

u.s.

115

59, 94, n. 39

120

'

...

7.

(1978) . 5

I therefore turn to the availability of a remedy

under the Tucker Act.
125
II
Petitioner will

have

a

remedy in the Court of

Claims in the event of a taking of its property.
1491

provides

in

pertinent

part

that

Section

"[t]he

Court

of

Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim

against

the

Constitution

United

States

founded .•• upon

130

the

A claim that the President's actions

"

took its property for public use without just compensation
"plainly would

fall within the literal words"

of §1491,

Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra, at 126, for
" [ i] f

there

is a taking,

the claim is

'founded upon the

Constitution,'" United States v. Causby, 328
(1946);

accord Jacobs v.

United States,

135

u.s.
u.s.

290

256, 267
13, 16

(1933).
There
whether

28

only

u.s.c.

jurisdiction

remains,

§1502 divests

over

President's actions.

taking

therefore,
the Court

claims

the

of Claims

arising

Section 1502 provides,

question

from

of
the

140

8.

"Except
as
otherwise
provided
by
Act
of
Congress, the Court of Claims shall not have
jurisdiction of any claim against the United
States growing out of or dependent upon any
treaty entered into with foreign nations."

145

As consistently construed by this Court and the Court of
Claims,

§1502 is not a

claims

such

as

bar

petitioner

to

jurisdiction over

might

divests the Court of Claims of

This

raise.

150

taking
section

jurisdiction only where a

treaty itself confers the right that the claimant relies
upon as against the United States.
127 U.S.

u.s.

427

51

(1888);

(1893);

United States,

231

United States v. Weld,

United States v.
Eastern

u.s.

Old Settlers,

Extension

326

Telephone

(1913) .6

155

148

Co.

v.

In this case,

the

right upon which petitioner would rely is conferred by the
Just Compensation Clause,
into

by

the

President

not by the Agreements entered

with

Iran

nor

by

any

of

160

the

Executive Orders or Department of Treasury regulations.?

III
In sum, petitioners have a remedy at law in the
Court of Claims against

the United States

that

actions

the

petitioner 1 s

President 1 s
property,

either

by

effect
the

in
a

the event
taking

submission

of

of
its

165

9.

breach-of-contract
nullification
this

remedy

of
is

claim
its

to

arbitration

attachments.

significant

to

my

The

by

or

availability

conclusion

as

to

the
of

170

the

President's powers, for the Just Compensation Clause "was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."
United States, supra, at 49.8

Armstrong v.

175

lPetitioner's
interest,

as

money

due

plus

$3,788,930,

complaint
for

services

rendered

under

a

a~~~~~

contract.

~4~

~~~~~~1w

~~

~~·~·
~

5

2The Declaration provides that the Claims Tribunal is

to be funded initially with $1 billion of Iranian assets
to

satisfy

awards

to American claimants,

wo8uld maintain a minimum balance of
security

account

been paid.
that

until

all

Declaration,

American

Tribunal total

claims
$3-4

,I

awards
7.

that

$500 million
the

Tribunal

Iran
in

a

have

10

It is estimated, however,

eligible

billion.

of

and

for
It

arbitration

is at

yet

in

unclear,

the
of

course, whether Iran will fulfill its promise to maintain
15

the security account until all awards are paid.

3Gr ay

v.

United

States

was

an

advisory

opinion

to

Congress concerning a waiver by treaty of claims against
France.

In return for France's agreement to release the

United States from a treaty obligation to protect French

20

2.

territorial

possessions

on

this

continent,

the

United

States relinquished certain claims of American nationals
against

When

France.

implicated

the

Just

asked

whether

Compensation

this

Clause,

relinquishment
the

Court

of

25

Claims stated:
"That any Government has the right to do this,
as it has the right to refuse in war the
protection of a wronged citizen, or to take
other action, which, at the expense of the
individual, is most beneficial to the whole
people,
is
too
clear
for
discussion.
Nevertheless, the citizen whose property is thus
sacrificied for the safety and welfa,re of his
country has his claim against that country; he
has a right to compensation .•.. It seems to us
that this 'bargain' .•. which was brought about by
the sacrifice of the interests of individual
citizens, falls within the intent and meaning of
the Constitution, which prohibits the taking of
private property for public use without just
compensation." 21 Ct. Cl. at 342-343.

30

35

40

See also Cushing v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 721 (1886).
I

think that Gray correctly concluded that the

relinquishment

of

legal

claims

in

the

settlement of

45

an

international dispute was a taking of property interests
for

a public use compensable under the Just Compensation

Clause.

I do not read Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S. 439, 457

(1896) ,

to express any opinion on the legal reasoning in

Gray.
be

In any event, any opinion expressed on Gray would

dictum,

as

interpretation of

the
a

only

issue

in

congressional Act

Blagge

was

that governed

the
the

50

3.

manner of paying claims found by the Court of Claims to be
due as compensation for the relinquishment of legal claims
at

issue

in

States, 420
J.,

Gray.

u.s.

concurring);

See

Aris

Gloves,

Inc.

v.

1386, 1395-1397 (Ct. Cl. 1970)
McGreevey,

55

United

(Nichols,

The Iranian Crisis and U.S.

Law, 2 Nw. J. Int'l Law & Bus. 384, 439-440 (1980).
60

4 The Tucker Act vests jurisdiction in federal district
court,

concurrent with

the Court

of Claims,

for

claims

against the United States involving less than $10,000.

u.s.c.

§1346(a)(2).

Although

nothing

in

the

28

record

65

indicates whether a taking of petitioner's property would
exceed $10,000,
petitioner's
unlikely

commercial

that

Accordingly,

if a taking occurs at all, the nature of

my

less

contracts

than

concern

is

with

$10,000
with

would

the

Iran
be

make

it

involved.

availability

of

remedy in the Court of Claims, not in the district court.

a

70

4.

5 cities Service Co.

v. McGrath,

well illustrates this rule of law.
acting

as

successor

to

the

342 U.S.

330

{1952),

The Attorney General,

Alien

Property

75

Custodian,

sought payment of certain negotiable debentures from the
obligor on the debentures and the indenture trustee.

The

obligations represented by the debentures had been seized
by the Alien Property Custodian under the Trading with the
Enemy Act,
themselves

80

50 u.s.c. App. §1 et seq., but the debentures
were

not

in

the

Custodian's

possession.

Petitioners argued that the seizure provisions of the Act
would effect a taking of their property in the event that
a foreign court subsequently held them liable to a holder

85

in due course of the debentures, and that the taking would
be

without

just

compensation

against the United States.

unless

they

had

a

remedy

Petitioners conceded that they

could plead payment in this country as a defense to suit
in another country.

The Court considered the availability

of

remedy

a

Tucker

Act

despite

skepticism

as

to

petitioners' concern over the prospect of double payment.
It stated:

90

5.

"While their defense to such litigation seems
adequate and final payment by them improbable,
we agree that petitioners might suffer judgment
the payment of which would effect a double
recovery
against
them.
In
that
event,
petitioner will have the right to recoup from
the United States, for a 'taking' of their
property within
the
meaning
of
the
Fifth
Amendment, 'just compensation' to the extent of
their double liability.
Such cause of action
will accrue when, as, and if a foreign court
forces petitioners to pay a holder in due course
of the debentures.
We agree .•. that only with
this assurance against double liability can it
fairly be said that the present seizure is not
itself
an
unconstitutional
taking
of
petitioners' property." Id., at 335-336.

6In United States v. Weld, 127

u.s.

95

100

105

110

51, 57 (1888), the

Court held:

115

"In order to make the claim one arising out of a
treaty within the meaning of [the predecessor
provision to §1502], the right itself, which the
petition makes to be the foundation of the
claim, must have its origin--drive its life and
existence--from
some
treaty
stipulation"
(emphasis in original).

To

illustrate

its point,

120

the Court contrasted the claim

asserted in Weld with the claim asserted in Great Western
Insurance Co

v.

United States 112 U.S.

193

( 1884) .

125

As

described by the Court, "[t]he petition [in Great Western]
based
treaty
U.S.

the

right

itself."
427,

469

of

recovery

on

In United States
(1893),

the

Court

the
v.

provisions

of

the

Old Settlers,

148

stated

that

"a

case

130

6.

arising from or growing out of a treaty is one involving
rights

given or

Claims

has

§1502.
902-906;
United

protected

consistently

by

a

treaty."

The Court

of

construction

of

United States, supra,

at

followed

Hughes Aircraft Co.

v.

this

Societe Anonyme Des Ateliers Brillie Freres v.
States,

160

Fratelli Gondrand v.

Ct.Cl.

192,

196-99

(1963);

Unites States, 166 Ct.Cl.

135

S.N.T.

473,

477

(1964).

140
7The
include

word

"treaty"

executive

in

§1502

agreements.

United States,

534 F.2d 889,

Because

is

§1502

has

been

Hughes
903, n. 17

inapplicable

to

this

construed

Aricraft

Co.

to
v.

(Ct. Cl. 1976).
case,

I

do

not

question that construction.

case

does

not

145

involve

governmental action that already
determined

to

be

unauthorized.

a

~as

situation

in

which

effected a taking is

A taking

that

is

not

authorized expressly or by necessary implication "is not

150

7.

the

act

of

the

Government,..

and

recovery

against

Government is not available in the Court of Claims.

the
Hooe

v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 336 (1910); Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases 419
I

do

not

address

u.s.

102, 127 n. 16

the question whether

petitioner

(1974).
would

have a remedy in some other court under another cause of
action if unauthorized Presidential action had taken its
property for a public use.
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STATUTORY ISSUES - MEMO TO FILE
Paul Smith's memo of June 22 on these issues is

persuasive - more so than the SG's rather arrogant brief.
Indeed, the Iranian parties really don't need a lawyer with
the SG so enthusiastic on their side.
This memorandum merely summarizes, for my use,
Paul's views -perhaps with some observations.
~~

The three statutes are:

the International

Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), the Hostage Act, and
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).

The first two

are possible sources of congressional authorization of the
type of agreeemtn before us.

FSIA affords some basis for

arguing that the prejudgment attachments were void initially
because Iran had not "explicitly" waived immunity.
,, i .ti\

<,
)

I.

IEEPA
Passed in 1977 to replace the Trading with the

Enemy Act, IEEPA authorizes presidential regulation of
economic matters in an emergency short of actual war.

To my

surprise, Paul notes that there is some congressional

· ,;

• ' . ,. I

oversight.

The President may declare an emergency to make

the Act effective, but must first consult Congress.

''

Also,

!

,.,-

. '

2.

Congress may terminate a President's action by a concurrence
resolution.

1.

What constitutes consulting?

What does the

record in this case show with respect to consulting?
2.

Elaborate on the power to terminate.

When?
•,

Voiding Attachments.

•J

Petitioner in this case did

not attach until a license was issued that, by its terms,
was revocable.

Paul thinks IEEPA authorized revocation, and

therefore whatever property interest petitioner gained by
the attachment was subject to be divested.

Paul cites Orvis

v. Brownell as persuasive but not controlling authority. ",,'
Even w'ith respect to the cases where attachments
were obtained prior to the President's restrictive

"'·
~.

·'

J.1·

'

regulations, Paul thinks a fairly persuasive argument can be
made that IEEPA authorized the President to "nullify" the
attachments.

•I find it difficult to believe that Congress

intended any such broad grant of power.

Power to Suseend Pending Cases.
agreement, in addition to voiding the

The Iran

attachments, ·~·
f;.

"suspended" all court cases in favor of adjudication by the
tribunal.
Both CAl and CADC held that IEEPA did not
authorize this action.

3.

Paul observes that a "President can control a res,
/

and control Americans seeking to obtain a res, but cannot

'

prevent Americans from suing foreign countries".

Paul also

notes that it would be "odd to allow the President to use
IEEPA to benefit the 'enemy' and injure Americans".

Thus,

Paul concludes that IEEPA does not authorize suspension of
the law suits.

Peter will conclude, I think, that the

President has inherent power to do this - as CADC and CAl
have held.
'f

'
J,

II.

The Hosta9e Act (1968).

00 "1.• 1..

f

'1\'

This ancient statute provides that "the President
..

.

·,;,_

shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war as he may
think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the
release" of Americans held by other nations.
"

Although this statute is extremely vague, the

',~,''

government relies on it - and Paul thinks with some reason · •

as a eliminating any argument as to the separation of
powers.

The Act appears to make a broad grant of authority

to do as he pleases - within the Constitution - to release
American citizens.

I would have a hard time "buying" the

full sweep of this argument.

b.l

Specifically, Paul thinks that the Hostage Act

'r'.

does constitute arguable authority for the right of a
President to "suspend" these suits.
1o)'

'1-.J

,{'1

.·,

_,

4.

i'!1;f,·.

' \.·

III.

''·

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
Both sides rely heavily on this Act.

Petitioner

argues that it constitutes an affirmative indication from
Congress that commercial claims against foreign governments
,,

~:

.

',, are to be hand led judicially, and not compromised by the

1;

President., The SG also argues (fn. 19, p. 26) that FSIA
J)'

supports the view that the attachments were already illegal.

:r·
:l'.l'il':

<1..'

The Act (1976) provides that:

if,

l,,~:.>l

"The property of a foreign state •
used
for commercial activity in the United States,
shall not be immune from attachment prior to
the entry of judgment • • • if (1) the
foreign state has explicitly waived its
immunity •• "26 u.s.c. 1610(d).
Although the purpose of the Act is to protect
American creditors,

§

1610(d) is the only provision that

reuires an "explicit" waiver of immunity.
is whether Iran has so waived immunity from
attachment by its 1955 treaty

~f

a~ity

The question then
prejudgmen~

that states:

"No [Iranianl enterprise of • • • shall • • •
claim or enjoy either for itself or for its
property, immunity therein from taxation,
suit, execution of judgment or other
liability to which privately owned and
controlled enterprises are subject therein."
Although this language makes no explict reference
to prejudgment attachment, FSIA preserves existing
"

international agreements such as the 1955 treaty of amity.
18 u.s.c.A §1609.

It can be argued, therefore, that the

broad language above includes at least an "implied waiver of
:·J

',·

s.
immunity from prejudgment attachment".

The language of the

treaty waiving immunity with respect to suits, execution of
judgments "or other liability to which privately owned"
enterprises are subject, could well include prejudgment
attachments.

Such attachments are commonly available in

private litigation.
'' ,,.,

.':

., "

Paul notes that "lower courts are split on this

issue", and he inclines to favor the government's view that
there has been no "explicit" waiver.

GIT

I would think there should be a presumption in
favor of waiver, as otherwise commercial transactions with
foreign entities will be discouraged severely.

The right to

sue, without the attachment right, often will be an empty
one.
I do note, however, that apparently Iran has
waived immunity with respect to "suit" and "execution of
judgment or other liabilities".

The SG - apparently quite

enthusiastic about Iranians' efforts to avoid paying just
debts, even argues that contracts to provide goods and
services to the Iranian army are noncommercial, and
therefore not subject to any waiver of immunity.

I would

not accept this argument.

* * *
'"

In brief summary, Paul's careful examination of

the statutes and cases casues him to think:

lfp/ss

6/23/81
80-2078 Dames & Moore v. Regan
STATUTORY ISSUES - MEMO TO FILE
Paul Smith's memo of June 22 on these issues is

persuasive - more so than the SG's rather arrogant brief.
Indeed, the Iranian parties really don't need a lawyer with
t

the SG so enthusiast icf'~on their side.

'

This memorandum merely summarizes, for my use,
Paul's views -perhaps with some observations.
The three statutes are:

the International

Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), the Hostage Act, and
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).

The first two

are possible sources of congressional authorization of the
type of agreeefu~p before us.
..J •

FSIA affords some basis for

arguing that the prejudgment attachments were void initially
because Iran had not "explicitly" waived immunity.

I.

IEEPA
Passed in 1977 to replace the Trading with the

Enemy Act, IEEPA authorizes presidential regulation of
economic matters in an emergency short of actual war.

To my

surprise, Paul notes that there is some congressional
oversight.

The President may declare an emergency to make

the Act effective, but must first consult Congress.

Also,

2

0

Congress may terminate a President's action by a concurrence
resolution.
Ask Paul:
1.

What constitutes consulting?

What does the

record in this case show with respect to consulting?
2.

Elaborate on the power to terminate.

Voiding Attachments.

When?

Petitioner in this case did

not attach until a license was issued that, by its terms,
was revocable.

Paul thinks IEEPA authorized revocation, and

therefore whatever property interest petitioner gained by
the attachment was subject to be divested.

Paul cites Orvis

v. Brownell as persuasive but not controlling authority.
Even with respect to the cases where attachments
were obtained prior to the President's restrictive
regulations, Paul thinks a fairly persuasive argument can be
made that IEEPA authorized the President to "nullify"
attachments.

~

I find it difficult to believe that Congress

intended any such broad grant of power.

~ f~ '.
~ 'II"

Power to Suspend Pendin2 Cases.

,aj.r-~ement, in addition to voiding the attachments,

~,....,\ ,.P~'s u spended"
rvr. ~v\
\~,('II
~

f.f \

The Iran

all court cases in favor of ad j ud ica t ion by the

" '"

~ yjbuna~~ :,,.~./f.ei~·'

pgJ"V

.~<..J

5&
'1,/l'}{.ltr"'""
t4~\ authorize

..

•

Both CAl and CADC held that IEEPA did not
this action.

3.

Paul observes that a "President can control a res,
and control Americans seeking to ,obtain a res, but cannot
prevent Americans from suing foreign countries".

Paul also

notes that it would be "odd to allow the President to use
IEEPA to benefit the 'enemy' and injure Americans".

Thus,

Paul concludes that IEEPA does not authorize suspension of
the law suits.

Peter will conclude, I think, that the

President has inherent power to do this - as CADC and CAl
have held.

II.

The Hostage Act (1968).
This ancient statute provides that "the President

shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war 1 as he may
think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the
release" of Americans held by other nations.
Although this statute is extremely vague, the
government relies on it - and Paul thinks with some reason as a eliminating any argument as to the separation of
powers.

The Act appears to make a broad grant of authority
/'W /~ -.l.il-vt
to do as .he pleases - within the Constitution - to release
1\
American citizens. I would have a hard time "buying" the
full sweep of this argument.
Specifically, Paul thinks that the Hostage Act

does constitute arguable authority for the right of a
President to "suspend" these suits.

4.

III.

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
Both sides rely heavily on this Act.

Petitioner

argues that it constitutes an affirmative indication from
Congress that commercial claims against foreign governments
are to be handled judicially, and not compromised by the
President.

The SG

~

argues (fn. 19, p. 26) that FSIA

supports the view that the attachments were already illegal.
The Act (1976) provides that:
"The property of a foreign state . . • used
for commercial activity in the United States,
shall not be immune from attachment prior to
the entry of judgment . • . if (1) the
foreign state has explicitly waived its
immunity . . • " 26 U.S .c. 1610 (d).
Although the purpose of the Act is to protect
American creditors, § 1610(d) is the only provision that
retires an "explicit" waiver of immunity.

The question then

1\

is whether Iran has so waived immunity from prejudgment

--·

attachment by its 1955 treaty of amity that states:

--

"No [Iran ian] enterprise pe'. . . shall •
claim or enjoy either for itself or for its
property, immunity therein from taxation,
suit, execution of judgment or other
liability to which privately owned and
controlled enterprises are subject therein."
Although this language, makes no explict reference
to prejudgment attachment, FSIA preserves existing
international agreements such as the 19551[;eaty of
18 U.S.C.A §1609.

~ity.

It can be argued, therefore, that the

broad language above includes at least an "implied waiver of

5.

immunity from prejudgment attachment".

The language of the

treaty waiving immunity with respect to suits, execution of
judgments "or other liability to which privately owned"
enterprises are subject, could well include prejudgment
attachments.

Such attachments are commonly available in

private litigation.
Paul notes that "lower courts are split on this
issue", and he inclines to favor the government's view that
there has been no "explicit" waiver.
I would think there should be a presumption in
favor of waiver, as otherwise commercial transactions with
foreign entities will be discouraged severely.

The right to

sue, without the attachment right, often will be an empty
one.
I do note, however, that apparently Iran has
waived immunity with respect to "suit" and "execution of
judgment or other liabilities".

The SG - apparently quite

enthusiastic about Iranians' efforts to avoid paying just
debts, even argues that contracts to provide goods and
services to the Iranian army are noncommercial, and
therefore not subject to any waiver .of immunity.

I would

not accept this argument.

* * *
In brief summary, Paul's careful examination of
the statutes and cases casues him to think:
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I. Petitioner challenges two distinct actions by the President in this case: (I) the ordering of the transfer of Iranian
assets subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and
(2) the provision for the settlement of claims against Iran by
means of their presentatiOn to the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal. Although both of these measures were
taken in connection with the Agreement with Iran, they
implicate quite different powers of the President.

--

.

As we explain in our opening brief (Govt. Br. 28-29), the
President had the power under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. (Supp.
III) 1701 et seq., to direct the return of frozen Iranian
property to Iran solely in order to obtain the release of the

2
hostages and resolve the crisis with Iran, without making
a.!lY-£.!:__~ i~i_o~~-f~_r_~~~_le~ent of the claims of United States
nationals. Thus, the validity of the Presidential order to
transref assets which are subject to judicial orders obtained
by petitioner does not depend on whether petitioner's claim
against the Iranian defendants is subject to the jurisdiction
of the Claims Tribunal and is thereby settled by the Agreement. See, e.g., American Be/lint'/, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 80-321 (D . D.C. June II, 1981), cert. before
judgment denied, No. 80-2111 (June 22, 1981). Nor doe s it
depend on whether the President even had authority to
settle claims of any American nationals. Conversely, the
1. President's power under the Constitution, the Hostage Act
(22 U .S.C. 1732), and the 1955 Treaty with Iran , 1 to provide
for the settlement and discharge of the claims of American
nationals against Iran through submission to arbi.!lation
does not depend on wheti1eilleaT5o1Iasthe authority und er
IEEPA to direct the transfer of blocked Iranian property,
up to $1 billion of which will be deposited in a security
account to fund awards by the Tribunal in favor of American claimants.

'?

2. Petitioner concedes (Pet. Br. 18) that the President has
authority to se~claims of United States nationals
against a foreign government. See Govt. Br. 40-50. The
entire burden of its argument on the claims settlement issue
(see Pet. Br. 9-18, 20-21) is that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) , 28 U .S .C. 1602 et seq., implicitl y
carves out an exception to this broad authority in the case of
claims for which that Act permits a suit against the foreign
government. For the reasons given in our opening brief
(Govt. Br. 56-63), however, the FSIA is wholly irrelevant to
the claims settlement issue.
1Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between
the United States and Iran, Aug . 15 , 1955, 8 U.S.T . 899 , T.I.A.S. No .
3853 .

3
The pertinent provisions of that Act (28 U .S.C. 16041607) deal solely with issues of immunity (H.R. Rep. No.
94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1976); S. Rep. No. 941310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976); see also Chas. T. Main
Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, No.
80-1027 (l st Cir. May 22, 1981 ), at 20) and confer jurisdiction on the district courts of in personam actions against a
foreign sovereign whenever the sovereign is not entitled to
immunity (28 U .S.C. 1330(a)). 2 The settlement by the Executive of a claim on which a claimant has filed suit against a
foreign government no more interferes with the jurisdiction
of the court or confers an immunity to that jurisdictionthe subjects addressed by the FSIA-than would a settlement entered into by the claimant himself. For example, if
petitioner entered into an out-of-court agreement with the
Iranian defendants settling its claims, that settlement would
furnish a basis for the Iranian defendants to assert the
affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction (Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(c)), not a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U .S.C. 1330(a) because of an immunity to suit. By the same
token, if the President settles the claim pursuant to his
constitutional or other authority, the Iranian defendants
presumably could assert a similar defense (cf. Heckman v.
United States, 224 U.S. 413, 444-446 (1912)) or one based
upon the failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); American Int'/ Group,
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 80-1779, 80-1891
(D.C. Cir. June 5, 1981 ), slip op. 23); they could not, however, obtain a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because of a
supposed immunity to the jurisdiction of the courts.
2The legislative history of the FSIA cited by petitioner (Pet. Br.
I 0-15) refers exclusively to the issue of a foreign government's immunity
to suit and the State Department's previous role in making"suggestions
of immunity" to the courts (id. at 12 & n.l 0). Petitioner still has cited no
reference suggesting a congressional intent in the FS lA to abrogate the
established practice of Executive claims settlement.

4

Moreover, as relevant here, the FSIA did not represent a
break with the past with respect to foreign sovereign
immunity; it merely codified the previously extant restrictive theory of sovereign immunity under which a foreign
government is generally subject to suit for its commercial
and other private acts. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, supra, at
7. That theory of sovereign immunity had been adopted by
the State Department itself in 1952. See Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698-699, 711-715
(1976). Yet since 1952, as the District of Columbia Circuit
observed, the Executive has entered into at least ten lump
sum settlement agreements with other nations .. American
lnt 'I Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, slip op.
30. Significantly, three of those agreements settled commercial contract claims, on which the foreign government
may not have been immune to suit in this country. See
United States-Hungary Claims Settlement, Mar. 6, 1973,
Art. 2(2), 24 U .S.T. 552, T.I.A.S. No. 7569; United StatesBulgaria Claims Settlement, July 2, 1963, Art. l(l)(c), 14
U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S. No. 5378; United States-Rumania
Claims Settlement, Mar. 30, 1960, Art. l(l)(c), II U.S.T.
317, T.I.A.S. No. 4451. If these settlements of commercial
contract claims were not inconsistent with the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity adopted by the State Department in 1952, there is no reason to believe that Executive
settlement of commercial claims became inconsistent with
that same theory when it was codified in the FSIA. Similarly, the Restatement, which incorporates the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity with respect to commercial
activities (Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
§ 69 ( 1965)), explicitly notes that the Department of State
will espouse and settle contract claims in appropriate circumstances even without the claimant's consent (id. at §
212 Reporters' Note, § 213. The drafters of the Restatement therefore apparently saw no inconsistency between
the proposition that foreign governments are subject to suit

I '

5

on claims arising out of their commercial activities and the
proposition that the President may settle the same claims.
Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that Congress
perceived such an inconsistency when it enacted the FSIA.J
Finally, the FSIA subjects a foreign sovereign to suit on
more than commercial contract claims. For example, 28
U.S.C. 1605(a)(3) provides that a foreign sovereign is not
immune from suit in the United States on certain expropriation claims. 4 Expropriation claims have frequently been the
subject of claims settlement agreements. Yet under petitioner's argument that claims may not be settled by the
Executive where they are (or perhaps may be) the subject of
a suit filed under the' FSIA, the Executive would be required
to exclude certain expropriation claims from claims settlement agreements as well. See also 28 U .S.C. 1605(a)(l)
(permitting suits where the foreign government has waived
immunity) . As we noted in our opening brief (Govt. Br. 59
n.55), such an approach would pose an insurmountable
barrier to claims settlement by the Executive, which would
not be in a position to make the complex legal and factual

JThe congressional reports on the FSIA also reflect an intent to
ensure that the practice in the United States with respect to immunity is
in line with that in other nations. H .R . Rep . No . 94-1487 , supra, at 7;
S. Rep . No . 94-1310, supra, at 7. The statutory purpose of bringing the
United States into line with the international community would not be
served by a construction of the FSIA that would disable the United
States government from settling the claims of its nationals through
negotiations with another nation, especially in circumstances as compelling as the Iranian crisis.

u.s.c. 1605(a)(3) provides that a foreign state shall not be
immune in any case in which rights in property taken in violation of
international law are in issue and that property (or property exchanged
for it) is present in the United States in connection with commercial
activity or that property is owned or operated by an instrumentality of
the foreign state that is engaged in commercial activity in the United
States.
428
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judgments necessary to determine whether each of a multitude of claims was one for which a suit would lie under the
FSIA and which was therefore not subject to settlement
between nations.
3. Petitioner contends (Pet. Br. 23-33) that IEEPA does
not authorize the President to provide for the transfer of
blocked Iranian assets to Iran and to the security account
intended to fund awards by the Claims Tribunal. In petitioner's view, the power to allow foreign assets to leave the
country is an "awesome" one (Pet. Br. 24) that defeats the
rights of American creditors.
The language of IEEP A is indeed "sweeping and unqualified" (Chas. T. Main Int'/, Inc. v. Kh'uzestan Water &
Power Authority, supra, at 9) with respect to the powers the
President may exercise over blocked assets of a foreign
country. But the legal principle that explains how those
powers may affect petitioner and other claimants who
obtained orders of attachment against Iranian property
after the President's November 14, 1979, blocking order is
quite simple. By issuing the blocking order, the President
obtained, in effect, a congressionally authorized "lien" or
right in those assets in order to enable him to deal with the
"unusual and extraordinary threat * * * to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States"
(50 U.S.C. (Supp. Ill) 1701(a)) that was created by the
hostage crisis. Petitioner and other individual claimants
who obtained orders of attachment against that property
after November 14, 1979, were thereby rendered, in effect,
junior creditors whose interest in Iranian property was
necessarily subordinate to and contingent upon the exercise
of the President's prior and paramount authority to control
the property in the national interest and for the benefit of
claimants generally, rather than for the benefit of the relatively few individual claimants who happened to have filed
suit and obtained attachments. Petitioner therefore cannot

7

complain of the President's exercise of the very powers
Congress conferred on him.
Petitioner was on notice of the contingent and subordinate nature of its interest when it filed suit, by virtue of
regulations providing that "any attachment* * *is null and
void" with respect to Iranian property"[ u]nless licensed or
authorized" under the regulations (31 C.F.R. 535.203(e)
( 1980)) .and making clear that the general license for prejudgment attachments and other proceedings (31 C.F.R.
535.418,535.504 (1980)) "may be* * *revoked at any time"
(31 C. F. R. 535.805 (1980)). When that genera1license for
pre-judgment attachments was revoked, the legal basis for
the attachments was eliminated and the attachments were
rendered "null and void. "5 Moreover, as we explain in our
opening brief(Govt. Br. 28-38), past decisions ofthis Court
make clear that a pre-judgment attachment of frozen assets
in a suit against the foreign debtor does not restrict the
President in his control over the property in any event.
In petitioner's view, however, IEEPA does not allow the
President "permanently to dispose" of foreign property out

5 Petitioner

argues (Pet. Br. 37-40) that these regulations meant only
that no new attachments could be obtained after the license was
revoked, but that attachments that were obtained while the license was
in effect would remain valid . Such an interpretation is inconsistent with
the very concept of a license, which ordinarily allows the use of property
only at 'the sufferance of the licensor, without creating any vested
interest in the property that survives the revocation of the privilege. Cf.
DeHaro v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 599,627 (1867). Because a
license by definition may be revoked at any time, petitioner's construction renders the explicit revocability provision redundant. See Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 ( 1979). Furthermore, petitioner's
interpretation · is entirely inconsistent with the purpose of the assets
control regulations, which is to leave control of the assets by the
President unfettered by the creation of interests in property, by court
order or otherwise. See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S . 472 (1949).

8

of the country (Pet. Br. 28). 6 This argument is answered by
the very language of JEEP A itself. The statute authorizes
the President to "regulate" or "direct and compel" the
"transfer, withdrawal, transportation,* * * or exportation
of* * *any property in which [a] foreign country* * *has
any interest * * * by any person, or with respect to any
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"
(50 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 1702(a)(l)(B)). This language plainly
authorizes the President to license a foreign country to
"withdraw" or "export" the property it has in the United
States or, as here, to bring about the same result by "directing" and "compelling" "any person" in possession of Iranian property to "transfer," "transport," and "export" it so
that it will be placed in the security account or in the custody
and control of Iran, the country to which it belongs. See
McLaughlin & Teclaff, The Iranian Hostage Agreements:
A Legal Analysis, 4 Fordham Int'l L.J. 223, 235 ( 1981 ).
Petitioner has pointed to nothing in JEEP A or its legislative history to suggest that Congress did not intend these
words to mean exactly what they say. To the contrary, the
House Report emphasizes that the power granted in JEEP A
is ".sufficiently broad and flexible to enable the President to
respond as appropriate and necessary to unforeseen contingencies" (H.R. Rep. No. 95-459, 95th Cong., I st Sess. 10
( 1977)). Here, the President determined that the transfers of
Iranian property contemplated by the Agreement with Iran

6 Petitioner

argues (Pet. Br. 27-28) that this supposed "permanent"
disposition of the assets conflicts with JEEP A's purpose of allowing
only temporary freezing of foreign assets. But petitioner loses sight of
the fact that the President's withholding of the assets from Iran, the
owner of the property, was temporary in nature, lasting only so long as
necessary to accomplish the objectives of the blocking order.
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were an "appropriate and necessary" response to the
"unforeseen contingencies" of the crisis following the seizure of the American hostages, because they implemented
the Agreement providing for the release of the hostages and
resolution of claims of United States nationals and prepared the way "to begin the process of normalization of
relations between the United States and Iran" (Executive
Order Nos. 12279, 12280, 12281 (46 Fed. Reg. 7919,7921,
7923 ( 1981 )); Pet. App. 43, 46, 49).
Petitioner takes a narrower view of the statute's purposes, however, contending that the President cannot dispose of the assets in a way that affects its attachments and,
therefore, its ability to recover on its claim in district court.
It is true that the blocking powers authorized by IEEP A
were intended in part to protect American claimants. See
Govt. Br. 29-30. But Congress expected that this would be
accomplished by the President, through a lump sum or
other form of settlement of claims generally. See, e.g., H.R.
Rep. No. 95-459, supra, at 17. IEEPA was not intended to
be a mere supplement to whatever powers of attachment
individual claimants might have obtained in United States
courts, as petitioner would have it.
If attachments obtained by claimants in the United States
were held to prevent the President from transferring or
freeing up blocked assets, they would prevent the President
from resolving the crisis that first led to the blocking order,
as IEEP A obviously contemplates. In the particular circumstances of this case, such judicial restraints would prevent the transfer of the $1 billion in bank-held assets that are
to be placed in the security account to pay awards by the
Claims Tribunal. And if the remainder of Iranian assets that
are subject to attachment could not be returned to Iran in
accordance with the terms of the Agreement, there is every
likelihood that Iran would not make any additional payments into the security account to fund awards by the

10
Tribunal. In that event, the mechanism established by the
President for the settlement of claims of United States
nationals generally would be rendered ineffective. Such a
result, reached for the benefit of those relatively few claimants who obtained pre-judgment attachments, 7 would
plainly conflict with the clear congressional purpose in
enacting IEEPA that nothing in the Act was intended " to
impede the settlement of claims of U.S. citizens against
foreign countries" (S. Rep . No . 95-466, 95th Cong., I st
Sess . 6 ( 1977); emphasis added). s

7Thc

passages in the I EEPA hearing and markup transcripts cited by
petitioner (Pet . Br. 26 n.27) do not support its assertion that Congress
intended to permit the President to freeze assets and negotiate a settlement only where the claimants could not sue the foreign government in
United States courts.
xwc have answered petitioner's argument (Pet. Br. 25-27) that. by
virtue of Sections 9 and 34 of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).
50 U .S.C. app . 9 and 34, the President would have been prohibited
under the TWEA from transferring frozen assets overseas rather than
satisfying the claims of particular American claimants . See Govt. Br.
36-38. Those sections provided a right for claimants to recover only out
of assets that were vested in the federal government - i.e., foreign assets
to which the United States had taken title. There is no compa rable right
under the TWEA to recover out of assets that were only frozen or
blocked, a s is the case with Iranian assets. See Markham v. Cabell, 326
U.S. 404 , 409-410 (1945). Congress declined to permit the President to
vest foreign assets under IEEPA. This omission obviously was not
meant to assist American claimants, because they are thereby deprived
of the benefits of Sections 9 and 34; the omission wa s instead intended
for the protection of the foreign property owner whose property might
be taken over by the federal government. Thus, the deletion of the
ve sting power cuts strongly against recognizing a right in petitioner,
through its post-blocking attachments, to prevent the disp osition of
foreign as sets in the manner agreed to by their owner. Sec Mclaughlin
& Tcclaff, supra, 4 Fordham lnt'l L.J . at 236 .

II
4.a. Petitioner contends (Pet. Br. 33-43) that the President's Executive Orders requiring the transfer of property
notwithstanding the orders of attachment and other judicial
orders petitioner obtained constitute a taking of property
without just compensation and should, for that reason, be
enjoined. But these attachments were acquired pursuant to
a license that was expressly made revocable at any time, and
all such judicial orders were in any event subordinate to the
President's previously invoked power to direct the transfer
of assets pursuant to IEEPA. See Govt. Br. 36 n.29, 64;
Markham v. Cabell, supra; see also note 5, supra. Thus,
petitione!___had no proEerty interest resulting from these
judicial orders that could be asserted against the federal
government, and the President's directing the transfer of the
property therefore does not constitute a taking of property
requiring the payment of just compensation.9

----------

b. Petitioner concedes (Pet. Br. 34 n.32) that any taking
argument with respect to the President's exercise of his
distinct power to settle claims of United States nationals
"may not yet be ripe for review" because it has not yet
presented its claim to the Tribunal and therefore does not
know how that claim will be received by the TribunaJ. 10 See

9

Petitioner also contends (Pet. Br. 34, 36) that it is entitled to just
compensation because the President has "nullified" the judgment petitioner obtained against the Government of Iran and AEOI. However ,
Executive Order No. 12294 (46 Fed. Reg. 14111 (Feb. 26, 1981)) does
not purport to "nullify" petitioner's judgment; that order merely suspends the domestic effect of claims that may be submitted to the Claims
Tribunal. Cf. American lnt'l Group. Inc . v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
supra, slip op 32-34. Sec also Govt. Br. 55-56 & n.52.
10 Petitioner states (Pet. Br. 4) that it is "highly uncertain" whether its
claim against the Iranian defendant s is within the jurisdiction of the
Claims Tribunal, because that jurisdiction docs not extend to "claims
arising under a binding contract between the parties specifically providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of
the competent I ran ian courts" (Dec!. II, Art. I I; Pet. App . 31 ). Petitioner's contract provides that if a dispute between the parties cannot be

12
also Chas. T. Main lnt '1, Inc. v. Khu zestan Water & Power
Authority, supra, at 23-24; American lnt'l Group, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, slip op. 34-38. We agree
with petitioner that this aspect of the taking issue need not
be considered here. Petitioner's suit &gainst the Iranian
defendants in California has not be;.; dismiss~d, ther~ by
terminating Its cause o action in
· ed States courts. The
cia 1m underlying that suit 1as only been suspen ed, and this
~ension will in turn require on iy a sta y of judicial proceedings pending presentation of the claim to arbitration.
Thus, there can be no argument at this stage that petitioner's property has been taken. There will be time enough to
consider a taking argument if the district court eventually
resolved through discussion s, the dispute shall be submitted to conciliation by three conciliators, one to be appointed by each party and the
third to be appointed by an agency of the Government of Iran . If either
party does not accept the deci sion of the conciliators, the contract
provides that "the matter sha II be decided finally by resort tot he courts
of Iran" (Pet. Br. 4 n.2).
The United States has taken the position that a clause giving Iranian
courts jurisdiction over disputes arising under the contract may not be
"binding" within the meaning of the clause excluding claims arising
under certain contracts from the Tribunal's jurisdiction, because circumstances have so changed in Iran that enforcement of the provision
would be inconsistent with the parties' intent when they entered into the
contract. See Iranian Asset Seu/ement: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm . on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., I st Sess.
68 (I 981 ). Under the Agreement, the Tribunal is to decide cases on the
"basis of respect for law, • • • taking into account relevant usages of
the trade , contract provisions and changed circumstances" (Decl. II ,
Art. V; Pet. App. 33). The reference to "changed circumstances" in
Article V was included for the specific purpose of bringing the changed
circumstances doctrine into play with respect to forum clauses. Hearing, supra, at 68 . In addition , the government has taken the position
that, even if forum clauses are "binding" for purposes of the Agreement ,
clause s such as the one in petitioner's contract that provide for arbitra tion or conciliation prior to resort to the court s of Iran do not relate to
disputes "within the sole jurisdiction oft he competent Iranian courts"
for purposes of the exclusionary clause in Declaration II, Article II
(emphasis added).

1.1
orders petitioner's suit against the Iranian defendants dismissed following a ruling by the Claims Tribunal on the
merits of petitioner's claim- assuming, of course, that petitioner would be dissatisfied with the award and would
oppose the order of dismissal. II
There would, moreover, be a host of factors
___.., to be taken
into account in considering the taking issue, many of which
are necessarily speculative at the present time. First, of
course, is the question whether there could ever be a taking
of property for purposes of the Just Compensation Clause
resulting from the United States' settlement of a claim
against a foreign government, in view of the established
doctrine that claims taken up by the United States belong to
the United States. See Govt. Br. 49; see also United Statesv.
The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103, 110 (1801);
Great Western Insurance Co. v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl.
206, 217-218; aff'd on other grounds, 112 U.S. 193 (1884);
Arts Gloves, Inc. v. United States, 420 F. 2d 1386 (Ct. Cl.
1970). 12
.........____

11 Thus, this is not a case that will lead inexorably to a final conveyance of property without an opportunity for prior judicial review to
consider the availability of a Tucker Act remedy. Compare Regional
Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, f26-127, 138-141 (1974).
In any event, an injunction should not be entered to prevent the implementation of an Executive Agreement of the President in circumstances
such as this on the basis of mere speculation that the remedies provided
will not be adequate in a few individual cases.
12 Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 ( 1886), does not indicate that
there would be a compensable claim. Unlike the present situation, there
the court found a taking because the American claims were valid, would
have been honored by the French, and were released in full by the
United States. See Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States. supra, 420 F. 2d
at 1396-1397 (Nichols, J., concurring) . In the present case, the Executive has not renounced petitioners claim in a similar fashion. Moreover,
Gray was "strictly an advisory opinion [for Congress] which was not
binding upon either of the parties and cannot be binding upon subsequent courts" (420 F. 2d at 1393). As this Court said of Gray, "[w]e
think that payments thus prescribed to be made were purposely brought
within the category of payments by way of gratuity, payments as of
grace and not of right." Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S. 439,457 (1896).

14

Second, as uming~t a aki!}g could be found in some
such circumstances, the appropriate test in a situation
involving an en bloc settlement of claims, we submit, should
be whether, under the circumstances, the settlement provided for a reasonable recovery (or procedure for recovery)
for the claimants as a group (cf. United States v. Sioux
Nation of Indians, No. 79-639 (June 30, 1980), slip op.
35-50), not whether any particular claimant would have
received more in United States courts than he did in a lump
sum settlement or through an arbitration mechanism.
Indeed, any other rule would perhaps end the long-standing
practice of en bloc claims settlement by the Executive.
Third, if it were necessary to focus on the effects of a
settlement on each individual claim comprised therein, a
court considering a taking claim would be required to conduct a complex trial to determine whether the value
received in settlement was in fact less than would have been
received in domestic litigation. This would in turn depend
on a variety of factors, many of which are unrelated to the
merits of the particular contract, expropriation, or other
claim that had been settlcd.IJ
13Thus, in order to prove a taking of property in the context of the
Iranian Agreement, a claimant would have to demonstrate some or all
of the following: (I) that its underlying claim is meritorious; (2) that the
claim would have been decided by an American court notwithstanding
such defenses as sovereign immunity, act of state, lack of sufficient
contacts for in personam jurisdiction, or perhaps an Iranian forum
clause; (3) that the claimant could have executed on a domestic judgment against Iranian property that would have remained in this country
even absent the President's blocking order; (4) that the Tribunal's award
was less than that a domestic court would have rendered; (5) that the
claimant could not recover on an award from the Tribunal either from
the $1 billion Security Account or the funds used to replenish and
maintain that account at a minimum of $500 million; (6) that the
claimant could not satisfy any Tribunal award in the courts of other
nations, even those who arc a party to the Convention on Recognition
and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,21 U.S.T. 2517,
T.I.A.S. No. 6997; and (7) that it award would not be satisfied out of
funds received by the United States as damages if Iran should default
under the Agreement.

15
Finally, there is the question of what would constitute
just compensation for the settlement of an international
claim for less than its estimated value in domestic courts.
Cf. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973).
These issues obviously are better left for resolution in the
case of a particular claimant who can demonstrate a concrete effect on his financial position. Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Nos. 79-1538,
79-1596 (June 15, 1981), slip op. 26-31.
For the foregoing reasons and the additional reasons
stated in our opening brief, it is respectfully submitted that
the judgment of the district court should be affirmed .

H. McCREE, JR.
Solicitor General
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C iM-lE:>EF S OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 24, 1981

Re :

80 -2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan

.)

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
To "get the show on the road" Bill Rehnquist has

·-

agreed to get an opinion in our hands by noon Sunday ,
next - if not before .
Regards ,

,-:''l-lf'~•.an

\:.f-v:U:O: Ul Uf

~as-fringtcn. ~.

~U,...

QJ.

TlUl'IJ

20,?'!-.;l

CHAMIOERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 26, 1981
Re:

No. 80-2078 - Dames and Moore v. Regan, Secretary
of the Treasury

Dear Bill:
I may possibly have a few inconsequential
suggestions, but you may regard this as a "join."
I will place ten Brownie Points in your personnel
file and grant you two weekends leave.
Regards,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

._;

.§u.pntttt <!fourl of iltt 1lfuit~b .§taft,«
~frittgiott, ~. <!f. 20.?)1.~

17
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June 26 ,
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

80-2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan

Dear Bill,
After a quick reading . of your draft, which I think is
very good and which I shall study more carefully, I have the
following comments:
First, my own view, and I thought the view espoused in
Conference, is that because of the President ' s authority to
prevent and condition attachments and because of the orders
he issued to this effect, it was not feasible for any
creditor to acquire a property interest by attachment.
Hence , there is no barrier to the transfer of the attached
funds by the President and so no taking of a property
interest giving rise to a claim for compensation .
I had
thought that this would decide the taking question with
respect to liquidating the attachments .
Second , what we are withholding is a decision on the
taking question with respect to suspending or cancelling
claims rather than the attachments .
That discussion , along
with the matter of the Court of Claims '
jurisdiction ,
perhaps should come after the section of the opinion dealing
with claims settlement .
~ Third ,
and this is a minor matter with respect to the
attachment issue , it seems to me that we should say a word
in response to the argument that although the President
could have forbidden attachments , he allowed them and hence
permitted the acquisition of a property interest .
Of
course, this merely requires a construction of the licensing
regulation as anticipating retroactive revocation.

Otherwise , I am quite content .
Sinceredours ,

/1r ~
Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

'''

- ---·
.:§u-prtnu <!frtttd rtf tltt ~tdr .:§tmc.G'

'Jil'a£tlrtng4rn, ~. <!f. 2D.;iJl.~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 26, 1981

Re:

80-2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan

Dear Bill:

I

Congratulations and thanks for putting together a
first class opinion in such a short time span.
I am
prepared to join all of it except the two paragraphs on
pages 25-26 concerning jurisdiction in the Court of
Claims.. I have serious doubts on the jurisdictional
question and would simply not address it.
I will not,
however, write anything except something like the
enclosed brief statement.
My other suggestions, none of which is critical,
are these:
1. Page 28, line 10. Perhaps you should
delete the word "unanimous" in view of Judge
Breyer's separate opinion.
2. Page 36, line 9.
If, instead of stating
"crucial to our decision" you could merely state
something like "strongly supporting our decision"
I would be a little happier because I would reach
the same result without the congressional
approval.
3. Page 47, line 10.
If you could leave out
the words "are reasonable. The President has" I
would be happier because I would like to avoid
expressing an opinion that may be read as
approving the merits of the settlement and I think
your opinion will make the same point if you
thereby simply combine the first two sentences of
that paragraph.

-2-

As I indicated, whether you accept or reject the
last three suggestions, I will join your opinion except
for the two paragraphs I identified at the outset.
Respectfully,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
Enclosure

0$2078I

80-2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.

In my judgment the possibility that requiring this
petitioner to prosecute its claim in another forum will
constitute an unconstitutional "taking" is so remote that I would
not address the jurisdictional question considered in the last
two paragraphs of Part III of the Court's opinion.
join the remainder of the opinion.

However, I

,,
Io: rbe Chief Justice
Kr. Justice Brennan
ICr JU&tioe Stewart
lr . Justice lh1te

/

'

JUst1oe Marsh ~l l
.Just:1oe F J a ~ r. .- ...
Mr . Justice p ~ lir . Just1c& S 1 ·. .
Kr

AU-

J·rom : Xr. JU8tio"' ~ ---

C1roulat~: 6/;6/j/
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Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the
I

Treasury

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions presented by this case

touch ~

upon the manner in which our Republic is to be governed.

Throughout the nearly

tt~ ~r ~;l ~:::J:lLeJ:.e{]e ~

under the Constitution, 't:-hi-s-s ttb j e e-t has g ener ats4- considerable
debate.

We have had the benefit of commentators such as John

Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison writing in The
Federalist Papers at the nation's very inception, the benefit of
astute fo~eign observers of our system su6h as Ale~is
d'Tocqueville and James Bryce writing during the first century of
the nation's existence, and the benefit of many other treatises

·

t
·

- 2 as well as more than 400 volumes of reports of decisions of this
Court.

As these writings reveal it is

dangerous to

~any

~bti~~ - both

futile and

epigrammatical explanation of how

this country has been governed.

Indeed, as Justice Jackson

noted, "[a] judge ..• may be surprised at the poverty of really
useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems
I

of executive power as they actually present themselves."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634

(1952)

(concurring opinion).
Our decision today will not dramatically alter this
situation, for the Framers "did not make the judiciary the
overseer of our government."
concurring).

Id., at 594

(Frankfurter, J.,

We are confined to a resolution of the dispute

presented to us.

That dispute involves various executive orders

and regulations by which the President nullified attachments and
liens on Iranian assets in the United States, directed that these
assets be transferred to Iran, and suspended claims against Iran
that may be presented to an international Claims Tribunal.

This

-

3 -

action was taken in an effort to comply with an Executive
Agreement between the United States and Iran.

We granted

certiorari before judgment in this case, and set an expedited
briefing and argument schedule, because lower courts had reached
conflicting conclusions on the validity of the President's
actions and, as the Solicitor General informed

~~s

the

f

Government acted by July 19th, Iran could consider the United
States to be in breach of the Executive Agreement.
But before turning to the facts and law which we believe
determine the result in this case, we stress that the expeditious
treatment of the issues involved by all of the courts which have
considered the President's actions makes us acutely aware of the
necessity to rest decision on the narrowest possible ground
capable of deciding the case.
347 (1936)

Ashwander v. TVA, 297

(Brandeis, J., concurring).

u.s.

288,

This does not mean that

reasoned analysis may give way to judicial fiat.

It does mean

that the statement of Justice Jackson that we decide difficult
cases presented to us by virtue of our commissions, not our

.,

- 4 -

competence, is especially true here.

We attempt to lay down no

general "guide-lines" covering other situations not involved
here, and attempt to confine the opinion only to the very
questions necessary to decision of the case.
Perhaps it is because it is so difficult to reconcile the
foregoing definition of Article III judicial power with the broad
range of vitally important day-to-day questions regularly decided
by Congress or the Executive, without either challenge or
interference by the Judiciary, that the decisions of the Court in

~

this area have been rare, episodic, and a££ord- little
precedential value for subsequent cases.

The tensions present in

any exercise of executive power under the tri-partite system of
£98 e r~~

government established by the Constitution have been

reflected in opinions by members of ths Court more than once.
The Court stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299

u.s.

304, 319-320 (1926):

"[W]e are here dealing not alone with an authority
vested in the President by an exertion of legislative
power, but with such an authority plus the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President
as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations--a power which does

'·
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not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress, but which, of course, like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination
to the applicable provisions of the Constitution."

And yet 15 years later, Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion
in Youngstown, supra, which both parties agree brings together as
much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this
area, focused not on the "plenary and exclusive power of the
President" but rather responded to a claim of virtually unlimited
powers for the Executive by noting:
"The example of such unlimited executive power that
must have most impressed the forefathers was the
prerogative exercised by George III, and the
description of its evils in the Declaration of
Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating
their new Executive in his image." 343 U.S., at 641.

As we
we

~rn

to the factual and legal issues in this case,

freel~~~ ~bviously

episode in

t rre

eciding only one more

never-ending tension between the President

exercising the executive authority in a world that presents each
day some new challenge with which he must deal and the
Constitution under which we all live and which no one disputes
embodies some sort of system of checks and balances.

'•

-

6 -

I

On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran was
seized and our diplomatic personnel were captured and held
hostage.

In response to that crisis, President Carter, acting

pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50

u.s.c.

§§

1701-1706 (Supp. II 1978)

(hereinafter "IEEPA"),

declared a national emergency on November 14, 1979,1 and 1 blocked
the removal or transfer of "all property and interests in
...

property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and
controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or
become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ...• "
Executive Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65279.2

President Carter

lTitle 50 u.s.c. § 170l(a) (Supp. II 1978) states that the
President's authority under the Act "may be exercised to deal
with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source
in whole or in substantial part outside the United States, to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States, if the President declares a national emergency with
respect to such threat." Petitioner does not challenge President
Carter's declaration of a national emergency.
.
2Title 50 u.s.c. § 1702 (a) (1) (B) (Supp. II 1978) empowers
the President to:
"investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding,
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or
exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect

'•
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authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate
regulations carrying out the blocking order.

On November 15,

1979, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
issued a regulation providing that "[u]nless licensed or
authorizea ... any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution,
garnishment, or other judicial process is null ana void with
respect to any property in which on or since [November 14, 1979]
there existed an interest of Iran."

31 C.F.R.

§

535.203(e)

...
(1980).

The regulations also made clear that any licenses or

authorizations granted could be "amended, modified, or revoked at
any time."

31 C.F.R.

§

535.805 (1980) .3

On November 26, 1979, the President granted a general
license authorizing certain judicial proceedings against Iran but

--------------

which d_ia not allow the "entry of any juagment..__9..r of any decree
-------~·................-..._ '"---'"~--- ...________.~

to, or transactions involving, .any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest .••• "
331 C.F.R. § 535.805 (1980) provides in full:
"The
provision of this part ana any rulings, licenses, instructions,
orders, or forms issued thereunder may be amended, modified, or
revoked at any time."

..
- 8 or order of similar or analogous effect .... " 31 C.F.R. §
'------·----"\....-~::......-------

535.504 {a)

{1980).

-

On December 19, 1979, a clarifying regulation

was issued stating that "the general authorization for judicial
proceedings contained in§ 535.504{a) includes pre-judgment
attachment."

31 C.F.R. § 535.418 {1980).

On December 19, 1979, petitioner Dames & Moore filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Central District of
California against the Government of Iran, the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, and a number of Iranian banks.

In its

complaint, petitioner alleged that its wholly owned subsidiary,
Dames & Moore International, S. R. L., was a party to a written
contract with the Atomic Energy Organization, and that the
subsidiary's entire interest in the contract had been assigned to
petitioner.

Under the contract, the subsidiary was to conduct

site studies for a proposed nuclear power plant in Iran.

As

provided in the terms of the contract, the Atomic Energy
Organization terminated the agreement for its own convenience on
June 30, 1979.

Petitioner contended, however, that it was owed

-

9 -

$3,436,694.30 plus interest for services performed under the
contract prior to the date of termination.4

The District Court

issued orders of attachment directed against property of the
defendants, and the property of certain Iranian banks was then
attached to secure any judgment that might be entered against
them.
On January 19, 1981, the Americans held hostage were
released by Iran pursuant to an Agreement embodied in two
Declarations of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria {App. to Pet. for Cert., at 21-29), and
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the

4The contract stated that any dispute incapable of
resolution by agreement of the parties would be submitted to
conciliation and that, if either party was unwilling to accept
/} the results of conciliation, "the matter shall be decided finally
' by resort to the courts of Iran." Pet. for Cert., at 7, n.2. In
its complaint, which was based on breach of contract and related
theories, petitioner alleged that it had sought a meeting with
the Atomic Energy Organization for purposes of settling matters
relating to the contract but that the Organization "has
continually postponed [the] meeting and obviously does not intend
that it take place." Complaint in Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, No. 79-04918 LEW (Px) (C.D. Cal.), at ~ 27.

- 10 -

Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran (App. to Pet. for Cert., at 30-35).
The Agreement stated that "it is the purpose of [the United
States and Iran] •.• to terminate all litigation as between the
Government of each party and the nationals of the other, and to
bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims
through binding arbitration."

App. to Pet. for Cert., at 21-22.

In furtherance of this goal, the Agreement called for the
establishment of an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal which
would arbitrate any claims not settled within six months.

Awards

of the Claims Tribunal are to be "final and binding" and
~

"enforceable ... in the courts of any nation in accordance with its
laws."

Id., at 32.

Under the Agreement, the United States is

obligated
"to te..Qll..in~ie all legal proceedings in United States
courts invo ving claims of United States persons and
institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to
nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein,
to prohibit all further litigation based on such
claims, and to bring about the termination of such
claims through binding arbitration." Id., at 21-22.

In addition, the United States must "act to bring about the

...

- 11 transfer" by July 19, 1981, of all Iranian assets held in this
country by American banks.

Id., at 24-25.

One billion dollars

of these assets will be deposited in a security account in the
Algerian Central Bank and used to satisfy awards rendered against
Iran by the Claims Tribunal.

Id.

. . .-r-'\--.....

On January 19, 1981, Preside~r~Jr issued a series of
executive orders implementing the terms of the Agreement t
Executive Order Nos. 12276-12285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-7932.

These

orders revoked all licenses permitting the exercise of "any
right, power, or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds,
securities, or deposits; "nullified'' all non-Iranian interests in
such assets acquired subsequent to the blocking order of November
14, 1979; and required those banks holding Iranian assets to
transfer them "to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be
held or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the
Treasury."

Executive Order No. 12279, 46 Fed.

On February 24, 1981,

Reg~

Presiden~ ssued

7919.
a second

Executive Order in which he "ratified" - the January 19th
~

- 12 Executive Orders.

Executive Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111.

Moreover, he "suspended'' all "claims which may be presented to
the ••• Tribunal" and provided that such claims "shall have no
legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the United
States."

Ibid.

The suspension of any particular

~laim

terminates if the Claims Tribunal determines that it has no
jurisdiction over that claim; claims are discharged for all
purposes when the Claims Tribunal either awards some recovery or
determines that no recovery is due.

Ibid.

Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, petitioner moved for summary
judgment in the District Court against the Government of Iran and
the Atomic Energy Organization, but not as against the Iranian
banks.

The District Court granted petitioner's motion and

awarded petitioner the amount claimed under the contract plus
interest.

Thereafter, petitioner attempted to execute the

judgment by obtaining writs of garni·shment and execution in state
court in the State of Washington, and a sheriff's sale of Iranian
property in Washington was noticed to satisfy the judgment.

- 13 However, by order of May 28, 1981, as amended by order of June 8,
the District Court stayed execution of its judgment pending
appeal by the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy
Organization.

The District Court also ordered that all pre-

judgment attachments obtained against the Iranian defendants be
vacated and that further proceedings against the bank defendants
be stayed in light of the executive orders discussed above.

App.

to Pet. for Cert. at 106-107.
On April 28, 1981, petitioner filed this action in the
District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief against the
United States and the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking to
prevent enforcement of the executive orders and Treasury
Department regulations implementing the Agreement with Iran.

In

its complaint, petitioner alleged that the actions of the
President and the Secretary of the Treasury implementing the
Agreement ·with Iran were beyond their statutory and
constitutional powers and, in any event, were unconstitutional to
the extent they adversely affect petitioner's final judgment
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against the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy
Organization, its execution of that judgment in the State of
Washington, its pre-judgment attachments, and its ability to
continue to litigate against the Iranian banks.

Id., at 1-12.

On May 28, 1981, the District Court denied petitioner's motion
for a preliminary injunction and dismissed petitioner's complaint
I

for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Id., at 106-107.

Prior to the District Court's ruling; the
...

United States Courts of Appeals for the First and the District of
Columbia Circuits upheld the President's . authority to issue the
exectuve orders and regulations challenged by petitioner.

See

Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority,
No. 80-1027 (CA 1 May 22, 1981); American Int'l Group, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 80-1779 (CA DC May 22,
1981) (Opinion filed June 5, 1981).

On June 3, 1981, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from
the District Court's order, and the appeal was docketed in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

On June 4,

- 15 the Treasury Department amended its regulations to mandate "the
transfer of bank deposits and certain other financial assets of
Iran in the United States to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
by noon, June 19."

App. to Pet. for Cert., at 151-152.

The

District Court, however, entered an injunction pending appeal
prohibiting the United States from requiring the transfer of
I

Iranian property that is subject to "any writ of attachment,
garnishment, judgment, levy, or other judicial lien" issued by
...

any court in favor of petitioner.

Id., at 168.

Arguing that

this is a case of ''imperative public importance," petitioner then
sought a writ of certiorari before judgment.
10.

See 28 U.S.C.

§

Pet. for Cert. at

210l(e); this Court's Rule 18 (1980).

Because the issues presented here are of great significance and
demand prompt resolution, we granted the petition for the writ,
adopted an expedited briefing schedule, and set the case for oral
argument on June 24, 1981.

u.s.

(1981).

II
The parties and the lower courts confronted with the instant

- 16 questions have all agreed that much relevant analysis is
contained in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952).

Justice Black's opinion for the Court in that case,

involving the validity of President Truman's effort to seize the
country's steel mills in the wake of a nation-wide strike,
recognized that "[t)he President's power, if any, to issue the
order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself."

Id., at 585.

Justice Jackson's concurring

opinion elaborated in a general way the consequences of different
types of interaction between the two democratic branches in
assessing presidential authority to act in any given case.

When

the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization from Congress, he exercises not only his powers but
also those delegated by Congress.

In such a case the executive

action "would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and
the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it."
Id., at 637.

When the President acts in the absence of
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congressional authorization he may enter "a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain."

Id., at 637.

In such a case the

analysis becomes more complicated, and the validity of the
President's action, at least so far as separation of powers
principles are concerned, hinges on a consideration of all the
circumstances which might shed light on the views of the

1

legislative branch toward such action, including "congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence."

Ibid.

Finally, when the

President acts in contravention of the will of Congress, "his
power is at its lowest ebb," and the Court can sustain his
actions "only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the
subject."

Id., at 637-638.

Although we have in the past and do today find Justice
Jackson's classification of executive actions into three general
categories analytically useful, we s'hould ·be mindful of Justice
Holmes' admonition, quoted by Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown,
343

u.s.,

at 597 (concurring opinion), that "The great ordinances

- 18 of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black
and white."

Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209

(1928) (dissenting opinion).

Justice Jackson himself recognized

that his three categories represented "a somewhat over-simplified
grouping," 343 U.S., at 635, and it is doubtless the case that
executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in

'
one of three pigeon-holes, but rather at some point along a
spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to
explicit congressional prohibition.

This is particularly true as

respects cases such as the one before us, involving responses to
international crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have
been expected to anticipate in any detail.
III
In nullifying post-November 14, 1979, attachments and
directing those persons holding blocked Iranian funds and
securities to transfer them to the Federal Reserve ·Bank of New
York for ultimate transfer to Iran, President Carter cited five

L-----------------The Government, however,

sources of express or inherent power.
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has principally relied
for these actions.

o~2

of

th~~:~

authorization

Section 1702 (a) (1) provides in part:

"At the times and to the extent specified in section
1701 of this title, the President may, under such
regulations as he may prescribe, by means of
instructions, licenses, or otherwise -(A)

investigate, regulate, or prohibit
( i)

any transact ions in foreign exchange,

(ii)
transfers of credit or payments between,
by, through, or to any banking institution, to the
extent that such transfers or payments involve any
interest of any foreign country or a national therebf,
(iii)
the importing or exporting of currency
or securities, and
(B)
investigate, regulate, direct and compel,
nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition,
holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or
dealing in, or exercising any right, power or privilege
with respect to, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest;
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States."

The Government contends that the acts of "nullifying" the
attachments and ordering the "transfer" of the frozen assets are
specifically authorized by the plain. language of the above
statute.

The two Courts of Appeals that have considered the
-~

issue agreed with this contention.

In Chas. T. Main Int'l., Inc.

v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, supra, the Court of Appeals

...

-
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for the First Circuit explained:
"The President relied on his IEEPA powers in November
1979, when he 'blocked' all Iranian assets in this
country, and again in January 1981, when he 'nullified'
interests acquired in blocked property, and ordered
that property's transfer. The President's actions, in
this regard, are in keeping with the language of IEEPA;
initially he 'prevent[ed] and prohibit[ed]' 'transfers'
of Iranian assets; later he 'direct[ed] and
compel[led]' the 'transfer' and 'withdrawal' of the
assets, 'nullify[ing]' certain 'rights' and
'privileges' acquired in them.
"Main argues that IEEPA does not supply the
President with power to override judicial remedies,
such as attachments and injunctions, or to extinguish
'interests' in foreign assets held by United States 1
citizens. But we can find no such limitation in
IEEPA's terms. The language of IEEPA is sweeping and
unqualified. It provides broadly that the President
may void or nullify the 'exercising [by any person of]
any right, power or privilege with respect to ..• any
property in which any foreign country has any interest
.... ' 50 u.s.c. § 1702(a) (1) (B) (emphasis added)."
Id., at 9.

In American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, supra,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
employed a similar rationale in sustaining President Carter's
action:
"The Presidential revocation of the license he
issued permitting prejudgment restraints upon Iranian
assets is an action that falls within the plain
language of the IEEPA. In vacating the attachments, he
acted to 'nullify [and] void ••. any ••• exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to ••• any
property in which any foreign country ••• has any
interest ••• by any person .•• subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.'" Id., at 19
(footnote omitted).
--

- 21 Petitioner contends that we should ignore the plain language
of this statute because an examination of its legislative history
as well as the history of
Act (TWEA), 50
language of

§

u.s.c.

5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy

§

App.

§

5(b), from which the pertinent

1702 is directly drawn, reveals that the statute

was not intended to give the President such extensive power over
the assets of a foreign state during times of national emergency.
According to petitioner, once the President instituted the
November 14, 1979, blocking order,

§

1702 authorized him "only to

continue the freez e or to discontinue controls."

Brief of

Petitioner at 32.
We do not agree and refuse to read out of

§

1702 all meaning

r-----------------------------------------~
to the words "transf e r", "compel", or "nullify." Nothing in the
-~~---------........__

legislative history of either
requires such a result.

§

1702 or

§

5(b) of the TWEA

To the contrary, we think both the

legislative history and cases interpreting the TWEA fully sustain
the broad authority of the Executive when acting under this
congressional grant of power.

See,

~'

Orvis v. Brownell, 345

- 22 U.S. 183 (1953) .5

Although Congress intended to limit the

President's emergency power in peacetime, we do not think the
changes brought about by the enactment of the IEEPA in any way
affected the authority of the President to take the specific
actions taken here.

We likewise note that by the time petitioner

instituted this action, the President had already entered the

5petitioner argues that under the TWEA the President was
given two powers: (1) the power temporarily to freeze or block
the transfer of foreign-owned assets; and (2) the power summarily
...
to seize and permanently vest title to foreign-owned assets. It
is contended that only the "vesting" provisions of the TWEA gave
the President the power to permanently dispose of assets and when
Congress enacted the IEEPA in 1977 it purposefully did not grant
the President this power. According to petitioner, the
nullification of the attachments and the transfer of the assets
will permanently dispose of the assets and would not even be
permissible under the TWEA. We disagree. Although it is true
that the IEEPA does not give the President the power to "vest" or
to take title to the assets, it does not follow that the
President is not authorized under both the IEEPA and the TWEA to
~
otherwise permanently dispose of the assets in the manner done
~
here. Petitioner errs in assuming that the only power granted
the language used in both § 1702 and § 5(b) of the TWEA is the
power to temporarily freeze assets. As noted above, the plain
language of the statute defies such a holding. Section 1702
-~·
authorizes the President to "direct and compel" the "transfer,
·~
withdrawal, transportation, ••. or exportation of ••• any
/?j~~- .. _
property in which any foreign country •.. has any interest •... " r-v~~
We likewise reject the contention that Orvis v. Brownell,
345 U.S. 183 (1953), and Zittman v. McGrath, 341 u.s. 446 (1951),
grant petitioner the right to retain . its attachment.s on the
Iranian assets. To the contrary, we think Orvis supports the
proposition that an American claimant may not use an attachment
that is subject to a revocable license and that has been obtained
after the entry of a freeze order to limit in any way the actions
the President may take under § 1702 respecting the frozen assets.
While an attachment so obtained may determine the relationships
between the creditor and the foreign debtor, it is in every sense
subordinate to the President's power under the IEEPA.

+'

S· -

b)

J

- 23 freeze order.

Petitioner proceeded against the blocked assets

only after the Treasury Department had issued revocable licenses
authorizing such proceedings and attachments.

The Treasury

regulations provided that "unless licensed" any attachment is
null and void, 31 C.F.R.

§

535.203 (e), and all licenses "may be

amended, modified or revoked at any time."

31 C.F.R.

§

535.805.
I

As such, the attachments obtained by petitioner were specifically
made subordinate to further actions which the President might
take under the IEEPA.

natur~~Jis

Petitioner was on notice of the contingent

interest in the frozen assets.

~~~J)

'd N~~

This Court has

previou~y

recognized

f,
that

~ ·~
the

foreign assets in the hands of the President .••• "

u.s.

472, 493 (1949).

congress·onal~

Propper v.

Such orders permit the

President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use
in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency.
The frozen assets serve as a "bargaining chip" to be used by the
President when dealing with a hostile country.

~

l~~~~) ~ ~fl-.,4

purpose in authorizing blocking orders is "to put control of

Clark, 337

...

Accordingly, it

~

- 24 is difficult to accept petitioner's argument because the
practical effect of it is to allow individual claimants
throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this
"bargaining chip" through attachments, garnishments or similar
encumbrances on property.

Neither the purpose the statute was

enacted to serve nor its plain language supports such a result.
I

Because the President's action in nullifying the
attachments and ordering the transfer of the assets was taken
pursuant to specific congressional authorization, it is
"supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion
would rest heavily upon any who might attack it."
343

u.s.,

at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).

Youngstown,

Under the

circumstances of this case, we cannot say that petitioner has
sustained that heavy burden.

A contrary ruling would mean that

the Federal Government as a whole lacked the power exercised by
the President, see id., at 636-637, and that we are not prepared
to say.

~!y)~'~
~
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We do not think it is appropriate at the present time to
contention that even if the President had
the authority to nullify the attachments, transfer the assets,
and "suspend" all claims pending in United States courts
(discussed infra), such actions would constitute an
unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution in the absence of just
compensation.

f

However, this contention, and the possibility that

the President's actions may effect a taking of petitioner's
property, makes ripe for adjudication the question whether
petitioner will have a remedy at law in the Court of Claims under
the Tucker Act, 28

u.s.c.

§§

1941, et

~.,

in such an event.

That the fact and extent of the taking in this case is yet
speculative is inconsequential because "there must be at the time
of taking 'a reasonable, certain and adequate provision for
obtaining · compensation. '"
Cases, 419

u.s.

Regional ·Ra i 1 Reorgani za:t ion Act

102, 124-125 (1974), quoting Cherokee Nation v.

Southern Kansas R. Co., 135

u.s.

641, 659 (1890); Cities Service

- 26 Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330, 335-336

(1952); Duke Power Co. v.

Carolina Enviornmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 94, n.39

(1978).

It has been contended that the "treaty exception" to the
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1502, might preclude the Court of Claims
from exercising jurisdiction over any takings claim the
petitioner might bring.

At oral argument, however, the
I

Government conceded that § 1502 would not act as a bar to
petitioner's action in the Court of Claims.
Arg. at

We agree.

Transcript of Oral

See United States v. Weld, 127 U.S. 51

(1888); United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 427

(1893);

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889 (Ct. Cl.
1976).

Accordingly, to the extent petitioner believes it has

suffered an unconstitutional taking by any of the President's
actions discussed here today, we see no jurisdictional obstacle
to an appropriate action in the United States Court of Claims
under the Tucker Act. 6

6we are not implying that petitioner has in fact suffered
a taking of his property by the President's actions nullifying
the attachments. That question, however, should be addressed
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Although we have concluded that the IEEPA constitutes
specific congressional authorization to the President to nullify
the attachments and order the transfer of Iranian assets, there
remains the question of the President's authority to suspend
claims pending in American courts.

Such claims have, of course,

an existence apart from the attachments which accompanied them.
In terminating these claims through Executive Order No. 12294,
the President purported to act under authority of both the IEEPA
and 22

u.s.c.

§

1732, the so-called "Hostage Act".7

App. to Pet.

for Cert. 52.
We conclude that although the IEEPA authorized the

initially by the Court of Claims if the occassion should arise.
We also note that we agree with petitioner and the Government
that the question of whether the "suspension" of the claims
constitutes a "taking" is not ripe for review. Brief of
Petitioner at 34, n. 32; Brief of the United States at 65.
Accord Chas. T. Main Int'l., Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power
Authority~ No. 80-1027 (CA 1, May 22, 1981) at 23-24; American
Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 80-1779, 801891 (CA DC June 5, 1981) at 34-38.
7 Judge Mikva, in his separate opinion in American Int'l
Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, slip op., at 1, argued
that the moniker "Hostage Act" was newly-coined for purposes of
this litigation. Suffice it to say that we focus on the language
of 22 u.s.c. §1732, not any short-hand description of it. See
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, II, ii, 43 ("What's in a name?").

- 28 nullification of the attachments, it cannot be read to authorize
the suspension of the claims.

The claims of American citizens

against Iran are not in themselves transactions involving Iranian
property or efforts to exercise any rights with respect to such
property.

An in personam lawsuit, although it might eventually

be reduced to judgment and that judgment might be executed upon,
is an effort to establish liability and fix damages and does not
focus on any particular property within the jurisdiction.

The

terms of IEEPA therefore do not authorize the President to
suspend claims in American courts.

This is the unanimous view of

all the courts which have considered the question.

Chas. T. Main

Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, slip op., at
13-14A; American Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, slip
op., at 27 n. 15; The Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Iran National
Airlines, 79 Civ. 7035 (CBM), slip op., at 17-20 (SONY, June 11,
1981); Electronic Data Systems v. Social Security Organization of
Iran, No. CA3-79-218-F, slip op., at 20 (ND Tex., June 7, 1981).
The Hostage Act, passed in 1868, provides:

-
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"Whenever it is made known to th~ President that
any citizen of the United States has been unjustly
deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of
any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the
President forthwith to demand of that government the
reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be
wrongful and in violation of the rights of American
citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the
release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded
is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall
use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may
think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the
release; and all the facts and proceedings relative
thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by
the President to Congress." 22 U.S.C. § 1732.

We are reluctant to conclude that this provision constitutes
specific authorization to the President to suspend claims in
American courts.

Although the broad language of the Hostage Act

suggests it may cover this case, there are several difficulties
with such a view.

The legislative history indicates that the Act

was passed in response to a situation unlike the recent Iranian
crisis.

Congress in 1868 was concerned with the activity of

certain countries refusing to recognize the citizenship of
naturalized Americans travelling abroad and repatriating such
citizens against their will.
Cong., 2d Sess.

(1868)

Conness); see also 22

See,

~,

Cong. Globe 4331, 40th

(Sen. Fessenden); id., at 4354 (Sen.

u.s.c.

§

1731.

These countries were not
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interested in returning the citizens in exchange for any sort of
ransom.

This also explains the reference in the Act to

imprisonment "in violation of the rights of American
citizenship."

Although the Iranian hostage-taking violated

international law and common decency, the hostages were not
seized out of any refusal to recognize their American
citizenship--they were seized precisely because of their American
citizenship.

The legislative history is also somewhat ambiguous

on the question whether Congress contemplated presidential action
such as that involved here or rather simply reprisals directed
against the offending foreign country and its citizens.
~,

Cong. Globe 4205, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.

See,

(1868); American

Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, slip op. 1-3 (opinion of
Mikva, J.).
Concluding that neither IEEPA nor the Hostage Act
constitutes specific authorization of the President's action
suspending claims, however, is not to say that these statutory
provisions are entirely irrelevant to the question of the

- 31 validity of the President's action.

We think both statutes

highly relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressional
acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances
such as those presented in this case.

As noted above in Part

III, supra, at 18-20, the IEEPA delegates broad authority to the
President to act in times of national emergency with respect to
property of a foreign country.

The Hostage Act similarly

indicates congressional willingness that the President have broad
discretion when responding t
sovereigns.

the

~f

foreign

As Senator Williams, draftsman of the language

eventually enacted as the Hostage Act, put it:
"If you propose any remedy at all, you must invest
the executive with some discretion, so that he may
apply the remedy to a case as it may arise. As to
England or France he might adopt one policy to relieve
a citizen imprisoned by either one of those countries;
as to the Barbary powers, he might adopt another
policy; as to the islands of the ocean another. With
different countries that have different systems of
government he might adopt different means." Cong.
Globe 4359, 40thCong., 2dSess. (1868).

Proponents of the bill recognized that it placed "a loose
discretion" in the President's hands, id., at 4238 (Sen.
Stewart), but argued that "[s]omething must be intrusted to the

- 32 Executive" and that "[t]he President ought to have the power to
do what the exigencies of the case require to rescue [a] citizen
from imprisonment".

Id., at 4233, 4357 (Sen. Williams).

An

original version of the Act, which authorized the President to
suspend trade with a foreign country and even arrest citizens of
that country in the United States in retaliation, was rejected
because "there may be a great variety of cases arising where
other and different means would be equally effective and where
the end desired could be accomplished without resorting to such
dangerous and violent measures."

Id., at 4233 (Sen. Williams).

Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA or the
Hostage Act directly authorizes the President's suspension of
claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor
of Congress' legislation in this area in trying to determine
whether the President is acting alone or at least with the
acceptance of Congress.

As we have noted, Congress cannot

anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the
President may find it necessary to take or every possible
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Such faiiure of Congress

specifically to delegate authority does not, "especially .•• in the
areas of foreign policy and national security," imply
"congressional disapproval" of action taken by the Executive.

u.s.

(1981) .

When Congress has enacted

legislation delegating broad authority to the President to act in
certain circumstances, and the President takes action in a
similar and analogous circumstance, though perhaps not precisely
covered by the statute, it is reasonable to suppose similar
congressional willingness that the President have broad
authority.

The enactment of legislation closely related to the

question of the President's authority in a particular case which
evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad
discretion may be considered to "invite" "measures on independent
presidential responsibility,"
(Jackson, J., concurring).

Youngstown, 343

u.s.,

at 637

At least this is so where there is no

contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as here,
there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of
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the sort engaged in by the President.

It is to that history

which we now turn.
Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding
claims by nationals of one country against the government of
another country are ''sources of friction" between the two
sovereigns.

United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 225 (1942).

To resolve these difficulties, nations have often entered into
agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals.

As

one treatise writer puts it, international agreements settling
claims by nationals of one state against the government of
another "are established international practice reflecting
traditional international theory".
and the Constitution 262 (1972).

L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs
Consistent with that principle,

the United States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign
authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign
countries.8

Though those settlments have sometimes been made by

8 At least since the case of the "Wilmington Packet" in
1799, Presidents have exercised the power to settle claims of
United States nationals by executive agreement. See Lillich, The

- 35 treaty, there has also been a long standing practice of settling
such claims by executive agreement without the advice and consent
of the Senate.

Under such agreements, the President has agreed

to renounce or extinguish claims of United States nationals
against foreign governments, in return for lump sum payments or
the establishment of arbitration procedures.

To be sure, many of
I

these settlements were encouraged by the United States claimants
themselves, since a claimant's only hope of obtaining any payment
at all might lie in having his government negotiate a diplomatic
settlement on his behalf.

But it is also undisputed that the

"President has sometimes disposed of the claims of citizens
without their consent, or even without consultation with them,
usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as
distinguished from those of the nation of the whole. "

Henkin,

Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974, 69 Am. J. Int'l
L. 837, 844 (1975). In fact, during the period of 1817-1917, "no
fewer than eighty executive agreements were entered into by the
United States looking to the liquidation of claims of its
citizens." McClure, International Executive Agreements 53
(1941). See also 14 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 247
(1970).
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supra, at 263.

Accord, The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign

Relations Law of the United States §213 (1965)

(President "may

waive or settle a claim against a foreign state ••. even without
the consent of the [injured] national").

It is clear that the

practice of settling claims continues today.

Since 1952, the

President has entered into at least ten binding settlements with
foreign nations, including an $80 million dollar settlement with
the People's Republic of China. 9
Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that
Congress has implictly approved the practice of claim settlement
by executive agreement.

This is best demonstrated by Congress'

enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22
U.S.C. § 1621, et seq., as amended
purposes:

(1980).

The Act had two

(1) to allocate to United States nationals funds

received in the course of an executive claims settlement with

9 Those agreements are 30 U.S.T. 1957 (1979) (People's
Republic of China); 27 U.S.T 3993 (1976) (Peru); 27 U.S.T. 4214
{1976) (Egypt); 25 U.S.T. 227 (1974) (Peru); 24 U.S.T. 522 (1973)
(Hungary); 20 U.S.T. 2654 (1969);
(Japan); 16 U.S.T. 1 (1965)
(Yugoslavia); 14 U.S.T. 969 (1963) Bulgaria); 11 U.S.T. 1953
(1960) (Poland); 11 U.S.T. 317 (1960) {Rumania).
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Yugoslavia, and (2) to provide a procedure whereby funds
resulting from future settlements could be distributed.

To

achieve these ends Congress created the International Claims
Commission, now the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and
gave it jurisdiction to make final and binding decisions with
respect to claims by United States nationals against settlement
funds.

I

By creating a procedure to implement future settlement

agreements, Congress placed its stamp of approval on such
...

agreements.

Indeed, the legislative history of the Act observed

that the United States was seeking settlements with countries
other than Yugoslavia and stated that the bill "contemplates that
settlements of a similar nature are to be made in the future".
H. Rep. No. 81-770, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 8 (1949).
Over the years Congress has frequently amended the
International Claims Settlement Act to provide for particular
problems arising out of settlement agreements, thus demonstrating
Congress' continuing acceptance of the President's claim
settlement authority.

With respect to the Executive Agreement
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with the Peoples Republic of China, for example, Congress
established an allocation formula for distribution of the funds
received pursuant to the Agreement.

22

u.s.c.

§

1627.

As with

legislation involving other executive agreements, Congress did
not question the fact of the settlement or the power of the
President to have concluded it.

In 1976, Congress authorized the

Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to adjudicate the m~rits of
claims by United States nationals against East Germany, prior to
any settlement with East Germany, so that the Executive would "be
in a better position to negotiate an adequate settlement .•• of
these claims."

S. Rep. No. 94-1188, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2

(1976); 22 U.S.C.

§

1644b.

Similarly, Congress recently amended

the International Claims Settlement Act to facilitate the
settlement of claims against Vietnam.
1645a(5).

22 U.S.C.

§

1645;

§

The House Report stated that the purpose of the

legislation was to establish an offi~ial i~ventory ·of losses of
private U.S. property in Vietnam so that recovery could be
achieved "through direct Government-to Government negotiation of

- 39 private property claims."
Sess. 2-3 (1980).

H.R. Rep. No. 96-915, 96th Cong. 2d

Finally, the legislative history of the IEEPA

further reveals that Congress has accepted the authority of the
Executive to enter into settlement agreements.

Though IEEPA was

enacted to provide for some limitation on the President's
emergency powers, Congress stressed that "nothing in this Act is
I

intended to interfere with the authority of the President to
[block assets], or to impede the settlement of claims of United
States citizens against foreign countries."
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1977): 50 U.S.C.

§

S. Rep. No. 95-466,
1706 (a) (1) .10

10 Indeed, Congress has consistently failed to object to
this long-standing practice of claim settlement by executive
agreement, even when it has had an opportunity to do so. In
1972, Congress entertained legislation relating to congressional
oversight of such agreements. But Congress took only limited
action, requiring that the text of significant executive
agreements be transmitted to Congress. 1 u.s.c. § 112b. In Haig
v. Agee, __ u.s. __ (1981), we noted that "Despite the
longstanding and officially promulgated view that the Executive
has the power to withold passports for reasons of national
security, Congress in 1978, 'though it once again enacted
legislation relating to passports, left completely untouched the
broad rule-making authority granted 'in the earlier ·Act.'" Id.,
at 20, quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965). Likewise in
this case, Congress, though legislating in the area, has left
"untouched" the authority of the President to enter into
settlement agreements.
The legislative history of 1 U.S.C. § 112b further reveals
that Congress has accepted the President's authority to settle
claims. During the hearings on the bill, Senator Case, the
sponsor of the Act, stated with respect to executive claim

- 40 In addition to congressional acquiescence in the President's
power to settle claims, prior cases of this Court have also
recognized that the President does have some measure of power to
enter into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and
consent of the Senate.

In United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203

(1942), for example, the Court upheld the validity of the
Litvinov Assignment, which was part of an Executive Agreement
whereby the Soviet Union assigned to the United States amounts
owed to it by American nationals so that outstanding claims of
other American nationals could be paid.

The Court explained that

the resolution of such claims was integrally connected with
normalizing United States' relations with a foreign state.
"Power to remove such obstacles to full
recognition as settlement of claims of our
nationals ..• certainly is a modest implied power of the
President .•.• No such obstacle can be placed in the way
of rehabilitation of relations between this country and
settlements that:
"I think it is a most interesting [area] in which
we h~ve accepted the right of ~he Pre~ident, tine
individual, acting through his diplomatic force, to
adjudicate and settle claims of American nationals
against foreign countries. But it is a fact."
Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress: Hearings before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 74
(1971).
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another nation, unless the historic conception of his
power and responsibilities .•• is to be drastically
revised." Id., at 229-230.

Similarly, Judge Learned Hand recognized:
"The constitutional power of the President extends
to the settlement of mutual claims between a foreign
government and the United States, at least when it is
an incident to the recognition of that government; and
it would be unreasonable to circumscribe it to such
controversies. The continued mutual amity between this
nation and other powers again and again depends upon a
satisfactory compromise of mutual claims; the
necessary power to make such compromises has existed
1
from the earliest times and been exercised by the
foreign offices of all civilized nations."

Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (CA 2 1951).
Petitioner raises two arguments in opposition to the
proposition that Congress has acquiesced in this long-standing
practice of claims settlement by executive agreement.

First, it

suggests that all pre-1952 settlment claims, and corresponding
court cases such as Pink, should be discounted because of the
evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Petitioner

observes that prior to 1952 the United States adhered to the
doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity, so that absent action by
the Executive there simply would be no remedy for an United
States national against a foreign government.

When the United

-
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States in 1952 adopted a more restrictive notion of sovereign
immunity, by means of the so-called "Tate'' letter, it is
petitioner's view that United States nationals no longer needed
Executive aid to settle claims and that, as a result, the
President's authority to settle such claims in some sense
"disappeared".

Though petitioner's argument is not wholly

without merit, it is refuted by the fact that since 1952 1 there
have been at least ten claim settlements by executive agreement.
Thus, even if the pre-1952 cases should be disregarded,
congressional acquiescence in settlement agreements since that
time supports the President's power to act here.
Petitioner next asserts that Congress divested the President
of the authority to settle claims when it enacted the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (hereinafter "FSIA"), 28
§

1602 et seq.

u.s.c.

The FSIA granted personal and subject matter
distric~

jurisdiction in the federal

courts over commercial suits

brought by claimants against those foreign states which have
waived immunity.

28

u.s.c

§

1330.

Prior to the enactment of the
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FSIA, a foreign government's immunity to suit was determined by
the Executive Branch on a case-by-case basis.

According to

petitioner, the principal purpose of the FSIA was to depoliticize
these commercial lawsuits by taking them out of the arena of
foreign affairs--where the Executive Branch is subject to the
pressures of foreign states seeking to avoid liability through a
f

grant of immunity--and by placing them within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts.

Petitioner thus insists that the

President, by suspending its claims, has circumscribed the
jurisdiction of the United States courts in violation of Article
III of the Constitution.
We disagree.

In the first place, we do not believe that the

President has attempted to divest the federal courts of
jurisdiction.

Executive Order No. 12294 purports only to

"suspend" the claims, not divest the federal court of
"jurisdiction".

As we read the Executive Order, those claims

not within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal will "revive"
and become judicially enforceable in United States courts.

This
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case, in short, illustrates the difference between modifying
federal court jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply a
different rule of law.

u.s.

1, 103 (1801).

See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5

The President has exercised the power,

acquiesced in by Congress, to settle claims and, as such, has
simply effected a change in the substantive law governing the
lawsuit.

I

Indeed, the very example of sovereign immunity belies

petitioner's argument.

No one would suggest that a determination
...

of sovereign immunity divests the federal courts of
"jurisdiction".

Yet, petitioner's argument, if accepted, would

have required courts prior to the enactment of the FSIA to reject
as an encroachment on their jurisdiction the President's
determination of a foreign state's sovereign immunity.
Petitioner also reads the FSIA much too broadly.

The

principal purpose of the FSIA was to codify contemporary concepts
concerning the scope of sovereign immunity and withdraw from the
President the authority to make binding determinations of the
sovereign . irnrnuni ty to be accorded foreign states.

See Chas T.

- 45 Main, Int'l v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, slip. op., at
20;

American Int'l Group Inc. v Islamic Republic of Iran, slip

op., at 30-32.

The FSIA was thus designed to remove one

particular barrier to suit, namely sovereign immunity, and cannot
be fairly read as prohibiting the President from settling claims
of United States nationals against foreign governments.

It is

telling that the Congress which enacted the FSIA conside~ed but
rejected several proposals designed to limit the power of the
President to enter into. executive agreements, including claims
settlement agreements. 11

It is quite unlikely that the same

Congress that rejected proposals to limit the President's
authority to conclude executive agreements sought to accomplish
that very purpose sub silentio through the FSIA.

And, as noted

11 The rejected legislation would typically have required
congressional approval of executive agreements before they would
be considered effective. See Congressional Oversight of
Executive Agreements: Hearings on s. 632 and S. 1251 Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 243-261, 302-311 (1975);
Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific
Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong.
2d Sess. 167, 246 (1976).

- 46 above, just one year after enacting the FSIA, Congress enacted
the IEEPA, where the legislative history stressed that nothing in
the IEEPA was to impede the settlement of claims of United States
citizens.

It would be surprising for Congress to express this

support for settlement agreements had it intended the FSIA to
eliminate the President's authority to make such agreements.
In light of all of the foregoing--the inferences to 1 be drawn
from the character of the legislation Congress has enacted in the
area, such as the IEEPA and the Hostage Act, and from the history
of acquiescence in executive claims settlement--we conclude that
the President was authorized to suspend pending claims pursuant
to Executive Order No. 12294.
in Youngstown, 343

u.s.,

As Justice Frankfurter pointed out

at 610-611, "a systematic, unbroken

executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and
never before questioned .•. may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive
Power' vested in the President by

§

·1 of Art. II."· Past practice

does not, by itself, create power, but "long-continued practice,
known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption
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that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its
consent •••• "
(1915).

United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469

See Haig v. Agee, ___ u.s., at

Such practice

is present here and such a presumption is also appropriate.

In

light of the fact that Congress may be considered to have
consented to the President's action in suspending claims, we
cannot say that action exceeded the President's powers.
Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the means
chosen by the President to settle the claims of American
nationals are reasonable.

The President has provided an

alternate forum, the Claims Tribunal, which is capable of
providing meaningful relief.

The Solicitor General also suggests

that the provision of the Claims Tribunal will actually enhance
the opportunity for claimants to recover their claims, in that
the Agreement removes a number of jurisdictional and procedural
impediments faced by claimants in United States courts.
for United States at 13-14.
the

Brief

Although being overly sanguine about

chances of United States claimants before the Claims

- 48 Tribunal would require a degree of naivite . which should not be
demanded even of judges, the Solicitor General's point cannot be
discounted.

Moreover, it is important to remember that we have

already held that the President has the statutory authority to
nullify attachments and to transfer the assets out of the
country.

The President's power to do so does not depend on his

provision of a forum whereby claimants can recover on those
claims.

The fact that the President has provided such a forum

here means that the claimants are receiving something in return
for the suspension of their claims, namely, access to an
international tribunal before which they may well recover
something on their claims.

Because there does appear to be a

real "settlement" here, this case is more easily analogized to
the more traditional claim settlement cases of the past.
Just as importantly, Congress has not dissapproved of the
action taken here.

Though Congress has held hearings on the

Iranian Agreement itself,l2 Congress has not enacted legislation,

Footnote(s) 12 appear on following page(s).

- 49 or even passed a resolution, indicating its displeasure with the
Agreement.

Quite the contrary, the relevant Senate Committee has

stated that the establishment of the Tribunal is "of vital
importance to the United States."
1st Sess. 5 (1981) .13

s.

Rep. No. 97-71, 97th Cong.,

We are thus clearly not confronted with a

situation in which Congress has in some way resisted the exercise
of presidential authority.
Finally, we reemphasize the narrowness of our decision.

We

do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to
settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities.

As

the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stressed, "the sheer
magnitude of such a power, considered against the background of

12 See Hearings on the Iranian Agreements Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981);
Hearings on the Iranian Assests Settlement Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); Hearings on the Algerian Declarations Before the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981).
13 Contrast congressional reaction to the Iranian
Agreements with congressional reaction to a 1974 Executive
Agreement .with Czechoslovakia. There the President sought to
settle over $105 million in claims against Czechoslovaka for
$20.5 million. Congress quickly demonstrated its displeasure by
enacting legislation requiring that the Agreement be
renegotiated. See Lillich, supra, at 839-40. Though Congress
has shown itself capable of objecting to executive agreements, it
has rarely done so and has not done so in this case.

r
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the diversity and complexity of modern international trade,
cautions against any broader construction of authority than is
necessary."

Chas T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power

Authority, slip. op., at 22.

But where, as here, the settlement

of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the
resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country
and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Congress
acquiesced in the President's action, we are not prepared to say
that the President lacks the power to settle such claims.
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST
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June 29, 1981

Re:

No. 80-2078

Dames & Moore v. Regan

Dear Harry:
Thank you for your letter of June 29th, with its
suggestions for possible changes in the opinion.
As you
might imagine, we are in something of a mad scramble right
now, trying to tailor the opinion to the votes taken at
Conference this morning, but my tentative views on your
suggestions are as follows:
1.
Since I would not necessarily reach the same result
without at least implicit congressional approval, I would
prefer leaving line 9 on page 36 as is.
·2.
I agree with your suggestion relative to line 10 on
page 47, and that should appear in the next draft to be
circulated.
3.
I think you are quite right that we are now
concerned with a deposit in the Bank of England, and I
propose to change the opinion to so state.
I would prefer
not- to elaborate any more than necessary as to how the bank
funds were transferred, though if you feel strongly on the
point and have language to suggest I will certainly consider
it.
4. With respect to Orvis, I had thought that a "once
over lightly" touch was best for the case. Orvis did not
have a license, and given the sharp contrast between the
decisions in Orvis and Zittman I would prefer to give as
little analysis to these cases as possible, since the
present case does not turn upon them.
I will try to work
into the last sentence of footnote 5 on page 22 some
modifications along the line you suggest.
5.
I think I have quite consistently maintained that
the "delegation doctrine", as you refer to it, has a

•..

'··'

different reach in foreign affairs than it does in domestic
affairs.
I think the Court so stated in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S ,. 304, 319-320 (1936),
while at the same time making it clear that such delegation
might not be upheld in a purely domestic matter. Since we
have chosen to rest the "suspension of claims" neither on
the delegation contained in § 1732 nor in IEEPA, but simply
refer to them along with a host of similar congressional
instances of acquiescence in the exercise of Presidential
power in a certain area, I think the language is consistent
with Jackson's statement in Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637,
cited on page 33.
If you have any modifications to suggest,
I would of course be happy to consider them.
6.
I felt after the Conference vote that there was
neither a majority to place direct reliance on § 1732 nor on
IEEPA for the "suspension" of the suits, and therefore
attempted to conform the opinion to the views of the
Conference.
I am pleased to think that you believe I
succeeded.
7. The opinion will conclude with a statement that the
mandate shall issue forthwith.

Sincerely, ~·

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
P.S~
On further pondering your letter, with respect to
paragraph 4, I would certainly be willing to go so far as to
say in the last sentence of footnote 6 on page 22:

"An attachment so obtained is in every sense
subordinate to the President's powers under the
IEEPA."
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RE:

No. 80-2078 Dames & Moore v. Regan
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Dear Bi 11:

l
~~

.

Confirming what I said at conference this morning
I am happy to join your really splendid opinion. I
understand that you intend to incorporate Byron's first
suggestion in his letter of June ·26, and I very much
favor that.
job.

Again my thanks and congratulations upon a great
Sincerely,

t/1) . ,

/~ · LL
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

:

~np-rtutt

<!fcurt of Urt ~b' ~hdte

Jfaeltittgt~ ~. <!f. 2ll~'l'
CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:
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No. 80-2078 - Dames and Moore v. Regan

Dear Bill:
I am generally with you and offer the following minor
suggestions for your last minute consideration:
1.
As is John, I, too, am concerned about the words
"crucial to our decision" in line 9 on page 36.
I would go
along with his "strongly supporting our decision" alternative
suggestion.
~

2.

I also agree with John's suggestion, relative to line

10 on page 47, and the omission of five words in that line.
3. At the top of page 11 reference is made to the coming
deposit in a security account in the Algerian Central Bank.
I
thought we were now concerned with a deposit in the Bank of .·
England.
Should some explanation be made, perhaps by way of
footnote, as to how this change came about?

I

''

4.
This comment relates to footnote 5 on page 22.
I
would have preferred an explicit statement that the attachment
in Orvis was valid only as a means of obtaining jurisdiction
over the foreign debtor.
The footnote's last sentence statement that a post-freeze attachment "may determine the relationships between the creditor and the foreign debtor" is true only
in a limited number of circumstances. Since the President may
override a post-freeze attachment, and since the FSIA forbids
the use of attachments for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction, it is doubtful that an att ac hme n t will be of much use in
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties.
It
would be of use only if the President simply decided to lift
the freeze without invoking any of his other powers under the
Emergency Act, leaving the foreign country free to withdraw its
a s sets unl es s r e straine d by an att ac hme nt.
The stat e ment in Orvis that a p ost-freeze attachment
"determined relationships between creditor and enemy debtor,"
345 u.s., at 186-187, was the source of petitioner's claim in
this c a se that the P re sid e nt had no powe r to invalidate its
a tt a chme nt.
By re p eat i ng th a t statemen t, I th i nk we may be
cr e ating con f usion.
/

Page 2.

' :

'

I

'
'

'

'

5.
I am somewhat concerned about the material, particularly . the first 2 sentences, that follow the citation of Haig
v. A~ee on page . 33.
Given your views on the delegation
doctr1ne in general, I was a little surprised by the presence
of those sentences. More importantly, however, I have no idea
where such a rule could lead. As of now, I think the statement
of that rule is unnecessary to the decision in this case, in
view of the clear history of congressional approval of claims
settlements set forth subsequently in the Dpinion.
I would be
much happier if those sentences could be deleted.
6.
I am pleased
reliance on § 1732.

that

the

opinion

places

no

direct

7.
Should the opinion conclude with a statement that the
mandate shall issue forthwith?
Sincerely,

JJ~ .
I

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference
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CHAHBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 29 , 1981

Re:

80-2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan

Dear Bill,
I congratulate you and thank you for a
fine job accomplished in a remarkably short
time. ·
It seems to me that the first suggestion
in Byron's letter to you of June 26 is correct,
and I hope you will incorporate it. With this
single qualification , you can count on my
joining your opinion if I am still a Member
of the Court , when it is announced .
Sincerely yours ,

· --

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

~ttprttttt
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CHAMBER S O F'

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 80-2078

Dames & Moore v. Regan

In light of today's conference and the various
correspondence, I have the fol~ ing cha ~ es to make:
I am happy to make the first and third of the changes
suggested in John's letter of June 26, but prefer not to
make the second.
Pages 25-26, and n. 6, are deleted. The following is
added as a new footnote on page 24, line 6:
Although petitioner concedes that the
President could have forbidden attachments, it
nevertheless argues that once he allowed them he
permitted claimants to acquire property interests
in their attachments. Petitioner further argues
that only the licenses to obtain the attachments
were made revocable, not the attachments
themselves. It is urged that the January 19,
1981, order revoking all licenses only affected
petitioner's right to obtain future attachments.
We disagree. As noted above, the regulations
specifically provided that any attachment is null
and void "unless licensed", and all licenses may
be revoked at any time. Moreover, common sense
defies petitioner's reading of the regulations.
The President could hardly have intended
petitioner and other similarly situated claimants
to have the power to take control of the frozen
assets out of his hands.

- 2 Our construction of petitioner's attachments
as being "revocable," "contingent," and "in every
sense subordinate to the President's power under
the IEEPA," in effect answers petitioner's claim
that even if the President had the authority to
nullify the attachments and transfer the assets,
the exercise of such would constitute an
unconstitutional taking of property in violation
of the Fifth Amendment absent just compensation.
We conclude that because of the President's
authority to prevent or condition attachments, and
because of the orders he issued to this effect,
petitioner did not acquire any "property" interest
in its attachments of the sort that would support
a constitutional claim for compensation.
I have attached new pages, essentially old pages 25-26,
including a new footnote, to appear at the end of the
opinion.
Sincerely,

/

~/

.

v
we do not think it is appropriate at the present time to
address petitioner's contention that even if the President had

a... .J.,~
the authority to suspend all claims pending in United States
A.

courts such action would constitute an unconstitutional taking in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in the absence of just compensation.!

Both

petitioner and the Government concede that the question of
whether the suspension of the claims constitutes a taking is not
ripe for review.

Brief of Petitioner at 34, n.

United States at 65.

32~

Brief of the

Accord Chas. T. Main Int'l., Inc. v.

Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, Slip Op., at

23-24~

American

Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Slip Op., at at
34-38.

However, this contention, and the possibility that the

President's actions may effect a taking of petitioner's property,
makes ripe for adjudication the question whether petitioner will
have a remedy at law in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act,
28

u.s.c. S

1491, in such an event.

That the fact and extent of

- 2 the taking in this case is yet speculative is inconsequential
because "there must be at the time of taking 'a reasonable,
certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation.'"
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419

u.s.

102, 124-125

(1974), quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135
U.S. 641, 659 (1890); Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342

u.s.

330, 335-336 (1952); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 94, n.39 (1978).
It has been contended that the "treaty exception" to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 28

u.s.c.

§

1502, might

preclude the Court of Claims from exercising jurisdiction over
any takings claim the petitioner might bring.

At oral argument,

however, the Government conceded that S 1502 would not act as a
bar to petitioner's action in the Court of Claims.
Oral Arg. at 39-42, 47.
127

u.s.

(1893);

We agree.

Transcript of

See United States v. Weld,

51 (1888); United States v. Old Settlers, 148

u.s.

427

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889 (Ct.

Cl. 1976).

Accordingly, to the extent petitioner believes it has

- 3 -

suffered an unconstitutional taking by any of the President's
actions discussed here today, we see no jurisdictional obstacle
to an appropriate action in the United States Court of Claims
under the Tucker Act.
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly affirmed,
and the mandate shall issue forthwith.

13/

Though we conclude that the President has settled

petitioner's claims against Iran, we do not suggest that the
settlement has terminated petitioner's possible taking claim
against the United States.

We express no views on petitioner's

claims that it has suffered a taking.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE W>< . .J . BRENNAN, .JR.

Zll.?'!~

June 29, 1981

j
t

RE:

No. 80-2078 Dames & Moore v. Regan

Dear Bi 11:
Your proposed changes outlined in your memorandum of
June 29 and enclosure are satisfactory to me.
Your responses to Harry respecting his suggestions are
also satisfactory.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

(!Jontt of Urr 'Jltnmlt .;§ hrlril'
)lagJ:tittgLrn. tJ3. QJ. 2U~J-I.~

~u:pr rtru>

CHAMBEI=IS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 29, 1981

Re:

80-2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan

Dear Bill:
Your changes are entirely acceptable to me and I
therefore join your opinion, except for the discussion
of the Court of Claims jurisdiction in Part v.
I have
sent the attached statement to the printer.
Respectfully,

Justice Rehnquist

---

Copies to the Conference
Attachment

'l'o; The Chief J ust i c e

Mr. J ustice Br ennan
Mr . J ustice Sts.wart
~·~!' . J ustice W1::~1 te
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T ~· .. "":~ r0
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From : Mr. Justice Stevens

80-2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan

Circulated: _

9
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-'---

Recirculated: ___________

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring .

In my judgment the possibility that requiring this
petitioner to prosecute its claim in another forum will
constitute an unconstitutional "taking " is so r emote that I would
not address ·the jurisdictional question considered in Part V of
the Court's opinion .
opinion .

However, I join the remainder of the

·~~

.,

June 29, 1981 '
•

:Of

80-2078 Dames ' Moore v. Regan
Dear Bill:
"'

I share the same admiration, expressed by others,
of your fine opinion and of the remarkable way in which you
produced it on such short notice.
The changes you have made in response to the
majority vote at Conference this morning with respect to
attachments prevent, however, my joining your opinion in its
entirety. Accordingly, I am circulating a brief opinion
concurring and dissenting in part.

~

f,,,

~*;~11

t:'

I must add, just for my own personal satisfaction,
that if the honor of the United States had not been pledged,
I would have nao great difficulty in sustaining the validity
of the Agreements of Algiers. Having been coerced by the
terrorist conduct of Iran in seizing and holding American
diplomats for ransom, the United States certainly was not
legally bound by these agreements. They would have been
voida6Ie, I think, in the courts of any country that had a
civilized legal system as well as before the International
Court of Justice. Having said this, I agree that the
President had authority to enter into these agreements.
We
your severe
reaction to
The bracing

all are much indebted to you and I hope that
discomfort over the weekend was merely a natural
the great pressure under which you have worked.
air of New England should be restorative.
•!J

Sincerely,

ii

~.: \'

"

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

1l,
l
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring and dissenting in part.
I join the Court's opinion except its decision
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that the nullification of the attachmentsjeffect~d
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taking
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the Court's opinion with respect

to the suspension and settlement of claims, I am
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agreemeRL

The opinion makes clear und;;J the Agreements of
~
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~fi;me ~~-~ claims~inst

Algiers*
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Iran and its
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instrumentalities ~ay not be adjudicated at a~ by the

c ,. ,,..$
Tribunal, and that others may not be paid in full.

Arei~~

P•" f,-..j
The Court holds that
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~~t
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not ~ adjudicated or not fully

~ ~ ~s
paid may be asoerte&iin the Court of Claims, the
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jurisdiction of
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~ this

Court acknowledges• a.n.d- w-i-l-1-··Be-
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*We recognize these Agreements because they pledged the
honor of the United States of Amerio.a. The Agreements would
not be binding under any rule of civfiized law as they were
coerced by Iran's lawless seizure of American diplomats.

3.
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relatively few persons, subject to the jurisdiction of our
courts, may not be appropriated by government as "bargaining
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chips" to further/\ foreign policy goals en---Be-h-a.±f--·e ·t;. ......t,h.e.-.
without providing just compensation.*

natio~.

The

extraordinary powers of the President and Congress upon
which our decision today rests cannot, in the circumstances.
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c"'"'"""''("'e'.....,f,-.1· l«r1•M

of this case, displace the Bill of Rights.

cr....... ~«-.

~~

*As ~held

in Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49

(1959):
"The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for public u~e ~
without just compensation was designed to
government from forcing some people alon to .
bear public burdens, which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole."

I

the recent case of Agins v. Tiburon,

'

. <

'·

' l:

.

u.s.

(1980) .
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IRANC2 SALLY-POW
JUSTICE POWELL, concurrinq and dissenting in part.
I join the Court's opinion except its decision
that the nullification of the attachments effected no taking
of property interests giving rise to a claim for
compensation.

This presents a separate question from

whether the settlement of claims may constitute a taking of
private property for public use requiring compensation.

I

would leave each type of "taking" claim for resolution on a
case-by-case basis in actions before the Court of Claims.
Even though the Executive Orders purported to make all
attachments conditional, there is a substantial question
whether these Orders by imposing restrictions on the timely
exercise of legal rights, may not in themselves have
effected a taking.

Moreover, the circumstances involved in

the hundreds of pending claims are not known to this Court.

2.

In my opinion, therefore, today's decisions with respect to
attachment is premature.
As I understand the Court's opinion with respect
to the suspension and settlement of claims, I am in
agreement.

The opinion makes clear under the Agreements of

Algiers* that some valid claims, against Iran and its
instrumentalities, may not be adjudicated at all by the
Arbitral Tribunal, and that others may not be paid in full.
The Court holds that claims not so adjudicated or not fully
paid may be asserted in the Court of Claims, the
jurisdiction of what this Court acknowledges, and will be
recognized by the United States as a taking under the Fifth
Amendment for a public purpose upon a showing that the

*We recognize these Agreements because they pledged the
honor of the United States of America. The Agreements would
not be binding under any rule of civilized law as they were
coerced by Iran's lawless sei.zure of American diplomats.

·,

3.

government's action created loss or damage with respect to
the assertion of a valid claim, he just claims of a
relatively few persons, subject to the jurisdiction of our
courts, may not be appropriated by government as "bargaining
chips" to further foreign policy goals on behalf of the
nation, without providing just compensation.*

The

extraordinary powers of the President and Congress upon
which our decision today rests cannot, in the circumstances
of this case, displace the Bill of Rights.

*As held in Ar_mstrong V:• United States, 364
(1959):

u.s. 40, 49

"The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation was designed to bar
government from forcing some people along to
bear public burdens, which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole."

This basis of the "taking clause" was reaffirmed unanimously
in the recent case of Agins v. Tiburon,

u.s.

(1980).

Mr. Justice Brennan

lkr. Juatioe Stewart
Mr. Justice White

f.h'. Juatioe
Mr. Justice
Mr;r. Justice
tar. Justice

Marshall
Blackrnun
Rehnquist
Stevens

~Justice Powell
l:.,.l.om.• uIIU-.

JUN Z 9 1981
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R8 ctrculated: ---------JUSTICE

POWELL,

concurring

and

dissenting

in

part.
I
that

th~

taking

join the Court's opinion except its decision

nullification of the attachments did not effect a

of

property

just compensation.

interests

giving
, n. 6.

Ante, at

rise

to

claims

for

The nullification

of attachments presents a separate question from whether
the suspension and proposed settlement of claims against
Iran may constitute a taking.
claims
actions

open

for

before

resolution
the

Court

of

I would leave both "taking"
on

a

case-by-case

Claims.

The

basis

facts

of

in
the

hundreds of claims pending against Iran are not known to
this Court and may differ from the facts in this case.

I

therefore dissent from the Court's decision with respect
to attachments.

The decision may well be erroneous,l and

lEven though the Executive Orders purported to make
attachments conditional, there is a substantial quest ion
whether the Orders themselves may have effected a taking
by making conditional the attachments that claimants
against
Iran
otherwise
could
have
obtained
without
condition.
Moreover,
because it is settled that an
attachment entitling a creditor to resort to specific
property for the satisfaction of a claim is a property

2.

it certainly is premature.
I agree with the Court's opinion with respect to
the suspension and settlement of claims against Iran and
its instrumentalities.

The opinion makes clear that some

claims may not be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal, and
that others may not be paid in full.

The Court holds that

parties whose claims are not adjudicated or not fully paid
may bring a

"taking" claim against

the United States

in

the Court of Claims, the jurisdiction of which this Court
acknowledges.
when

it

The Government must pay

furthers

the

nation's

foreign

just compensation
policy

goals

by

making "bargaining chips" of claims held by a relatively
few

persons

courts.2

and

subject

to

the

jurisdiction

The extraordinary powers of

the

of

our

President and

right compensable under the Fifth Amendment, Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), Louisville Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), there is a question whether
the revocability of the license under which petitioner
obtained its attachment suffices to render revocable the
attachment itself.
See Marschalk Co. v. Iran National
Airlines Corp., No. 79 Civ. 7035 (CBM) (June 11, 1981).
2 As the Court held in Armstrong v. United States, 3 6 4
u.s. 40, 49 (1960):
"The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use
without just compensation was designed to bar

3.

Congress

upon

which

our

decision

rests

cannot,

in

the

circumstances of this case, displace the Just Compensation
Clause.

Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fair ness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."
The Court unanimously reaffirmed this basis of the Just
Compensation Clause in the recent case of Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260-261 (1980).

Mr. Justice Brennan

MT. Juetioe Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Plt'. Juat1oe Marshall
Mr. Justice Bla.clanun
Mrr. Justice Rehnquist
Mr. Justice Stevens

~• uJustice Powell
~om·.
mJ,.- .

,jUN 2 9 1981
Circulated:-----------
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JUSTICE

POWELL,

concurring

and

---

dissenting

in

part.
I

join the Court's opinion except its decision

that the nullification of the attachments did not effect a
taking

of

property

just compensation.

interests

giving

Ante, at

, n. 6.

rise

to

claims

for

The nullification

of attachments presents a separate question from whether
the suspension and proposed settlement of claims against
Iran may constitute a taking.
claims
actions

open

for

before

resolution
the

Court

of

I would leave both "taking"
on

a

case-by-case

Claims.

The

basis

facts

of

in
the

hundreds of claims pending against Iran are not known to
this Court and may differ from the facts in this case.

I

therefore dissent from the Court's decision with respect
to attachments.

The decision may well be erroneous,l and

lEven though the Executive Orders purported
attachments conditional, there is a substantial
whether the Orders themselves may have effected
by making conditional the attachments that
against
Iran otherwise
could
have
obtained
condition.
Moreover,
because it is settled
attachment entitling a creditor to resort to
property for the satisfaction of a claim is a

to make
question
a taking
claimants
without
that an
specific
property

2.

it certainly is premature.
I agree with the Court's opinion with respect to
the suspension and settlement of claims against Iran and
its instrumentalities.

The opinion makes clear that some

claims may not be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal, and
that others may not be paid in full.

The Court holds that

parties whose claims are not adjudicated or not fully paid
may bring a

"taking" claim against the United States

in

the Court of Claims, the jurisdiction of which this Court
acknowledges.
when

it

The Government must pay

furthers

the

nation's

foreign

just compensation
policy

making "bargaining chips" of claims held by a
few

persons

courts.2

and

subject

The extraordinary

to

the

goals

relatively

jurisdiction

powers of

by

of

our

the President and

right compensable under the Fifth Amendment, Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), Louisville Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), there is a question whether
the revocability of the license under which petitioner
obtained its attachment suffices to render revocable the
attachment itself.
See Marschalk Co. v. Iran National
Airlines Corp., No. 79 Civ. 7035 (CBM) (June 11, 1981).
2 As the Court held in Armstrong v. United States, 364
u.s. 40, 49 (1960):
"The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use
without just compensation was designed to bar

3.

Congress

upon

which

our

decision

rests

cannot,

in

the

circumstances of this case, displace the Just Compensation
Clause.

Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."
The Court unanimously reaffirmed this bas is of the Just
Compensation Clause in the recent case of Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260-261 (1980).
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
The Court's opinion makes clear under the
Agreements of Algiers* that some valid claims,
against Iran
f
and its instrumentalities, may not be adjudicated at all by
the Arbitral Tribunal, and others may not be paid in full.
I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that claims
not so adjudicated or not fully paid may be asserted

in the

Court of Claims, the jurisdiction of which this Court
acknowledges, and will be recognized by the United States as

*We recognize these Agreements because they pledged the
honor of the United States of America. The Agreements would
not be binding under any rule of civilized law as they were
coerced by Iran's lawles~ seizure of American diplomats.

2.

a taking under the Fifth Amendment for a public purpose to
the extent such a claim has not been paid in full.

The just

claims of a relatively few persons, subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts, may not be appropriated by
government as "bargaining chips" to further foreign policy
goals on behalf of the nation, without providing just
(

compensation.*

The extraordinary powers of the President

and Congress upon which our decision today rests cannot
displace the Bill of Rights.

*Here pick up a quote from Agins.
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J usTICE STEVENS, concurring.
In my judgment the possibility that requmng this petitioner to prosecute its claim in another forum will constitute
an unconstitutional "taking" is so remote that I would not
address the jurisdictional question considered in Part V of the
the Court's opinion. However, I join the remainder of th~
opm10n.
•
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Dear Bill:
·'

This refers to your letter concerning the
certified questions in Marschalk.
It seems to me that the proper disposition would
be to dismiss the certified questions, and cite our opinion
that should speak for itself. You have written a full and
informative opinion. I do not think we should answer major,
substantive questions in monosyllables, any more than we
should write a syllabus for one of our opinions. My
recollection is that we have dismissed questions in other
cases: e.g., u. s. v. Will and Foley v. Carter (No. 80444).

-

~\

~,:

"'~

-

.,

}·\,'""':~

.;§uprrmr Qjcurt c tijt 1!lnit.t~ ~faf.cg
1Uaslringtcn, p. c.q. 20,5JI-.$
CHAM BE RS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 30, 1981

t

Re:
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

July 1, 1981

Proposed Order in No. 80-2127Q, Iran National Airlines v.
The Marschalk Co.
It is the opinion of this Court that the questions
certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit must be answered as follows:
(1}. Yes. See No. 80-2078, Dames & Moore v.
Regan, Secretary of the Treasury (July 2, 1981}.
(2}. Yes. See No. 80-2078, Dames & Moore v.
Regan, Secretary of the Treasury (July 2, 1981}.
(3}. The President's action in nullifying
the attachments did not constitute a taking of
property for which compensation must be paid. We
dismiss question (3} so far as it concerns whether
the action of the President in suspending the
claims constituted a taking of property for which
compensation must be paid. See No. 80-2078, Dames
& Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury (July
-- 2, 1981}.
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Iran National Airlines v. The Marschalk Co.

JUSTICE POWELL,;:diesenting.
I would dismiss the certificate, citing
=

Q'tl~lpAI1vza:

u.s.

,.,. J?all!e!3 &. Moore v.'HR..egan,

(1981}, announced today.

~

The Court's opi.nion in that case

provides 'the only answers that this Court should give to the
questions certified to us by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.

Having rendered an opinion on the subject

of those questions, we should not.,.!!1Sie'tala e. answer them
in monosyllables nor attempt a syllabus of a portion of the
Court's opinion.

We recently have dismissed certification

of questions where the Court has addressed the subject of
the questions in a full opinion. ~Foley, v. Carter,
7

-

u.s.

(1981).

u.s.

(1981).

See also United States v. Will,
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Mr. Just1ce Br0nnan
Mr Ju~t1ce Stewart
Kr . Justice White
Mr. JJstice Marshall
Mr Justtco Blackmun
Mr Tu~ttce Powell
Mr . Justice Stevens

TF~OUGROUI

From : Mr . Justice Rehnquist
C1roulated: ________

1st PRINTED DRAFT

, ',1rculated:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE!
No. 80-2078
Dames & Moor~, Petitioner,! On Writ of Certiorari to th~
v.
United States Court of.
Donald T. Regan, Secretary of
Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
the Treasury, et al.
[June -, 1981]
JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions presented by this case touch fundamentally
upon the manner in which our Republic is to be governed.
Throughout the nearly two centuries of our Nation's existence
under the Constitution, this subject has generated considerable debate. We have had the benefit of commentators such
as John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison writing in The Federalist Papers at the Nation's very inception,
the benefit of astute foreign observers of our system such as
Alexis deTocqueville and James Bryce writing during the first
century of the Nation's existence, and the benefit of many
other treatises as well as more than 400 volumes of reports
of decisions of this Court. As these writings reveal it is
doubtless both futile and perhaps dangerous to find any epigrammatical explanation of how this country has been governed. Indeed, as Justice Jackson noted, "[a] judge ... may
be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous
authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power
as they actually present themselves." Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 634 (1952) (concurring
opinion).
Our decision today will not dramatically alter this situation, for the Framers "did not make the judiciary the overseer
of our government." Id., at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
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ring). We are confined to a resolution of the dispute presented to us. That dispute involves various Executive Orders
and regulations by which the President nullified attachments
and liens on Iranian assets in the United States, directed that
these assets be transferred to Iran, and suspended claims
against Iran that may be presented to an International
Claims Tribunal. This action was taken in an effort to comply with an Executive Agreement between the United States
and Iran. We granted certiorari before judgment in this
case, and set an expedited briefing and argument schedule,
because lower courts had reached couflicting conclusions on
the validity of the President's actions and, as the Solicitor
General informed us, unless the Government acted by July
19, 1981, Iran could consider the United States to be in breach
of the Executive Agreement.
But before tuming to the facts and law which we believe
determine the result in this case, we stress that the expeditious
treatment of the issues involved by all of the courts which
have considered the President's actions makes us acutely
aware of the necessity to rest decision on the narrowest possible ground capable of deciding the case. Ashwander v. TV A,
297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This
does not mean that reasoned analysis may give way to judicial
fiat. It does mean that the statement of Justice Jacksonthat we decide difficult cases presented to us by virtue of our
commissions, not our competence-is especially true here.
We attempt to lay down no general "guide-lines" covering
other situations not involved here, and attempt to confine the
opinion only to the very questions necessary to decision of the
case.
Perhaps it is because it is so difficult to reconcile the foregoing definition of Art. III judicial power with the broad
range of vitally important day-to-day questions regularly decided by Congress or the Executive, without either challenge
or interference by the Judiciary, that the decisions of the
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Court in this area have been rare, episodic. and afford little
precedential value for subsequent cases. The tensions pres..
ent in any exercise of executive power under the · tri-partite
system of Federal Government established by the Constitution have been reflected in opinions by Members of this Court
more than once. The Court stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-320 (1926):
"[W] e are here dealing not alone with an authority
vested in the President by an exertion of legislative
power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-a power which does not require as a
basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of
course, like every other governmental power, must be
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of
the Constitution."
And yet 16 years later, Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Youngstown, supra, which both parties agree brings
together as much combination of analysis and common sense
as there is in this area. focused not on the "plenary and exclusive power of the President" but rather responded to a
claim of virtually unlimited powers for the Executive by
noting:
"The example of such unlimited executive power that
must have most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III. and the description of
its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to
doubt that they were creating their new Executive in
his image." 343 U. S., at 641.
As we now turn to the factual and legal issues in this case,
we freely confess that we are obviously deciding only one
more episode in the never-ending tension between the President exercising the executive authority in a world that pre-
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sents each day some new challenge with which he must deal
and the Constitution under which we all live and which no
one disputes embodies some sort of system of checks and
balances.

I
On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran
was seized and our diplomatic personnel were captured and
held hostage. In response to that crisis, President Carter,
acting pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act. 50 U. S. C. ~§ 1701-1706 (Supp. II 1978) (hereinafter "IEEPA"), declared a national emergency on N ovember 14, 1979.1 and blocked the removal or transfer of "all
property aud interests in property of the Government of
Iran. its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are qr become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. . . ." Executive Order No.
12170, 44 Fed. Ref.!;. 65279. 2 President Carter authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations carrying
out the blocking order. On November 15, 1979, the Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a regulation providing that "[u]nless licensed or authorized ... any
attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment,
Title 50 U. S. C. § 1701 (a) (Supp. II 1978) Rtate~ that ilw }>resident's authority under the Act "ma~r be exercised to deal with nn~· unu~ual
and extraordinary threat, which ha~ its source in whole or iu substantial part outside the United States, to the nationnl security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national
tJmergency with re~pect to such threat." Petitioner docs not challenge
Presid(•nt Carter's declaration of a national emergency.
2 Titlc 50 U.S. C. §1702(a)(l)(B) (Supp. II 1978) empower;:; the
PreRident to:
"inveHtigate, n·gulate, direct and eompel, nullify, void. prevent or wohibit,
any acquisition, holding, withholding, u~e, transfer, withdrawn! , tran~:>]Jorla
tion, importation or exportation of, or draling in, or exerci:sing an~' right,
power, or privilege with rc;;pect to, or tran;;artions involving, any property iu which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest. " • !'
1
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or other judicial process is null and void with respect to any
property in which on or since [November 14. 1979] there
existed an interest of Iran." 31 CFR § 535.203 (e) (1980).
The regulations also made clear that any licenses or authorizations granted could be "amended, modified, or revoked at
any time." 31 CFR § 535.805 (1980). 8
On November 26, 1979, the President granted a general
license authorizing certain judicial proceedings against Iran
but which did not allow the "entry of any judgment or of any
decree or order of similar or analogous effect .... " 31 CFR
§ 535.504 (a) (1980). On December 19. 1979. a clarifying
regulation was issued stating that "the general authorization
for judicial proceedings contained in § 535.504 (a) includes
pre-judgment attachment." 31 CFR § 535.418 (1980).
On December 19, 1979. petitioner Dames & Moore filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California agai11st the Government of Iran, the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran, and a number of Iranian ballks.
In its complaint, petitioner alleged that its wholly owned
subsidiary, Dames & Moore International. S. R. L .. was a
party to a written contract with the Atomic Energy Organization. and that the subsidiary's entire interest in the contract had been assigned to petitioner. Under the contract,
the subsidia.r y was to conduct site studies for a proposed
nuclear power plant in Iran. As provided in the terms of
the contract, the Atomic Energy Organization terminated the
agreement for its own convenience on June 30, 1979. Petitioner contended, however, that it was owed $3,436,694.30
plus interest for services performed under the contract prior
to the date of termination. 4 The District Court issued orders
8 31 CFR § 535.805 (1980) providr~ in full: "Thr provi~ion of this
part and any rulings, licrnsrs, in~tructions, ordrrs, or forms is.~11ed thcrcundPr may be Hmrnded, modified, or revoked at mt~' time."
4 The contract stated that any dispute incapable of resolution by agn•cmcnt of the parties would be submitted to conciliation aml that, if either·
party wa::s unwilling to. accept the results of conciliation, "the matter lihalf
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of attachm('nt directed against woperty of the defendants,
and the property of certain Iranian banks was then attached

to sc>cure any .iudgmPnt that might be entered against them.
On January 20. 1081. thr Americans hrlcl hostage were re}('asrd by Iran pursuant to an Agrerment entered into the day
before and embodied in two Declarations of tlw Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
(App. to Pet. for C'ert .. at 21-20). and Declaration of the
Gov('rnmcnt of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of th(' Unitrcl State's of Am('rica and the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran ( App. to Pet. for Cert .. at 3035). The Agreement stated that 11 it is the purpose of [the
United States and Iran l ... to terminate all litigation as
between the Government of each party and the nationals of
the other. and to bring about the settlement and termination
{)f all such claims through binding arbitration." App. to
Prt. for C'ert .. at 21-22. In furtherance of this goal. the
Agreement called for the establishment of an Iran-United
~tates C'laims Tribunal which would arbitrate any claims not
~ettlcd 'vithin 6 months. Awards of the Claims Tribunal arc
to be "final and binding" and "enforceable ... in the courts
t>f any nation in accordance with its law." !d., at 32. Under
the Agreement. the United States is obligated:
"to terminate all legal proceedings in United States
eourts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify
be decidPd fhiHll~· by rt>~ort to the comts of Iran ." Pet. for CNt. , at 7,
n. 2. In itR complaint, which WI\R based on breach of contmrt 11nd related
theories, petitionrr 11llq~ed that it had sought a mPPting with the Atomic
Enrrg~' Organization for pmposeR of sdtling mattf'r~ rPlating to the rontmct but 1hnt thE' Organization "hllR continually J10stponed [thf'l meE>ting
and obviou~ly clors not intend that it tnkr place." Complaint i11 DamPs

d: Moo1'e v. Atomic Energy 01'ganization of Iran, No. 79-04918 LEW
(Px) (CD Cal.), at ,[27.

l
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all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to
bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration." Id., at 21-22.
In addition, the United States must "act to bring about the
transfer" by July 19, 1981, of all Iranian assets held in this
country by American banks. Id., at 24-25. One billion dollars of these assets will be deposited in a security account in
the Bank of England, to the account of the Algerian CC'ntral
Bank, and used to satisfy awards rendered against Iran by
the Claims Tribunal. Ibid.
On January 19, 1981, President Carter issued a series of
Executive Orders implementing the terms of the Agreement.
Executive Order Nos. 12276-12285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-7932.
These orders revoked all licenses permitting the exercise of
"any right. power, or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds,
Sf'curities, or deposits; "nullified" all non-Iranian interests in
such assets acquired subsequent to the blockiug order of
November 14, 1979; and required those banks holding Iranian
assets to transfer them "to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, to be held or transferred as directed by the Secretary
of the Treasury." Executive Order No. 12279, 46 Fed. Reg.
7919.
On February 24. 1981, President Reagan issued an Executive Order in which he "ratified" the January 19th Executive Orders. Executive Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111.
Moreover, he "suspended" all "claims which may be presented to Lhe ... Tribunal" and provided that such claims
"shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any
court of the United States." Ibid. The suspension of any
particular claim terminates if the Claims Tribunal determines that it has no jurisdiction over that claim; claims are
discharged for all purposes when the Claims Tribunal either
awards some recovery and that amount is paid, or determines
that no recovery is due. Ibid.

L
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Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, petitioner moved for summary judgment in the District Court against the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Orgauization, but not
against the Iranian banks. The District Court granted petitioner's motion and awarded petitioner the amount claimed
under the contract plus interest. Thereafter, petitioner attempted to execute the judgment by obtaiuing writs of garnishment and execution in state court in the State of Washington, and a sheriff's sale of Iranian property in \Vashington
was noticed to satisfy the judgment. However, by order of
May 28, 1981, as amended by order of June 8, the District
Court stayed execution of its judgment pending appeal by
the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization. The District Court also ordered that all prej uclgmt>n t
attachments obtained against the Iranian defendants be
vacated and that further proceedings against the bank defendants be stayed in light of the Executive Orders discussed
above. App. to Pet. for Cert., at 106- 107.
On April 28, 1981, petitioner filed this action in the District Court for declaratory and inj uuctive relief against the
United States and the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking to
prevent enforcement of the Executive Orders and Treasury
Department regulations implementing the Agreement with
Iran. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that the actions
of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury implementing the Agreement with Iran were beyond their statutory
and constitutional powers and, in any event, were unconstitutional to the extent they adversely affect petitioner's final
judgment against the Governme11t of Iran and the Atomic
Energy Organization, its execution of that judgment in the
State of Washington, its prejudgment attachments, and its
ability to continue to litigate agaiust the Iranian banks. I d.,
at 1- 12. On May 28, 1981. the District Court denied petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissecf
petitioner's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
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relief could be granted. Id., at 106-107. Prior to the District Court's ruling, the United States Courts of Appeals for
the First and the District of Columbia Circuits upheld the
President's authority to issue the Executive Orders and regulations challenged by petitioner. See Chas. 7'. Main Int'l,
Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Author'ity, F. 2d (CAl 1981); American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran,- U.S. App. D. C . - , - F. 2cl- (1981).
On June 3, 1981, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from
the District Court's order, and the appeal was docketed in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
On June 4, the Treasury Department amended its regulations
to mandate "the transfer of bank deposits and certain other
financial assets of Iran in the United States to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York by noon, June 19." App. to Pet.
for Cert., at 151-152. The District Court, however, entere<l
an injunction pending appeal prohibiting the United States
from requiring the transfer of Iranian property that is subject to "any writ of attachment, garnishment, judgment, levy,
or other judicial lien" issued by any court in favor of petitioner. Id., at 168. Arguing that this is a case of "imperative public importance," petitioner then sought a writ of
certiorari before judgment. Pet. for Cert., at 10. See 28
U. S. C. § 2101 (e); this Court's Rule 18 (1980). Because
the issues presented here are of great significance and demand
prompt resolution, we granted the petition for the writ,
adopted an expedited briefing schedule, and set the case for
oral argument on June 24, 1981. U. S. (1981).

II
The parties and the lower courts confronted with the instant questions have all agreed that much relevant analysis
is contained in Youngstown Sheet & 'l'ube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U. S. 579 (1952). Justice Black's opiuion for the Court in
that case, involving the validity of President Truman's effort
to seize the country's steel mills in the wake of a nationwide

'
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strike, recognized that "ft]he President's power, if any, to
issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or
from the Constitution itself." !d., at 585. Justice Jackson's
eoncurriug opinion elaborated in a general way the consequences of different types of interaction between the two
democratic branches in assessing presidential authority to
act in any given case. When the President acts pursuant
to an express or implied authorization from Congress, he
exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by
Congress. In such a case the executive ~ction "would be
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." Id.,
at 637. When the President acts in the absence of congressional authorization he may enter "a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain." I d., at 637. In such a
case the analysis becomes more complicated, and the validity
of the President's action. at least so far as separation of
powers principles are concerned, hinges on a consideration
of all the circumstances which might shed light on the views
of the Legislative Branch toward such action , including "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence." Ibid. Finally,
when the President acts in contravention of the will of Congress, "his power is at its lowest ebb," and the Court can
sustain his actions "only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject." I d., at 637- 638.
Although we have in the past and do today find Justice
Jackson's classification of executive actions into three general categories analytically useful, we should be mindful of
Justice Holmes' admonition , quoted by Justice Frankfurter in
Youngstown , 343 U. S., at 597 (concurring opinion), that
"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish
a11d tlivide fields of black and white." Springer v. Philippine Islands , 277 U. S. 189, 209 (1928) (dissenting opinion) .
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Justice Jackson himself recognized that his three categories
represented "a somewhat over-simplified grouping," 343 U. S.,
at 635, and it is doubtless the case that executive action in
any particular illstance falls, not neatly in one of three
pigeon-holes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition. This is particularly true as respects
cases such as the one before us, involving responses to international crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have
been expected to anticipate in any detail.

III
In nullifying post-November 14, 1979, attachments and
directing those persons holding blocked Iranian funds and securities to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York for ultimate transfer to Iran, President Carter cited five
sources of express or inherent power. The Government. however, has principally relied on § 1702 of the IEEP A as authorization for these actions. Section 1702 (a) ( 1) provides
in part:
"At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701
of this title, the President may, under such regulations
as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses,
or otherwise-"(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit"(i) any transactious in foreign exchange,
"(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by,
through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that
such transfers or payments involve any interest of any
foreign country or a national thereof,
"(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities, and
"(B) investigate. regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, impor-
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tation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power or privilege with respect to, or transactions
invol viug, any property in which any foreign country or
a uational thereof has any interest;
"by any person. or with respect to any property, subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States."
The Government contends that the acts of "nullifying" the
attachmeuts and ordering the "transfer" of the fro~eu assets
are specifically authorized by the plain language of the above
statute. The two Courts of Appeals that have considered the
issue agreed with this contention. In Chas. T. Main lnt'l,
Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, supra, the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit explained:
"The President relied on his IEEP A powers in N ovember 1979, when he 'blocked' all Iranian assets io this
country, and again in January 1081, vrhen he 'nullified'
interests acquired in blocked property, and ordered that
}Jroperty's transfer. The President's actions, in this regard, are in keeping with the language of IEEP A; initially he 'prevent[ed] and prohibit[ed]' 'transfers' of
Iranian assets; later he 'direct[ed] and compelllecl]' the
'transfer' and 'withdrawal' of the assets. 'nullify[ing]'
certain 'rights' and 'privileges' acquired in them.
"Main argues that JEEP A does not supply the President with power to override judicial remedies, such as
attachments and injunctions, or to extinguish 'interests'
in foreign assets held by United States citi~ens. But we
can find no such limitation in TEEP A's terms. The language of IEEPA is sweeping and unqualified. 1t provides broadly that the President may void or nullify the
'exercising [by any person ofl any right, power or privilege with respect to ... any property in which any foreign country has any interest ... .' 50 U. S. C. ~ 1702
(a) (1) (B)." ]'. 2d, at (emphasis iu original).
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In American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
supra, the Court of Appea1s for the District of Columbia Circuit employed a similar rationale in sustaining President
Carter's action:
"The Presidential revocation of the license he issued
permitting prejudgment restraints upon Iranian assets is
an action that falls within the plain language of the
IEEPA. In vacating the attachments, he acted to 'nullify [and] void ... any ... exercising any right, power,
or privilege with respect to . . . any property in \vhich
any foreign country ... has any interest ... by any person ... subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.' ''
- F . 2d, a t - (foot11ote omitted).
Petitioner contends that we should ignore the plain language of this statute because an examination of its legislative
history as well as the history of ~ 5 (b) of the Trading With
the Enemy Act (hereinafter "TWEA"). 50 U. S. C. App.
~ 5 (b), from which the pertinent language of ~ 1702 is directly drawn, reveals that the statute was 11ot intended to
give the President such extensive power over the assPts of a
foreign state during times of national emergency. According
to petitio11er, once the President instituted the November 14,
1979, blockiug order, ~ 1702 authorized hilll "only to continue
the freeze or to discontinue controls." Brief for Petitioner, at
32.
We do not agree and refuse to read out of~ 1702 a1l meaning to the words "transfer," "compel," or "11ullify." Nothing
in the legislative history of either ~ 1702 or § 5 (b) of the
TWEA requires such a result. To the contrary, we think
both the legislative history and cases interpreting the TWEA
fully sustain the broad authority of the Executive when acting Wlder this cougressional grant of power. See, e. g., Orvis
v. Brownell, 345 U. S. 183 (1953)." Although Congress in0 Petitioner argue~ that under the TWEA thr Prc·~ident wa ~ givPn two
powen;: (1) t he power tempontrily lo freeze or blork the tran t~ fcr of for-

80-2078-0PINION

14

DAMES & MOORE v. REGAN

tended to limit the President's emergency power in peacetime, we do not think the changes brought about by the
enactment of the IEEP A in any way affected the authority
of the President to take the specific actions taken here. We
likewise note that by the time petitioner instituted this action, the President had already entered the frecr.e order.
Petitioner proceeded against the blocked assets only after the
Treasury Department had issued revocable licenses authorizing such proceedings and attachments. The Treasury regulations provided that "unless licenserl" any attachm<'IlL is
null and void, 31 CFR § 535.203 (e). anrl aU lic<'nses "may
be amended, modified, or revoked at any time." 31 CFR
eign-owned assets; and (2) the power summarily to srize aud perulaueully
vc;.;l title lo foreign-owned assets. It is rontt•nded that on]~· tlu• "\'(·sting"
provi~ions of the TWEA gave the Pre::;ident the power Pf' l'1!1mwnlly to
dispose of asl:lets and when Congress enacted the JEEPA in 107'i it Jllll'po,.;cfully did not grant the President this power. According to pd it ioucr,
the nullification of the attarhments Hnd the tmn~fer of the a,;~('~~ will p(·rmauently di::>posr of the as::;ets and would not even be j)(•rmi,;::;iule uuder
the TWEA. We disagree. Although it is true the TEEPA dof's
not give the Prrsideut thr power to "n•st" or to tnkc· title lo th(• a;:f'ets,
it doc::; not follow that the President i;.; not authorizrd UJI(kr both the
IEEPA and thP TWEA to othrrwise permmwntl~, cti~po~e of the n~~d~
in the manner done here. Petitioner err~ in a:-;snmiug that the only pOW('!'
granted by the language used in both§ li02 and § 5(b) of th<' TWEA i:;
the power trmporarily to freeze HSSPtf'. AH noted above, IIH· plain lnnguage of the statute defie~ such a holding. SPrtion 1702 nut horize~ the
Pre::;ident to "direct and compel" the "tran~frr , withdrn\\'al , trau~portatiou , . . . or exportation of . . . any property in which any foreign
country . . . has any intere~t . . . . "
We likcwi~r reject the c·ontention that Orvis v . Bmwnell. 845 F. S. 1~3
(HJ5~), and Zittman \'. McGrat-h, 341 U. S. 446 (1951), grant petitiou(•r
the right to rrtain its attachmPnt;; on the Iranian n~;;rts . To tiH• rontrary,
we think Orvis supportR tlw prOJJOsition that an Amrriran C"lnimant may
11ot u:;e an at tachmrnt that i~ subjrct to n. rrvocabl<' liernf'r and that ha:;
been obtnined after the entry of a frerze ordrr to limit in all~ · way the
actions lhc President may take under § 1702 resprrting t hr frozen a~:-;l'ts.
An attachment ;,;o obtained i1:1 in every sense subordinate to the Pre:sident'l:f
power under the JEEPA.
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§ 535.805. As such, the attachments obtained by petitioner
were specifically made subordinate to further actions which
the President might take under the JEEP A. Petitioner was
tm notice of the contingent nature of its interest in the frozeu
assets.
This Court has previously recognized that the congressioual
purpose in authorizing blocking orders is "to put control of
foreign assets in the hands of the President ...." Propper
v. Clark , 337 U. S. 472, 493 (1949). Such orders permit the
President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for
use in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a "bargaining chip" to be
used by the President when dealing with a hostile country.
Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner's argument because the practical effect of it is to allow individual claimants
throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this
"bargaiui11g chip" through attachments, garnishments or similat· encumbrances 011 property. Neither the purpose the
statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language supports
such a result. 6
6 Although petitioner concede~ that the Pre ~idcnt could have forbidden
attachmeuts, it neverthele~s argues that once he allowed them the PrP:-;ideut
permitted claimant ~ to acquire property intN·r:<ts in t hl'ir :II ta('hlllt·llt H.
Petitioner further argues that only thr lirru~es to obtaiu tlw attaclnueut ~
were madr rpvocable, not the attarhmrnt~ themHrln·~ . Tt i" urged that the
January 19, 1981, order revoking nil licrn H<'~ oul.' · affect<'d pl'titiouer'l>'
right to obtain future attachment:-;. We di~agrre. A" not<·d :tbovt', th e
regulations ~ Jwcifically providPcl that any Ht taelnn<·nt i~ null and void
"unlC'~~ Jicen ~ed ," and all lict>n:;ps may be revoked at any tim<·.
Morcovt·r, common Hense defies petitionrr's reading of thr l'<'gnlal ions. Th e
Pn·:;iclent could hardly have intPndcd petitioner and ol her "imilarly Hituatecl claimants to have the power to take control of the frozl'n a::;:;etl' out
of hb hantk
Our con ~ tru c tion of petitioner'::; attarhmf'nts as lH'ing- " rrvoenhle," "contingent ," aud "in Pvery sen:;e :;uburclinaiP to tlH' PrP~<idrnt '" pow<•r under
the IEEPA ," in effect answer:; petitionPr'H rlaim that <'\·en if th r PrP;;ideut had the authot:ity to nullify th e attachments ami tnm"fcr the <l:;:;el ::;,
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Because the Prcsiden t's action in nullifying the attach~
ments and ordering the transfer of the assets was taken pursuant to specific congressional authorization. it is "supported
by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would
rest heavily upon any who might attack it." Youngstown,
343 U. S., at 637 (Jackson. J .. concurring). Und0r the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that pctition0r has
sustained that heavy burden. A contrary ruling would mean
that the Federal Government as a whole lacked the power
exercised by the President, see id., at 636- 637, and that we (
are not prepared to say.

IV
Although we have concluded that the TREPA eom;titutes
specific congressional authorization to the Prcside11 t to 11ullify
the attachments and order the transfer of Trania11 assets, there
remains the question of the President's authority to suspend
claims pending in American courts. Such claillls have, of
course, an existe11ce apart from the attachments which accompanied them. ln t0rminating these claims through Executive Order No. 12294. the PresidPnt purported to act under
authority of both the lEEPA and 22 U. S. C. ~ 1732, the
flo-called "Hostage Act." 7 App. to Pet. for Cert., &t 52.
the exercise of ~uch would constitute an uncon~titutional takilll/: of JH'OJWrly
in violation of the Fifth AmenclrnE'nt ::tbHrnt juHt compt·n~atiou. We cou<:ludc that bccau~e of the PrPsidt?nt'H nuthorit:v lo ]>!'(•vent or condition
~ttadunent::;, Hlld because of the ord('l'~ hP iHHU('rl to this (•fft•<·l. j)l'litium:r
did not acquire any "property" iuterl:'~t in it~ attaelunPnt~ ol' the ~ort that
would support a ron~titutional claim for compen~ation.
7 .T udge Mikva, in his ~eparatp opinion in A mer-iran Jut' I Group, Iuc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran,- U.S. App. D . C . - , - , - F. 2<1-,(lUlU) , argued that the monikPr "HoHtag<· Ar·t" wa~ lll'wly-<·oinPtl fur
purpo:,;e~ of thi::; litigation. Suftire il to ~ay that wr fo<'ll>' 011 tlw language
of 22 U. S. C. § 17a2, not any ;;hurl-hand dr~cript ion of il. Sec Shnkcapcare, Homeu and Juliet, II, ii, 43 ("What'::; in a name?").
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We conclude that although the IEEPA authorized the nullification of the attachments, it cannot be read to authoriz:e
the suspension of the claims. The claims of American citizens against Iran are not in themselves transactions .involving
Iranian property or efforts to exercise any rights with respect
to such property. An in personam lawsuit. although it might
eventually be reduced to judgment and that judgment might
be executed upon, is an effort to establish liability a11d fix
damages and does not focus on any particular property within
the jurisdiction. The terms of the IEEPA therefore do not
authorize the President to suspend claims in American courts.
This is the view of all the courts which have considered the
question. Chas. '1'. Main lnt'l, Inc. v. Khuzestau Water &
Power Authority, F. 2d, at - ; American Int'l Group,
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,- F. 2d, at-, n. 15; The
Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Iran National Airlines, F. Rupp.
-, (SDNY 1981); Electronic Data Systems v. Social
Security Organization of Iran,- F. Supp. - , (ND Tex.
1981).
The Hostage Act, passed in 1868, provides:
"Whenever it is made known to the President that any
citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived
of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign
government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that goverwn<·ll t the reasous of such
imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in
violation of the rights of American citize11ship. the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen.
and if the release so demanded is uureasonably delayed
or refused, the Presiclen t shall use such moans, uot
amouuting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and
proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the
facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon a's
practicable be commuuieatecl by the President to Congress." 22 U. S. C. § 1732.
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We arc reluctant to conclude that this provision constitutes
specific authorization to the President to suspend claims iu
American courts. Although the broad language of the Hostage Act suggests it may cover this case. there are several
difficulties with such a view. The legislative history illdicates that the Act was passed in response to a situation unlike
the recent Iranian crisis. Congress in 1868 was concerned
with the activity of certain countries refusing to recognize
tho citizenship of naturalized Americans traveling abroad, and
repatriating such citizens against their will. See, e. g., Cong.
Globe 4331, 40th Coug., 2d Sess. (1868) (Sen Fe~:>senden);
id., at 4354 (Sen. Conuess); see also 22 U. S. C. ~ 1731.
'These countries were noL interested in rrturnillg the citizens
in excha11ge for any sort of ransom. This also explains the
reference in the Act to imprisonment "in violation of the
rights of American citizenship." Although the Iranian hostage-taking violated internatioual law and common decency,
the hostages were not seized out of any refusal to recognize
their American citizenship-they were seized precisely because of their American citizenship. The legislative history
is also somewhat ambiguous on the question whether Congress contemillated presidential action such as that illvolved
here or rather simply reprisals directed against the offending
foreign country and its citizens. See. e. g., Cong. Globe 4205,
40th Cong.,' 2d Sess. (1868); American Int'l Group, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, a t - (opinion of Mikva, J.).
Concluding that neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act
constitutes specific authorization of the President's action suspending claims, however, is not to say that these statutory
provisions are entirely irrelevant to the question of the valirlity of the President's action. We think both statutes highly
relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those presented in this casr. As noted above
in Part III, supra, at 12-13, the lEEPA rlekgates broad authority to the President to act in times of national emergency
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wi~h

respect to property of a foreign country. The Hostage
Act similarly indicates congressional willingness that the
President have broad uiscretion when responding to thf' hostile acts .of foreign sovereigns. As Senator Williams, draftsman of the language eventually enacted ItS the Hostage Act,
put it:
"If you propose any remedy at all. you must invest
the executive with some discretion. so that he may apply
the remedy to a case as it may arise. As to England or
France he might adopt one policy to relieve a citizen
imprisoned by either one of those countries; as to the
Barbary powers, he might adopt another policy; as to
the islands of the ocean aHother. With different countries that have different systems of government he might
adopt different means." Cong. Globe 4359, 40th Cong..
2d Sess. ( 1868).
Proponents of the bill recognized that it placPd "a loose discretion" .in the President's hands. id., at 4238 (Sen. Stewart),
but argued that "[s]omething must be intrusted to the Executive" and that "l t]he President ought to have the power to
do what the exigencies of the case require to rf'scue [a] citizen
from imprisonment." !d., at 4233, 4357 (Sen. Williams).
An original version of the Act, which authorized the President to suspend trade with a foreign country and even arrest
citizens of that country in the United States in retaliation,
was rejected because "there may be a great variety of cases
arising where other and different means would be C'qually
effective and where the end desired could b<> accomplished
without resorting to such da11gerous and violent measures."
!d., at 4233 (Sen. Williams).
Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEP A or
the Hostage Act directly authorizes the Pn.'sident's suspension of claims for the reasons noted. wp cannot ignore the
general tenor of Congress' legislation in this area in trying to
determine whether the President is acting alone or at least
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with the acceptance of Congress. As we have notecl, Congress ca1mot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it necessa_ry to take or
every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure
of Congress specifically to delegate authority does not. "especially ... in the areas of foreign policy and national security,"
imply "congressional disapproval" of action taken by the
Executive. Haig v. Agee,- U.S.-,- (1981). On the
contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the
question of the President's authority in a particular case
which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad
discretion may be considered to "invite" "measures 011 independent presidential responsibility," Youngstow11, 343 U. S.,
at 637 (Jackson , J., concurring). At least this is so where
there is 110 contrary indication of legislative intent and when.
as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescpuce in
conduct of the sort engaged in by the President. It is to
that history which we now turn.
Not infrequently in afi'airs between nations, outsta11ding
claims by nationals of one country against the government of
another country arc "sources of friction" between the two
sovereigns. U11ited States v. P'ink, 315 U. S. 203, 225 (194:2 ) .
To resolve these difficulties. nations have often en tercel into
agreements settling the claims of their respective uationals.
As one treatise writer puts it, iuternational agreements st>ttling claims by nationals of one state against the govemmeu t
of another "arc established international practice reftectillg
traditional intemational theory." L. Henkin. Foreign Afi'airs
and the Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that principle, the United States has repeatedly exercised its sovereig11 authority to settle the claims of its nationals agaillst
foreign countries. Though those settlements havr sometimes been made by treaty. there has also been a longstanding
practice of settling such claims by executive agreement with-

I~
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out the advice anrl consent of the Senate. 8 Under such agreements, the President has agreed to renounce or extiuguish
claims of United States nationals against foreign governments in return for lump sum payments or the establishment
of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of these settlements were encouraged by the United States claimants themselves, since a claimant's only hope of obtaining any payment
at all might lie in having his government negotiate a diplomatic settlement on his behalf. But it is also u11disputed
that the "United States has sometimes disposed of the claims
of citizens without their consent. or even without consultation
with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as distiuguished from those of the nation as a whole."
Henkin, supra, at 263. Accord, The Restatement (Second)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the Uuited States § 213
(1965) (President "may waive or settle a claim against a foreign state . . . even without tlH' consent of the [injured]
national"). It is clear that the practice of settliHg claims
continues today. Since 1952. the President has entered into
at least 10 bi11ding settlemm1ts with foreigu nations, including an $80 million settlement with the People's Republic of
China. 9
At lea~l :since the case of the "Wilmington Packet" iu 1799, Pre~iclent s
have exercised the power to settle claimR of United StatPs nationals by
executive agreement. See Lillich, Thr Gravel Amendtrwllt to tlw Trade
Reform Act of 1Y74, 69 Am. J . Int'l L. 837, 8H (Hl75). Iu fact. during
the pt•riod of 1817-1917, "no fcwrr than eight~· rxec11tive agrec·mc•nts
were entrred into
the United Statr~ lookillg to th(• liqHidation ol' elaim::;
of it:; citizens." McClure, International Exc•cut ivc Agn·Pment~ 5:3 (1941).
See also 14M. Whiteman , Digest of International Lnw 2-!7 (HJ70).
9 Tho~e agreement:; are 30 U. S. T. 1957 (1H79) (PcopiP'~ Hl'puulic
of China); 27 U. S. T. 3993 (1976) (Peru); '27 U. S. T. 4214 (1976)
(Egypt); 25 U. S. T. 227 (1974) (Peru); 24 F. S. T . 522 (1Y7:3)
(Hungary) ; 20 U. S. T. 2654 (1969) (Japan); ](j U. S. T. 1 (1965)
(Yugo::;lavia) ; 14 U. S. T . 969 (1963) (Bulgaria); 11 U.S. T. 1Y53
(1960) (Poland) ; 11 U. , T. 317 (1960) (Hnmania) .
8

uy
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Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement
by executive agreement. This is best demonstrated by Congress' enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act
of 1949, 22 U. S. C. § 1621 el seq., as amended (1980). The
Act had two purposes: (I) to allocate to United States nationals funds received in the course of an executive claims
settlement with Yugoslavia. and (2) to provide a procedure
whereby funds resulting from future settlements could be
distributed. To achieve these ends Congrf'ss created the International Claims Commission. now the Foreign (']aims Settlement Commission. and gave it jurisdictio11 to make fiual
and binding decisions with respect to claims by United States
nationals against settlement funds. 22 U. S. C. § 1623 (a).
By creating a procedure to bnplement future settlement
agreements. Congress placed its stamp of approval on such
agreements. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act observed that the United States was seeking settlements with
countries other than Yugoslavia and stated that the bill "colitemplates that settleme11ts of a similar nature are to be made
in the future." H. R. Rep. No. 81-770, 81st Cong., 1st Scss.,
4, 8 (1949).
Over the years Congress has frequently amended the International Claims Settlement Act to provide for particular
problems arising out of settlement agreements, thus demonstrating Congress' continuing acceptance of the President's
claim settlement authority. With respect to the Executive
Agreement with the People's Republic of China, for example,
Congress established an allocation formula for distribution
of the funds received pursuant to the Agreement. 22 U. S. C.
§ 1627. As with legislation involving other executive agreeInents, Congress did not question the fact of the settlement
or the power of the President to have concluded it. In 1976,
Congress authorized the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to adjudicate the merits of claims by United States na-
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tionals against East Germany, prior to any settlement with
East Germany, so that the Executive would "be in a better
position to negotiate an adequate settlement . . . of these
claims." S. Rep. No. 94-1188, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 2
(1976); 22 U. S. C. § 1644b. Similarly, Congress recently
amemled the Iu ternational Claims Settlement Act to facilitate the settlement of claims against Vietnam. 22 U. S. C.
§ 1645; ~ 1645a (5). The House Report stated that the purpose of the legislation was to establish an official inventory of
losses of private U11ited States property in Vietnam so that
recovery could be achieved "through direct Government-toGovernment negotiation of private property claims." H. R.
Rep. No. 96-915. 96th Cong., 2d Sess.. 2-3 (1980). Finally,
the legislative history of the IEEPA further reveals that Congress has accepted the authority of the Executive to elltcr
in to settlement agreements. Though th<' JEEP A was enacted to lJroviuc for some limitation on thP President's emergency powers, Congress stressed that "nothing in this Act is
intended to interfere with the authority of the President to
[block assets1. or to impede the settlement of claims of
United States citizens against foreign couutries." S. Rep.
No. 95-466, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1977); 50 U. S. C.
§ 1706 (a) ( 1) .10
10 Iuueed, CongrC:'ss has eonAiRtrn11~· failed to oh.iC:'<·t to this lon~t-standiHg
practice of rlaim settlement by execu1in' agrrl•nwnt, even whE:'ll it has
had an opportunit~· to do so. In 1972. Cougn•,.;,.; eHtE:-rtained kgi~lalion
relating to congre~l:iional over;;ight of NIU:h ngn·C:'nH·ntK. But Congre;-;,.; took
only limited action, requiring that the trxt of ~ignifieant exPcutivu agreement!:! be tranl:imith•d to Congresi'. 1 U. S. C. § 112b. In Haig v. Agee,
U. S . - (1981), wr noted that "Dr~pite the long~lamlinf! and officially promulgated view that 1he Exr('utiw lw~ the powPr lo withhold
passportl:i for rem;uns of national i'e<·urity, Cm1gre.'s in 1978, 'though it
once again enactC:'d Jrgislation relating to pa~:<JlOt'i::<, lt'ft complell'ly untouclwd the broad rule-making authority granted in the em·liPr Act.'"
ld., at 20, quoting Zemel v. R'ttsk, 381 U. S. 1, 12 (1965). Likewise lu
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In addition to congressional acquiescence in the President's
power to settle claims, prior cases of this Court have also
recognized that the President does have some measure oi
power to enter into executive agreements without obtaining
the advice and consent of the Senate. In United States v.
Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942), for example. the Court upheld
the validity of the Litvinov Assignment. which was part of an
Executive Agreement whereby the Soviet Union assigned to
the United States amounts owed to it by American nationals
so that outstanding claims of other American national~:; could
be paid. The Court explained that the resolution of such
claims was integrally connected with normalizing United
States' relations with a foreign state.
"Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition
as settlement of claims of our nationals ... certaiuly is
a modest implied power of the President. . . . No such
obstacle can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of
relations between this country and another nation , unless
the historic conception of his power and responsibilities ... is to be drastically revised." Id., at 229- 230.
Similarly, Judge Learned Hand recognized:
"The constitutional power of the President extends to
the settlement of mutual claims between a foreign govtl1is case, CongresR, though legislating in the area, lw s left "untoud1ed" the
authority of the President to enter into settlemrnt agreements.
'I'he lcgi~lntive hi::;tory of 1 U. S. C. § 112b further reve<tls that Congress lws ac·rcptc·cl the· Pre::;iclent 's authority to settle claims. During the
11cnrings ou tiH · hill, Senator Case, the sponsor of the Act, stated with
r espect to executive rlaim ~ eltlemrntfl that:
"I think it is ft most intere::;ting fa rca l in which W(' llavc [l(•('rptt>d tile
right of tht> President, one iuclividual, acting through hifl diplomati c
force, to adjudi cate aucl ~cttlc claims of Arncriean nntional~ agaiu ~t fort·ign
counlriP~. But it is H fu ct."
Tran~mitlal of E xecutive Agrcemruts to Congrrss : HearingH bt' forc thC'
Sena te Committee on Foreign Relatioilll, 92.d Cong., l :sL Scss., 74 (1971) .
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ernment and the United States, at least when it is an
incident to the recog11itiou of that government; and it
would bP unreasonable to circumscribe it to such controversies. The continued mutual amity between this nation and other powers again and again depends upon a
satisfactory compromise of mutual claims; the necessary
power to make such compromises has existed from the
earliest times and been exercised by the foreign offices of
all civilized nations." Ozanic v. United States, 188 F. 2d
228, 231 (CA2 1951).
Petitioner raises two arguments in opposition to the ptoposltion that Congress has acquiesced in this longstandiHg pmctice of claims settlement by executive agre<.'ment. First. it
suggests that all pre-1952 settlement claims, and corresponding court cases such as Pink, should be discounted because of
the evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immuuity. Petitiouer observes that })rior to 1952 the United States adhered
to the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity. so that absent
action by the Executive there simply would be uo remedy for
an United States national against a foreign gowrnment.
When the Uuited States in 1952 adopted a more restdctive
notion of sovereigu immunity, by means of the so-called
"Tate" letter, it is petitioner's view that Fnited States nationals no longer needed Executive aid to settle claims ami
that, as a result. the President's authority to settle such
claims in some sense "disappeared." Though petitioner's argument is not wholly without merit, it is refuted by the fact
that since 1952 there have been at least 10 claims settlements
by executive agreement. Thus, even if the pre-1952 cases
should be disregarded, congtessional acquiescence in settlement agreements since that time supports the President's
power to act here.
Petitioner next asserts that Congress divested the President
Qf th~ ~uthority to s~ttl~ cl~im~ when it enacted the Foreign
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Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (hereinafter "FSIA"), 28
U.S. C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq. The FSIA gTanted personal and
subject matter jurisdiction in the federal district courts over
commercial suits brought by claimants against those foreign
states which have waived immunity. 28 U. S. C. ~ 1330.
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, a foreign government's
immunity to suit was determined by the Ex<'cutive Branch
on a case-by-case basis. According to petitioner, the principal purpose of the FSIA was to depoliticizc these commercial lawsuits by taking them out of the arena of foreign affairs-where the Executive Branch is subject to the prt-ssures
of foreign states seekiug to avoid liability through a graut of
immunity-and by placing them within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts. Petitioner thus insists that the President, by suspending its claims. has circumscribed the jurisdiction of the United States courts in violation of Art. Ill of the
Constitution.
We disagree. In the first place, we do not believe that
the President has attempted to divest the federal courts of
jurisdiction. Executive Order No. 12294 purports only to
"suspend" the claims. not divest the federal court of "jurisdiction." As we read the Executive Order, those claims not
within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal will "revive"
and become judiciaJly enforceable in United States courts.
This case, in short. illustrates the difference between modifying federal court jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply
a different rule of law. See United States v. Schooner Peggy,
5 U.S. 1, 103 (1801). The President has exercised the power,
acquiesced in by Congress. to settle claims and, as such. has
simply effected a change in the substantive law governing the
lawsuit. Indeed. the very example of sovereign immunity
belies petitioner's argument. No one would suggest that a
determination of sovereign immunity divests the federal
courts of "jurisdiction." Yet, petitioner's a.r·gument, if accepted, would have required courts prior to the enactment
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of the FSIA to reject as an encroachment on their jurisdiction
the President's determination of a foreign state's sovereign
immunity.
Petitioner also reads the FSIA much too broadly. The
principal purpose of the FSTA was to codify contmnporary
concepts concerning the scope of sovereign immunity and
withdraw from the President the authority to make binding
determinations of the sovereign immunity to be accorded foreign states. See Chas. T. Main lnt'l, Inc. v. Khuzestau Water
& Power Authority,- F. 2d, at-; A-merican Int'l Group,
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,- F. 2d, at-. The FSfA
was thus tlesigued to remove one particular barrier to suit,
namely sovereign immunity, and cannot be fairly read as
prohibiting the President from settling claims of United
States nationals against foreign governments. It is telling
that the Congress which enacted the FSIA considere<l but
rejectetl several proposals designed to limit the power of the
President to enter in to executi vc agreements, incl11ding claims
settlement agreements. 11 It is quite unlikely that the same
Congress that rejected proposals to limit the President's authority to conclude executive agreements sought, to accomplish that very purpose sub silentio through the FSIA. And,
as noted above, just 1 year after enacting the FSIA, Congress enacted the IEEPA, where the legislative history
stressed that nothing in the JEEP A was to impede the sPttlement of claims of United States citizens. It wonld be
surprising for Congress to express this support for settlement
The rejected legi~htlion would typically have rt>quire<.l eoHgre;;sioHal
approval of executive agret>llii'JltH before 1hey would be co11~idered effectivr. Set> Congrt>~sional Over~ight of Exccn1iw Agreemeut~: Hl•ariug~
on S. 632 nnd S. 1251 hPfore tlw Subc·ommit tep on Setmratiou of Powers
of 1hc Senate Committet- on the .Judiciar~·, 94th Cong., ht Se~~., 243-261,
302-311 (1975): Congr!'~~ional R<·view of Interuutioual Agreement~:;:
Hem·ing,; before 1ht> Subl'onunittrP 011 IJtt('l'national Sermity and Scientific
Affairs of 1he House Committee on lntcmational Relations, 94th Coug.,
2cl Se~s., 167, 246 (1976).
11
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agreements had it intended the FSIA to eliminate the Presl~
dent's authority to make such agreements.
In light of all of the foregoing- the inferences w be drawn
from the character of the legislation Congress has e11acted
in the area. such as the JEEP A and the Hostage Act. and
from the history of acquiescence in executive claims settlement-we conclude that the President was authorized to suspend pending claims pursuant to Executive Order Ko. 12294.
As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Youngstowo, 343 F. S.
at 610-611, "a systematic. unbroken executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power'
vested i11 the President by ~ 1 of Art. II." Past practice
does not, by itself, create power, but "long-conti11ued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a
presumption that the faction l has been [taken] in pursuance
of its consent . . . . " Unit ed States v. Midwest Oil Co ., 230
U . S. 459, 469 (1915). See Haig v. Agee,-- U. S., at - ,
- . Such practice is present here and such a presumption
is also appropriate. In light of the fact that Congress may
be considered to have consented to the President's action in
suspending claims. we cannot say that action exceeded the
President's powers.
Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that thE' means
chosen by the President to settle the claims of American
nationals provided an alternate forum, the Claims Tribunal.
which is capable of providing meaningful relief. The Solicitor General also suggests that the provision of the Claims
Tribunal will actually enhance the opportunity for claimants
to recover their claims,' in that the Agreement removes a Humber of jurisdictional and procedural impediments facPd by
claimants in Uuited States courts. Brief for United Stat<'S, at
13- 14. Although being overly sangui11e about the chances of
United States claimants before the Claims Tribunal ·would
require a degree of naivete which shoulu not be uemandl' d
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even of judges, the Solicitor Gen('rals' point cannot be discount<>d. MorC'over, it is importaJJt to remember that we
have already held that the President has the statutory authority to nullify attachments and to transfer the assets out of
the country. The President's power to do so does not clepeml
on his provision of a forum whereby claimants can recowr on
those claims. The fact that the PresiclC'nt has provided such
a forum here means that the claimants are receiving something in retum for the suspension of th('ir claims. namely. access to an intematioual tribunal beforC' which they may well
recover something on their claims. BecausC' thpre uoes appear to be a real "settlement" here. this case is more easily
analogized to the more traditional claim settlemcHt cases of
the past.
Just as importantly, Congress has not uisapproved of the
action taken here. Though Congress has held hearings on
the Iranian Agreement itself/~ Congress has 110t enacted legislation, or eve11 passed a resolution, indicating its displeasure
with the AgrePment. Quite the contrary, the relevant Senate Committee has stated that the establishme11t of the Tribunal is "of vital importance to tlw United States." S. Rep.
No. 97-71, 97th Cong., 1st Scss., 5 (1981). ~ We are thus
1

12 SPc Heari11g~ ou the Iraniun AgrPement~ heforP the Seuatr C'onHnitlee
on Forf:'ign Relation~. 97th Cong .. bt Sess. (1981); Hearing~ on 1hl' Iranian A~~c:st~ Settlement before the Sl'nate C'ommitP<·r 011 Bnnkiug, Honsi11g
nnd Urban Affair:;, 97th Cong., 1~t SP~s. (lflR1): HParing~ on lh<' Al~eriatt
Declnrutions before the Hou~;e Committee on ForPigu Affairs, 9ith Coug.,
M Se:s~. (HJ81) .
1 3 ContrHst congre::;sional reaction to tlw Irnuia11 Agn.>(''llH·nt~ with coJJgre~~;ioual reactiou to a 1973 Executive Agreem('nt witl1 Cz<'cho:;lol'akia.
There tlw Pre~ident :;ought to sPttle ovrr $105 million in claime ngain;;t
CzechoJ;lovakiu for $20.5 million. Congre:;s quickly demon~trated its di~
plra~ure by euactiug legi;;lation requiring thnt thr Agreement be n·lwgotialed. See Lillich, supra, at 839-840. Though Congre~s has ~hown itf'('lf
capable of objecting to executive agreement:;, it has rarely done ;;o ami
bas not d.one so in this ca:;e,
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clearly not confronted with a situation in which Congress has
in some way resisted the exercise of presidential authority.
Finally, we re-emphasize the narrowness of our decision.
We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power
to settle claims, even as agaiust foreign governHwntal rntities. As the C'ourt of Appeals for the }"'irst Circuit stressed,
"the sheer magnitude of such a power. consid<'rcd again st the
background of the diversity and complexity of modem intPrnational trade, cautions against any broader· construction of
author·ity than is necessary." Chas. T. Ma-in btl'l, inc. v.
Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, - F. 2<1. at - . But
where, as here. the settlement of claims has been determined
to be a necessary incident to thr rPsolution of a major foreign
policy dispute between our country and anoLh(•r. aml where,
as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in th e
Presideut's action , we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle such claims.

v
We do not think it appropriate at th e presonL tinw Lo address petitioner's contention that the SUSJ>Pnsion of claims. if
authorizeu , would constitute a taking of property in violation
of the Fifth Amendment to th e United States Constitution
in the absence of just compensation. 14 Both J)(>titionPt' aud
th e Government concede that thr question whc•th er tht> suspension of the claims constitutes a taking is 110t ri1>e for review. Brief for Petitioner. at 34. n. 32; Brief for Fnitecl
States, at 65. Accord, Chas. T. Main Tnt'l, f11c. v. Khuzestan
Water & Power Authority, supra, at - ; American lnt'l
Group , Inc. v. Islamic Republic of !ran , F. 2cl . at - .
However, this contention , and the possibility that th e Pre!:li14 Though we coucluue that the T'rei:iiucnt has scttl<'u Jwlitiutu~ r ·,. l'laiws
agaiusL Iran , we do not ~ ugge;; t that the ~ ettl e rnmt Jw,. lenuiHall'd petitioner':; poH;;ible taking claim againi:i t the Uuited tital e:;. We exprc;;s 110
view::; on petitioner '::; claimi:i that it ha:; ~;uffe red a taking.
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dent's actions may effect a taking of petitioner's property,
makes ripe for adjudication the question whether IWtitioMr
will have a remedy at law iu the Court of Claims under the
'ruckf>r Act, 28 U. S. C. § 14\:H, in such an event. That the
fact and extf'nt of the taking in this case is yet speculalive
is inconsequrntial because "there must be at thr time of taking 'a reasonable, certain and adequate provision for ohtaining compensation.'" Reyional Rail Reorganizat·ion Act
Cases, 410 U. S. 102, 124-125 (1974), quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 659 (1890);
Cities Serv·ice Co. Y. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330. 335- 336 (1952);
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438
U. S. 59, 94. n. 39 (1978).
It has been conteuded that the "treaty exception " lo the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 28 U. S. C. § 1502, might
]>reclude the Court of Claims from exercising jurisdiction ovet'
any takings claim the petitioner might bring. At oral argumcn t, however, the Government conceded that § 1f>02 woulcl
not act as a bar to petitioner's action in the Court of Claims.
rrr. of Oral Arg., at 39-42, 47. We agree. See United States
v. Weld, 127 U. S. 51 (1888); United States v. Old Settlers,
1M~ U. S. 427 (1893); H1.lghes Aircraft Co. v. Uuited States,
534 F. 2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Accordingly, to the· extent }Wtitioner believes it has suffered an UIICOilStitutional taking uy
the suspension of the claims. we sec no jurisdictional obstacle
to an appropriat(' action in the U11ited States Court of Claims
under the Tucker Act.
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly affirmed,
~lH.l the mandate shall issue forthwith.
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom Justice Marshall and
Justice Stevens join, dissenting.
I would dismiss the certificate, citing Dames &
~ Moo~e

v. Regan,

u.s.

(1981), announced today.

The

Court's opinion in that case provides the only answers that
this Court should give to the questions certified to us by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Having

rendered an opinion on the subject of those questions, we
should not answer them in monosyllables nor attempt a
syllabus of a portion of the Court's opinion.

We recently

have dismissed certification of questions where the Court
has addressed the subject of the questions in a full
opinion.

u.s.

Foley v. Carter,

United States v. Will,

u.s.

(1981) .

See also

(1981).
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring and dissentiug in part.
I join the Court's opinion except its decision that the 11 ullification of the attachments did not effect a taking of property
interests giving rise to claims for just compensation. Ante,
at - , n. 6. The nullification of attachments presents a
separate question from whether the suspension and proposed
settlement of claims against Iran may constitute a taking.
I would leave both "taking" claims open for resolution on a
case-by-case basis in actions before the Court of Claims. The
facts of the hundreds of claims pending against Ira11 are not
known to this Court and may differ from the facts in this
case. I therefore dissent from the Court's decision with respect to attachments. The decision may well be erroneous/
and it certainly is premature.
1

Even though the Executive Orders purported to make atta<'lnneuts
conditional, there i~:> a subi:)hlfltinl question wlwtlwr the Onl<·r~ t!H'msclves
may have effected a taking by mnking co!H.litional the ntta('hmt'nt::; that
claimants aginst Iran otherwi10e could have obtained without condition.
Moreover, becau::;e it i;,; ,;ettled that an att1whmrnt entitling n creditor to
resort to specific property for the satisfaction of n claim i~> a property
right compcn;,;able under the Fifth Amcuclnwnt, Arm.strung v. United
State.s, 364 U. S. 40 (1960), Louisville Bank v. Uadfvrd, 295 U. S. 555
(1935), there i~ a quei:)tion whether the revoeaLilit.'· of the lieens<· uudt•r
which petitioner obtained it;,; attachment ~uffict•::; to rendt'r rC'vocaule the ·
attachment it,;elf. See Mm·schalk Co. v. Iran Natioual Airliue.s Corp.,.
No. 71:.1 0iv. 7035 (C.BM) (June 11, 1981) .
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I agree with the Court's opinion with respect to the sus.:.·
pension and settlement of claims against Iran and its iustrumen tali ties. The opinion makes clear that some claims may
uot be adjudicated· by the Claims Tribunal, and that others
may not be paid in full. · The Court holds that parties whose
valid claims are not adjudicated or not fully paid may bring
a "taking" claim against the United States in the Court of
Ctaims, the jurisdiction of which this Court acknowledges.
The Government must pay just compensation when it furthers the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as "bargaining chips" claims !"awfully held by a relatively few persons
and. subJect to the jurisdiction of our courts. 2 The extraordinary powers of the President and Congress upon which our·
d.ecision rests cannot, in the circumstances of this case, dispiace the Just Coin'pensation Clause of the Constitution.

2

A'/5 the Court held in Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49

(1960):
"The Fifth Amendment'~ guarantee that private property shall not be
tHkcn for a public u~c without just compemmtion wa;; designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdeu;; which,
in all fairue::;;:; aud ju~tice, l:ihould be borue by the public Hl:i a whole."
The Court un;wi.mou:;ly reaffirmed this under::;tanding of the J"w;t Compensation Clau::;e in the recent ca::;e of Agins v. City of 'l'iburon, 447 U. S.

225, 26o-2ul (1980).
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring and dissentiug in part.
I join the Court's opiniou except its decision that the u ullificatiou of the attachments did not effect a taking of property
interests giving rise to claims for just compensation. Ante,
at - , n. 6. The nullification of attachments presents a
separate question from whether the suspension aud proposed
settlement of claims against Iran may constitute a taking.
I would leave both "takiug" claims opeu for resolution on a
case-by-case basis in actions before the Court of Claims. The
facts of the hundreds of claims pending against Iran are not
known to this Court and may differ from the facts iu this
case. I therefore dissent from the Court's decision with respect to attachments. The decision may well be erroneous/
and it certainly is premature.
1 Even though the Executive Orders pmportecl to make atta!'!mwnts
conditional, there is a sub~tantinl queHtion whrtlwr tlw Or<l<·r~ them~l'lves
may have effected a taking by making conditional the attaehnwnt~ that
claimants aginst Iran othrrwi~e could have obtained without cuudition.
Moreover, becautie it is settled that an attaduneut entitling a creditor to
resort to specific property for the ~ati~factiou of a rlaim is a property
t·ight compewsnble under the Fifth Amcndm<·nt, Annstnmo v. United
States, 364 U. S. 40 (1960), Louisville Bau!.; v. Radford, 295 U. f:l. 555
(1935), there is a quetition whether the revo<·abilit.\· of the licl·u:s(• undrr
which petitioner obtnined it:s attarhment :sufficeti to rendrr rcvucaule the ·
attachment it::;elf. See M arschallc Co. v. Iran N atiottal Airline~ CorJJ.t··
No. 7!:1 t:iv. 7035 (CBM) (June 11, 1081) .
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I agree with the Court's opinion with respect to the sus:.pension and settlement of claims against Iran and its iustrumeutalities. 'fhe opit1ion makes clear that some claims may
not be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal, and that others
may not be paid in full. The Court holds that parties whose
valid claims are not adjudicated or not fully paid may bring
a "taking" claim against the United States in the Court of'
CI'aims, the jurisdiction of which this Court acknowledges.
'i'he Government must pay just compensation when it furthers the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as "bargaining chips" claims lawfully held by a relatively few persons
and. subJect to the jurisdiction of our courts. 2 The extraordinary powers of the President and Congress upon which our·
d-ecision rests cannot, in the circumstances of this case, dispiace the Just Coinlpensation Clause of the Constitution.

2
As the Court held in A1'1nstrony v. United States, 304 U. S. 40, 49
(1960):

"The Fifth Amendment'~ guarantee that private property f<hall not be
taken for a public u~c without ju~t comppn~ation Wllti c)p:;igned to bar
Oovermneut from forcing some JWO]Jie alone to bPar public burden~ which,
in all fairut'~~ aucl jutitice, ~hould be borue by the public a:; a whole."
The Court uuanimou;,;ly reaffirmed thi~; undt'f:;tauding of the JuJ:it. Compemmtiou Clau~e in the recent ca:se of Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
225, 260-261 (19!;0).
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The questions presented by this case touch fundamentally ~
upon the manner in which our Republic is to be governed. ~
~
Throughout the nearly two centuries of our Nation's existence __, ., A
1,
under the Constitution, this subject has generated consider- ...----/'~~
able debate. We have had the benefit of commentators such ~ ~./"L
as John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison writ- ~ /'-- · --- - - •
ing in The Federalist Papers at the Nation's very inception,
the benefit of astute foreign observers of our system such as
Alexis deTocqueville and James Bryce writing during the first
century of the Nation's existence, and the benefit of many
other treatises as well as more than 400 volumes of reports
of decisions of this Court. As these writings reveal it is
doubtless both futile and perhaps dangerous to find any epigrammatical explanation of how this country has been governed. Indeed, as Justice Jackson noted, "[a] judge ... may
be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous
authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power
as they actually present themselves." Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 634 (1952) (concurring
opinion) .
Our decision today will not dramatically alter this situation, for the Framers "did not make the judiciary the overseer
of our government." Id., at 594 (Frankfurter, J ., concur-

80-2078-0PINION
2

DAMES & MOORE v. REGAN

ring). We are confined to a resolution of the dispute presented to us. That dispute involves various Executive Orders
and regulations by which the President nullified attachments
and liens on Iranian assets in the United States, directed that
these assets be transferred to Iran, and suspended claims
against Iran that may be presented to an International
Claims Tribunal. This action was taken in an effort to comply with an Executive Agreement between the United States
and Iran. We granted certiorari before judgment in this
case, and set an expedited briefing and argument schedule,
because lower courts had reached conflicting conclusions on
the validity of the President's actions and, as the Solicitor
General informed us, unless the Government acted by July
19, 1981, Iran could consider the United States to be in breach
of the Executive Agreement.
But before turning to the facts and law which we believe
determine the result in this case, we stress that the expeditious
treatment of the issues involved by all of the courts which
have considered the President's actions makes us acutely
aware of the necessity to rest decision on the narrowest possible ground capable of deciding the case. Ashwander v. TV A,
297 U. S. 288. 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This
does not mean that reasoned analysis may give way to judicial
fiat. It does mean that the statement of Justice Jacksonthat we decide difficult casf's presented to us by virtue of our
commissions, not our competence-is especially true here.
We attempt to lay down no general "guide-lines" covering
other situations not involved here, and attempt to confine the
opinion only to the very questions necessary to decision of the
case.
Perhaps it is because it is so difficult to reconcile the foregoing definition of Art. III judicial power with the broad
range of vitally important day-to-day questions regularly decided by Congress or the Executive, without either challenge
or interference by the Judiciary, that the decisions of the
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Court in this area have been rare, episodic, and afford little
precedential value for subsequent cases. The tensions pres..
ent in any exercise of executive power under the tri-partite
system of Federal Government established by the Constitution have been reflected in opinions by Members of this Court
more than once. The Court stated in United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319- 320 (1926) :
"["T] e are here dealing not alone with an authority
vested in the President by an exertion of legislative
power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-a power which does not require as a
basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which , of
course, like every other governmental power, must be
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of
the Constitution."
And yet 16 years later, Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Youngstown, supra, which both parties agree brings
together as much combination of analysis and common sense
as there is in this area, focused not on the "plenary and exclusive power of the President" but rather responded to a
claim of virtually unlimited powers for the Executive by
noting:
"The example of such unlimited executive power that
must have most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III. and the description of
its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to
doubt that they were creating their new Executive in
his image." 343 U. S., at 641.
As we now turn to the factual and legal issues in this case,
we freely confess that we are obviously deciding only one
more episode in the never-ending tension between the President exercising the executive authority in a world that pre-
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sents each day some new challenge with which he must deal
and the Constitution under which we all live and which no
one disputes embodies some sort of system of checks aud
balances.

I
On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran
was seized and our diplomatic personnel were captured and
held hostage. In response to that crisis, President Carter,
acting pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act. 50 U. S. C. ~~ 1701-1706 (Supp. II 1978) (hereinafter "IEEP A"), dE-clared a national emergency on N ovember 14, 1979. 1 and blocked the removal or transfer of "all
property and interests in property of the Government of
Iran. its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are qr become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. . . ." Executive Order No.
12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65279. 2 President Carter authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations carrying
out the blocking order. On November 15, 1979, the Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a regulation providing that "[u]nless licensed or authoriL~ed ... any
attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment,
1 Title 50 U. S. C. § 1701 (a) (Supp. II 1978) states that ihe Presideut's authority under the Act "may be exercised to deal with any unmmal
and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or in subetantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States, if the PrPsident declares a llational
~mergcncy with respect to such threat." Pctitiouer doc~ not challenge
President Carter'R declaration of a nationnl emergency.
2 Title 50 U. S. C. § 1702 (a) (1) (B) (Supp. II 1978) empowers the
!~resident to:
"investigate, rf'gulate, direct and compel. rmllif~·, void , prevent or l>rohibit,
any acquisition , holding, withholding, use, tran~fcr, withdrawal, trnn~porta
tion, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exerci~ing <Ill~' right,
JJowcr, or privilege with re~pect to, or tran~actions involving, auy property iu which any foreign country or a . national thereof has auy
interc::;t. " " !'
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or other judicial process is null and void with respect to any
property in which on or since rNovember 14. 1979] there
existed an interest of Iran." 31 CFR § 535.203 (e) (1980).
The regulations also made clear that any licenses or authorizations granted could be "amended, modified, or revoked at
any time." 31 CFR § 535.805 (1980). 9
On November 26, 1979, the President granted a general
lice11se authorizing certain judicial proceedings against Iran
but which did not allow the "entry of any judgment or of any
decree or order of similar or analogous effect ...." 31 CFR
§ 535.504 (a) (1980). On December 19, 1979. a clarifying
regulation was issued stating that "the general authorization
for judicial proceedings contained in ~ 535.504 (a) includes
pre-judgment attachment." 31 CFR ~ 535.418 (1980).
On December 19, 1979, petitioner Dames & Moore filed
suit in the United States District Court for the C'eutral District of California against the Government of Iran, the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran, and a number of Iranian ballks.
In its complaint, petitioner alleged that its wholly owned
subsidiary, Dames & Moore International. 8. R. L., was a
party to a written co11tract with the Atomic Energy Organization, and that the subsioiary's entire interest in the contract had been assigned to petitioner. Under the contract,
the subsidiary was to conduct site studies for a proposed
nuclear power plant in Iran. As provided in the terms of
the contract, the Atomic Energy Organization termiuated the
agreement for its own convenience on June 30, 1979. Petitioner contended, however, that it was owed $3,436,694.30
plus interest for services performed under the contract prior·
to the date of termination. 4 The District Court issued orders
9 31 CFR § 535.805 (1980) providrH in full: "The provi~ion of this
part aml nuy ruling:;, licenRr,, iu~tructions, ordrrs, or forms i~~ued thereunder may bP arnrnded, modifird, or revokc•d nt all~' time•."
4 The contract stated 1hat any disputr incapable of rr~olution by agrrcmcnt of ihe parti<"S would be ;;ulnnittrd to conriliHlion nJI(I that, if either
party was unwilljng to. accept the result:; of comiliation, "t he matter ,;hall'
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of attaclm1('nt directed against property of the defendants,
and the property of certain Iranian banks was then attached
to srcure any judgment that might be entered against them.
On January 20. 1981. tlw Americans held hostage were releasrd by Iran pursuant to an Agreement entered into the day
before and embodied in two Declarations of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria. Declaration of the Government of thr Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
(App. to Prt. for Cht., at 21-20). and Declaration of the
Government of thr Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the 1Tnitrd States of America and the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran ( App. to Pet. for Cert .. at 3035). The Agreement stated that "it is the purpose of [the
United States and Iran 1 ... to terminate all litigation as
between the Government of ('ach party and the nationals of
the other. and to bring about the settlement and termination
of all such claims through binding arbitration." App. to
Pet. for Cert .. at 21-22. In furtherance of this goal, the
Agreement called for tlw establishment of an Iran-United
~tates Claims Tribunal which would arbitrate any claims not
settled \vithin 6 months. Awards of the Claims Tribunal are
to be "final and binding" and "enforceable ... in the courts
flf any nation in accordance with its law." !d., at 32. Under
the Agreement, the United States is obligated:
"to t('rminate all legal proceedings in United States
eourts involving claims of United States persons and institutions agai11st Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify
bP dr<'ickd finnll~· by fP>'ort to the conrts of Iran ." Pet. for CPrt. , nt 7,
n. 2. In itR complaint, which war: bnRrd on breach of contrnr1 and related
throries , prtitionrr nllrgrd 1hat it hnd sought a mPPting with thP Atomic
Energy Organiza1ion for purpoRr8 of srttling mattrrs rrlnting to the rontract but tha1 thr Organization "hn~ continually postponed [the·! mePting
and obviou;:;ly does not intPnd that it take place." Compluiut in Dames

Moore v. Atomic Energy Orgauization of hau, No. 79-04918 LEW
(Px) (CD Cal.), at ,f27.
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all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to pro~
hibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to
bring about tho termination of such claims through binding arbitration." I d., at 21-22.
In addition, the United States must "act to bring about the
transfer" by July 19, 1981, of all Iranian assets helcl in this
country by American banks. Id., at 24-25. One billion dol~
lars of these assets will be deposited in a security account in
the Bank of England, to the account of the Algeria11 Cc11tral
Bank, aiHl used to satisfy awards rendered against Iran by
the Claims Tribunal. Ibid.
On January 19, 1981, President Carter issued a series of
Executive· Orders implementing the terms of the Agreement.
Executive Order Nos. 12276-12285, 46 Feel. Reg. 7913-7932.
These onlcrs revoked all licenses permitting the exercise of
"any right, power, or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds,
securities, or deposits; "nullified" all non-Iranian interests in
such assets acquired subsequent to the blocking order of
November 14, 1979; and required those banks holdiug Iranian
assets to transfer them "to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, to be held or transferred as directed by the Secretary
of the Treasury." Executive Order No. 12279, 46 Fed. Reg.
7919.
On February 24. 1981, President Reagan issued an Executive Order in which he "ratified" the January 19th Executive Orders. Executive Order No. 12294. 46 Fed. Reg. 14111.
Moreover, he "suspended" all "claims which may be pre~
se11 ted to the . . . Tribunal" and provided that such claims
"shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any
court of the United States." Ibid. The suspension of any
particular claim terminates if the Claims Tribunal determines that it has no jurisdiction over that claim; claims are
discharged for all purposes when tho Claims Tribunal either
awards some reeovery and that amount is paid, or determines
that no recovery is due. Ibid.

I
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Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, petitioner moved for summary judgment in the District Court against the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Orgaui;.:ation. but not
against the Iranian banks. The District Court granted petitioner's motion and awarded petitioner the amount claimed
under the contract plus interest. Thereafter, petitioner attempted to execute the judgment by obtailling writs of garnishment and execution in state court in the State of Washington, and a sheriff's sale of Ira11iau property in Washington
was noticed to satisfy the judgment. However, by order of
May 28, 1981, as amended by order of June 8, the District
Court stayed execution of its judgment pending appeal by
the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization. The District Court also ordered that all prejudgment
attachments obtained against the IraniaJl defendants be
vacated and that further proceedings against the ba1lk defendants be stayed in light of the Executive Orders discussed
above. App. to Pet. for Cert .. at 106- 107.
On April 28, 1981. petitioner filed this action in the District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief agaiust the
United States and the Secretary of the Treasury. seeking to
prevent enforcement of the Executive Orders and Treasury
Department regulations implementing the Agreement with
Iran. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that the actions
of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury implementing the Agreement with Iran were beyond their statutory
and constitutional powers and, in any event, were unconstitutional to the extent they adversely affect petitioner's final
judgment against the Government of Iran and the Atomic
Energy Organization, its execution of that judgment in the
State of Washington, its prejudgment attachments, and its
ability to continue to litigate against the Iranian banks. !d.,
at 1- 12. On May 28, 1981, the District Court ueuied petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction anu dismissed
petitioner's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
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relief could be granted. !d., at 106-107. Prior to the District Court's ruling. the United States Courts of Appeals for'
the First and the District of Columbia Circuits upheld the
President's authority to issue the Executive Orders and regulations challenged by petitioner. See Chas. 1'. Afain lnt'l,
Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, - F . 2cl(CAl 1981); American lnt'l Group, Inc. v. l:,;lamic Republic
U. S. App. D. C. - , - F . 2d- (1981).
of Ira'n, On June 3, 1981, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from
the District Court's order, and the appeal was docketed in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
On June 4, the Treasury Department amended its regulations
to mandate "the transfer of bank deposits aud certain other
financial assets of Iran iu the United States to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York by noon, June 19." App. to Pet.
for Cert., at 151- 152. The District Court, however, entered
an injunction pending appeal prohibiting the United States
from requiring the transfer of Iranian property that is subject to "any writ of attachment, garnishment, judgment. levy,
or other judicial lien" issued by any court in favor of petitioner. Id., at 168. Arguillg that this is a case of "imperative public importance," petitioner then sought a writ of
certiorari before judgment. Pet. for Cert., at 10. See 28
U. S. C. § 2101 (e); this Court's Rule 18 (1980). Because
the issues presented here are of great significance and demand
prompt resolution, we granted the petition for the writ,
adopted an expedited briefing schedule, and set the case for
oral argument on June 24, 1981. U. S. (1981).

II
The parties and the lower courts confronted with the instant questions have all agreed that much relevant analysis
is contained in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U. S. 579 ( 1952). Justice Black's opiuiou for the Court in
that case, involving the validity of President Truman's effort
to seize the country's steel mills in the wake of a nation wide

80-2078-0PINION

10

DAMES & l\IOORE v. REGAN

strike, recognized that "[t]he President's power, if any, to
issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or
from the Constitution itself." !d., at 585. Justice Jackson's
eoncurring opinion elaborated in a general way the consequences of different types of interaction between the two
democratic branches in assessing presidential authority to
act in any given case. When the President acts pursuant
to an express or implied authorization from Congress, he
exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by
Congress. In such a case the executive ~ction "woul<.l be
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." !d.,
at 637. When the President acts in the absence of congressional authorization he may enter "a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
\Yhich its distribution is uncertain." I d., at 637. In such a
case the analysis becomes more complicated, and the validity
of the President's action. at least so far as separation of
powers principles are concerned, hinges on a consideration
of all the circumstances which might shed light on the views
of the Legislative Branch toward such action, including "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence." Ibid. Finally,
when the President acts in contravention of the will of Congress, "his power is at its lowest ebb." and the Court can
sustain his actions "only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject." !d., at 637-638.
Although we have in the past and do today find Justice
Jackson's classification of executive actions into three general categories analytically useful, we should be mindful of
Justice Holmes' admonition, quoted by Justice Frankfurter in
Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 597 (concurring opinion) , that
"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not E~stablish
and divide fields of black and white." Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 209 (1928) (dissentiug opinion).
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Justice Jackson himself recognized that his three categories
represented "a somewhat over-simplified grouping," 343 U. S.,
at 635, and it is doubtless the case that executive action in
any particular iJJstance falls, not neatly in one of three
pigeon-holes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition. This is particularly true as respects
cases such as the one before us, involving responses to international crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have
been expected to anticipate in any detail.

III
In nullifying post-November 14, 1979, attachments and
directing those persons holding blocked Iranian funds and securities to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York for ultimate transfer to Iran, President Carter cited five
sources of express or inherent power. The Government, however, has principally relied on § 1702 of the IEEP A as authorization for these actions. Section 1702 (a) ( 1) provides
in part:
"At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701
of this title, the President may, under such regulations
as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses,
or otherwise"(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit"(i) any transactio11s in foreign exchange,
"(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by,
through , or to any banking institution, to the extent that
such transfers or payments involve any interest of any
foreign country or a national thereof,
u(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities, and
u(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition. holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, impor-
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tatim1 or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power or privilege with respect to, or transactions
involving, any property in which any foreign country or
a national thereof has any interest;
"by any person. or with respect to any property, subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States."
The Government contends that the acts of "nullifying" the
attachments and ordering the "transfer" of the froz:en assets
are specifically authorized by the plain language of the above
statute. The two Courts of Appeals that have considered the
issue agreed with this contention. In Chas. T. Main lnt'l,
Inc. v. Khuzestan "J!Vater & Power Authority, s'upra, the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit explained:
"The President relied on his JEEP A powers in N ovember 1979, when he 'blocked' all Iranian assets ill this
country, and again in January 1981. when he 'nullified'
interests acquired in blocked property, and ordered that
property's transfer. The President's actions, in this regard, are in keeping with the language of JEEP A; initially he 'prevent[ed] and prohlbit[ed]' 'transfers' of
Iranian assets; later he 'direct[edl and compelJled]' the
'trallsfer' and 'withdrawal' of the assets. 'nullifyling]'
certain 'rights' and 'privileges' acquired in them.
"Main argues that IEEPA does not supply the President with power to override judicial remedies, such as
attachments and injunctions, or to extinguish 'interests'
in foreign assets held by United States citizens. But we
caH find no such limitation in IEEPA's terms. The language of JEEP A is sweeping and unqualified. It provides broadly that the President may void or nullify the
'exercising [by any person ofl any right. pov,·er or privilege with respect to ... any property in which any foreign country has any interest .... ' 50 U. S. C. ~ 1702
(a) (1) (B)." F. 2d, at (emphasis .iu original).
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In American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
supra, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit employed a similar rationale in sustainiug President
Carter's action:
"The Presidential revocation of the license he issued
permitting prejudgment restraints upon Irauian assets is
an action that falls within the plain la11guage of the
IEEPA. In vacating the attachments, he acted to 'nullify [and] void ... any ... exercising any right. power,
or privilege with respect to ... any property in which
a11y foreigu country ... has any interest ... by any person ... subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.'"
- F . 2d, at (footnote omitted).
Petitioner contends that we should ignore tho plain language of this statute because an examination of its legislati vc
history as well as the history of ~ 5 (b) of the Trading With
the Enemy Act (hereinafter "TWEA"), 50 U. S. C. App.
§ 5 (b), from which the pertinent language of ~ 1702 is directly drawn, reveals that the statute was not intended td
give the President such extensive power over the assets of a
foreign state during times of national emergency. According
to petitioner, once the President instituted the Xovember 14,
1979, blocking order, ~ 1702 authorized him "only to coutiuue
the freeze or to discontinue controls." Brief for Petitioner, at
32.
We do not agree and refuse to read out of~ 1702 all meaning to the words "transfer," "compel," or "nullify." Nothing
in the legislative history of either ~ 1702 or ~ 5 (b) of the
TWEA requires such a result. To the contrary, we think
both the legislative history and cases iBterpretiug the TWEA
fully sustain the broad authority of the Executive wheu acting under this congressional grant of power. See, e. y., Orv·is
v. Brownell, 345 U. S. 183 (1953).G Although Congress in0 Petitioner arguel:l that unrler the TWEA thr Pn·~ident was givrn two
powers: (1) the power temporarily to freeze or bloc·k the tran:sfcr of for-
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tended to limit the President's emergency power in peacetime, we do not think the changes brought about by the
enactment of the IEEP A in any way affected the authority
of the President to take the specific actions taken here. We
likewise note that by the time petitioner instituted this action, the President had already entered the frerze order.
PetitioHer proceeded against the blocked assets only after the
Treasury Department had issued revocable licPnsrs authorizing such proceedings and attachments. The Treasury regulations provided that "unless licensed" any attaehmrn t is
null ancl void, 31 CFR § 535.203 (e). and all licrnscs "may
be amended, modified, or revoked at any time." 31 CFR
eign-owued assets; nnd (2) the power summ:rrily to srizc :llld permanently
vc;;t title to foreign-owned a~::;et~. It is contrnded that onl~· tlw "vestiug"
provi::;ion~ of the TWEA gave the Pre~ident the powrr ]Jf'I'1IIW1mtly to
diopo::;c of a::;~et~ and when Congr<'l:ll:l enacted the JEEl' A iu 1!177 it purpo~cfully did not grant the Pre~idrnt thi~ power. According to pditioncr,
the nullificatiou of the attarhment~:J and th~· trau~fer of the a,;~('[fl will p<·rlllllllf'!ltly diHpo::;P of the n~:;~rts and would uot even be pt>rmi~;-;iule undl'r
the TWEA. We disagree. Although it i~:J true thr TEEPA dors
nut give the President t!JP power to "vrst" or to tnke till<' io the u~~<-t ::;,
it tloes not follow that the President i;; uot nut horizrd UJI(kr both the
IEEPA aud tht> TWEA to othPrwi~e pNrnanrntl)' di~po~e of tlw as~d :;
in the manner done here. PE'titioner err~ iu a~snming that the only powc·r
granted by the language used in both § 1702 and § 5 (b) of t h<' TWEA j:,;
the power trmporarily to frE'eze assets. As noted abovr, tiH· plHin language of the statute dE'fi<'H such a holding. SPrtion 1702 anthorizr~ the
President to "direct and compel" the "tran~<frr, withdrawal. tran:;portatiou, . . . or exportation of . . . any property in which any foreign
eountry . . . ha~ any inten·~t. ... "
We likcwi~l' reject the contf'ntion that Orvi11 v. B1'0u•nell. :345 F. S. lR3
(1953), am! Zittman v. McGrath, 341 U . S. 446 {1951), gnwt pctitimH·r
thr right, to rrtain its attachment:; on the Irnninn ns~rt:::;. To t hP c·onlrar),
Wl' think Orvi11 SUJlportl' the prupo::;ition that an Anwrican c·lnim:mt may
11ot u~e au attaehmrnt that i~ ~nbjed to a. rrYorabh· licrn~r and that hm;
bePn obtaiu<-d after the entry of a freeze ordrr to limit in any WH) the
actions the f>re;,ident may take under § 1702 resjwrting thr frozen a~<sds. l
An attaclnueut so obtained is in every sense subordinate to the Prc~idcut's
power untlcr the IEEPA.
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§ 535.805. As such, the attachments obtained by petitioner
were specifically made subordinate to further actions which
the President might take under the IEEPA. Petitioner was
tm notice of the contingent nature of its interest in the frozen
assets.
This Court has previously recognized that the congressional
purpose in authorizing blocking orders is "to put control of
foreign assets in the hands of the President .... " Propper
v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 493 (1949). Such orders permit the
President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for
use in negotiating the resolution of a declarccl national emergency. The frozell assets serve as a "bargaining chip" to be
used by the President when dealing with a hostile country.
Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner's argument because the practical effect of it is to allow individual claimants
throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this
"bargaiuiug chip" through attachments, garnishments or similar encumbrances on property. Neither the purpose the
statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language supports
such a result. 6
0 Although petitioner concedes thnt the Pre~iclent could have forbiddm
attachment::;, it neverthele::;s argues that once he allowed them tlw PreHidenL
JWrmitted claimants to acquire property int<'re~t~ in their :~tln<"hnH·ntH.
Petitioner further argueH that only thr lirrn~eR to obtain th<· altachmc•nt:,:
were made revocable, 1101 the attarhmentH tlwmHrln·l'. Tt i~ mgc·d that the
January 19, 1981, order revoking Hll licen~P~ on]~· atfcct<•d p<'tilimiC'r'~
right to obtain future nttachmentH. We di~agrre. A~ noll'd :1hove, the
regulation;; ~pecifically providPd that :uw atta('hnwnt i~ null and void
"uu]p~,; lic<'n;;ed," and all licPn~e;; may he revoked nt nny I illle.
Moreover, common sense defies petitioner'~ reading of thr rl'gulat iom:. The
Pn•::~ident could hardly have intruded petitioner and other 1<imi larly Rilualed claimantb lo have the power to take control of the frozen a:;:;ct:; out
of hi~ hautl~.
Our eou~tructiou of petitioner':; nttachme>nts as being "rrvo('ahle," "coli·
tingeut," and "in l'Wry sen:;e wbordinatr to t lw Pre~<id<•nt'~ power uml<·r
the IEEPA," i11 effect auswer:; petitioner'~< rlaim that ('ven if th<' Pre::~i
dcnt had the authotity to nullify the attachments and lran~fer lhc a:;set;,;,
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Because the President's action in nullifying the attach~
ments and ordering the trausfer of the assets was taken pursuant to specific congressional authorization. it is "supported
by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation. allCI the burden of persuasion would
rest heavily upon any who might attack it." Youngstown,
343 U. S., at 637 (Jackson. J., concurring). Und0r the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that petitioner has
sustained that heavy burden. A contrary ruling would mean
that the Federal Government as a whole lacked tlt<:• power
exercised by the President, see id., at 636--637, aJHl that we
are not prepared to say.

IV
Although we have concluded that tlw IREPA eom;titutes
specific congressional authorization to the President to nullify
the attachments and order the transfer of Irania11 assPts. there
remains the question of the President's authority to suspelHl
claims pending in American courts. Ruch claims have, of
course, an existence apart from the attachments which accompanied them. In terminating theS(' claims through Executive Order No. 12294. the President purported to act under
authority of both the TEEPA and 22 U. S. C. § 1732, the
Mo-called "Hostage Act." 7 App. to Pet. for Cert., at 52.
the exercise of ::;uch would con::;titute an uncon~titntional taki11g of vrop<>rty
iH violation of the Fifth Amendment nb>:ent j11~l compPll~tdion. We tolldude that bccau~P of the Pre~idPnt'::; authorit~· to prcvc111 or <:omlition
att uchm(•nts, and bccau::;e of the ordrrH he i~~uPrl I o I his effPcl. pclitiom:r
did not acquire any "property" intere~t in it~ <lltnehmPnt~ of the ~ort that
would SUI>porL a con~titutional claim for compen~atiou.
7 .Judge Mikva, in hilS ~eparatp opinion in American lnt'l Gruup, lnc. v.
Islamic Republic of lrau,- U.S. App. D . C . - , - , - F . 2d - , (l!:!Hl), urgued that the moniker "Ho~tag;c• Act" wa~ Jll'wl~ ·- eoinl'tl for
purpo::>CIS of thi~S litigation. Sutfir-e it to i'n~· that W(' fol"n~ 011 th1• luugHage
of 22 U. S. C'. § 1732, not any short-hand de~cript ion of it. ::-lee ::-lhakcspcare, Hom eo and Juliet, II, ii, 43 ("What'::; in a name?") .
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We conclude that although the IEEPA authorized the nul·
lificatiOll of the attachmellts, it cannot be read to authorize
the suspension of the claims. The claims of American citi·
zens against Iran are not in themselves transactions involving
Iranian property or efforts to exercise any rights with respect
to such property. An in personam lawsuit. although it might
eventually be reduced to judgment and that judgment might
be executeu upon, is an effort to establish liability alld fix
damages all!] does not focus on any particular property within
the jurisdiction. The terms of the IEEPA therefore do not
authorize the President to suspend claims in American courts.
This is the view of all the courts which have coJu;idered the
question. Chas. 1'. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water &
Power Authority, F. 2d, at - ; American Int'l Group,
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,-- F. 2d. at-, JJ. 15; 'l'he
F . Supp.
Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Ira'll National Airlines, (SDNY 1981); Electronic Data Systems v. Social
- , Security Organization of Iran,- F. Supp. - , - (ND Tex.
1981).
The Hostage Act, passed in 1868, provides:
"Whenever it is made k11own to the PresiclenL that any
citizen of the United States has Leen unjustly deprived
of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign
government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that govenlmPnt the reasons of such
imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in
violation of the rights of American citizenship, the PresideJJt shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen.
and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed
or refused , the President shall use such means, 110t
amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary anJ
proper to obtain or effectuate the release: anJ all the
facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as
practicable be communicated by the President to Congress." 22 U. S. C. § 1732.
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We are reluctant to conclude that this provision constitutes
specific authorization to the President to suspend claims in
American courts. Although the broad language of the Hostage Act suggests it may cover this case. there are several
difficulties with such a view. The legislative history indicates that the Act was passed in response to a situation unlike
the recent Iranian crisis. Congress in 1868 was concerned
with the activity of certain countries refusing to recognize
the citizenship of naturalized Americans traveling abroad, aud
repatriating such citizens against their will. Sec, e. g., Cong.
Globe 4331, 40th Con g.. 2d Sess. ( 1868) (Sen F<•ssenden) ;
id., at 4354 (Sen. Conness); see also 22 U. S. C. ~ 1731.
These countries were not interested in returning the citize11s
in excha11ge for any sort of ransom. This also explaius the
reference in the Act to imprisonment "in violation of the
rights of American citizenship." Although the Iranian hostage-taking violated international law and common decency,
the hostages were not seized out of any refusal to recognize
their American citizenship-they were seized precisely because of their American citizenship. The legislative history
is also somewhat ambiguous on the question whether Congress contemplated presideHtial action such as that involved
here or rather simply reprisals directed against the offending
foreign couu try and its citizens. See. e. g., Con g. Globe 4205,
40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868); American Int'l Group, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, a t - (opinion of Mikva, J.).
Concluding that neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act
constitutes specific authorization of the President's actio11 suspending claims, however, is not to say that these statutory
provisions are entirely irrelevant to the quE:'stion of the validity of the President's action. We think both statutes highly
relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressiollal acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those presented in this casr. As noted above
in Part III, supra, at 12-13, the TEEPA <lelcgates broad authority to the President to act iu times of national emergency
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:with respect to property of a foreign country. The Hostage
Act similarly indicates congressional willingness that the
President have broau discretion when responding to the hostile acts of foreign sovereigns. As Senator Williams, draftsman of the language eventually enacted as th ' Hostage Act,
put it:
"If you propose any remedy at all. you must invest
the executive with some discretion. so that he may apply
the remedy to a case as it may arise. As to England or
France he might adopt one policy to relieve a citizen
imprisoned by either one of those countries; as to the
Barbary powers, he might adopt another policy; as to
the islands of the ocean another. With different countries that have different systems of government he might
adopt different means." Cong. Globe 4359, 40th Cong ..
2cl Sess. (1868).
Proponents of the bill recognized that it placed "a loose discretion" in the President's haHds. id., at 4238 (Sen. Stewart),
Lut argued that "[s]omethiug must be intrusted to the Executive" and that "[tlhe President ought to have the power to
do what the exigencies of the case require to rescue [a] citizen
from imprisonment." Id., at 4233, 4357 (Sen. Williams).
An original version of the Act, which authorized the President to suspend trade with a foreign country and even arrest
citizens of that country in the United States in retaliation ,
was rejected because "there may be a great variety of cases
arising where other and different means would be equally
effective and where the end desired could be accomplished
without resorting to such dangerous and violent measures."
ld., at 4233 (Sen. Williams).
Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEP A or
the Hostage Act directly authorizes the President's suspension of claims for the reasons noted. we cannot ignore the
general tenor of Congress' legislation in this area in trying to
determine whether the President is acting alone or at least
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with the acceptance of Congress. As we have 11oted, Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it necessary to take or
every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure
of Congress specifically to delegate authority does not. "especially ... in the areas of foreign policy and national security,"
imply "congressional disapproval" of action taken by the
~ S ~ o--\_....Executive. Haig v. Agee,- U.S.-,- (1981). On the 1&.rrl"\ \
contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the
question of the President's authority in a particular case
which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad
discretion may be considered to "invite" "measures ou iHdependent presidential responsibility," Y nungstown, B43 U. S.,
at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). At least this is so where
ther!'l is 110 contrary indication of legislative intent and when.
as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence 111
conduct of the sort engaged in by the President. It is to
that history which we now turn.
Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outsta11diug
claims by nationals of one country against the government of
another country are "sources of friction" between the two
sovereigns. Un-ited States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 225 (194:2).
To resolve these difficulties, nations have often entered into
agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals.
As one treatise writer puts it, international agreements settling claims by nationals of one state against the govermneut
of another "are established international practice reftectillg
traditional international theory." L. Henkin. Foreign Affairs
and the Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that principle, the United States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign authority to settle the claims of its nationals agaiust
foreign countries. Though those settlements have sometimes been made by treaty, there has also been a longstandiHg
practice of settling such claims by executive agrcemeut with-
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out the advice and consent of the Senate. 8 Under such agreements, the President has agreed to renounce or extinguish
claims of United States nationals against foreign governments in return for lump sum payments or the establishment
of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of these settlements were encouraged by the United States claima11ts themselves, since a clairnaut's only hope of obtaining any payment
at all might lie iu having his government nE:'gotiate a diplo- l
matic settlement on his behalf. But it is also u11disputed
that the "Uuited States has sometimes disposed of the claims
of citizens without their consent. or even without consultation
with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as distinguished from those of the nation as a whole."
Henkin, supra, at 263. Accord, The Restatement (Secoud)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States ~ 213
(1965) (President "may waive or settle a claim against a foreign state . . . even without thE:' consent of the [iujured]
national"). It is clear that the practice of settliug claims
continues today. Since 1952. the Presidellt has entered into
at least 10 binding settlemellts with foreign nations, iucluding an $80 million settlement with the People's Republic of
Chiua.0
8 At lea~t ::;ince the case of the "Wilmington Pacht" i11 17!:J9, PrP~idcnt s
have exercised the power to ~ettle claim~ of UnitPd State~ national:, by
executive agn•t>ment. See Lillich, The Gravel Amendment to the Trade
Reform Act of 1974, 69 Am. J. Tnt'] L. 8.'37, R-l-! (H175). In fnd. during
the pPriod of 1817-1917, "no fewer than eighty ex<·cutive ngrePnH·nts
were entered into by the United State~ looking to tht• liquidation of claims
of its citizens." 1\icCiurP, Intemntional Ex<·cutivl' Agn·<· ment~ 53 (1941) .
See also 14M. Whiteman, Digest of Interna1ional Law :247 (1970).
9 Those agreernen1:s ure 30 U. S. T. 1957 (1979) ( Peoplt·'~ Hcpublie
of Chiua); 27 U. S. T . 399:3 (1976) (Peru); 27 lJ. S. T. 4214 (J97f1)
(Egypt); 25 U. S. T. 227 (1974) (Peru); 2-l l'. S. T. 522 (1973)
(Hungury) ; 20 U. S. T. 2654 (1969) (J1qmu) ; 16 U. S. T. 1 (1965)
(Yugoslavia); 14 U. S. T. 969 (1963) (Bulgaria); 11 U. S. T. 1953
(1960) (Poland); 11 U. S, T. 317 (1960) (Rumania) .
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Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement
by ext>cutive agreement. This is best demonstrated by Congress' enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act
of 1949, 22 U. S. C. § 1621 et seq., as amended (1980). The
Act had two purposes: (1) to allocate to United States nationals funds received in the course of an executive claims
settlement with Yugoslavia, and (2) to provide a procedure
whereby fuuds resulting from future sctth,ments could be
distributed. To achieve these ends Congress created the International Claims Commission, now the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. and gave it jurisdictio11 to make fiual
and binding decisions with respect to claims by United States
nationals against settlement funds. 22 U. S. C. § 162:3 (a).
By creating a procedure to implement future settlelllent
agreements. Congress placed its stamp of approval on such
agreements. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act observed that the United States was seeking s<>ttlemen ts with
countries other than Yugoslavia and stated that the bill "contemplates that settlements of a similar nature are to be made
in the future." H. R. Rep. No. 81-770, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
4, 8 (1949).
Over the years Congress has frequently amended the International Claims Settlement Act to provide for particular
problems arising out of settlement agreements. thus demonstrating Congress' continuing acceptance of the President's
claim settlement authority. With respect, to the Executive
Agreement with the People's Republic of Chi11a, for example,
Congress established an allocation formula for distribution
of the funcls received pursuant to the Agreemt>nt. 22 U. S. C.
§ 1627. As with legislation involving other executive agreements, Congress did not question the fact of the settlement
or the power of the President to have concluded it. I11 1976,
Cougress authorized the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to adjudicate the merits of claims by United States na-

80-2078-0PINION
DAMES & MOORE v. REGAN

23

tionals against East Germany, prior to any settlement with
East Germany, so that the Executive would "be in a better
positiou to npgotiate an adequate settlement . . . of these
claims." S. Rep. No. 94-1188, 94th Coug., 1st Sess., 2
(1976); 22 U. S. C. § 1644b. Similarly, Congress recently
amended the Iu ternatioual Claims Settlement Act to facilitate the settl('mPnt of claims agai11st Vietnam. 22 U. S. C.
§ 1645; ~ Hi45a (5). The House Report stated that the purpose of the legislation was to establish an official inventory of
losses of private Fuited States property in Vietnam so that
recovery could be achieved "through direct Government-toGovernment negotiation of private property claims." H. R.
Rep. No. 96-915. 96th Co11g., 2d Sess.. 2-3 (1980). Finally,
the legislative history of the IEEPA further reveals that Congress has accc>pted the authority of the Executive to enter
into settlement agreements. Though th(' IEEPA was enacted to provide for some limitation on th(' President's emergency powers, Congress stressed that "nothi11g in this Act is
intended to interfere with the authority of the President to
fblock assets1. or to impede the settle>ment of claims of
United States citizens against forcig11 couutries." S. Rep.
No. 95-466, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1977); 50 U. S. C.
§ 1706 (a) ( 1) .10
10 IndP<>d, Congre>s::; has eonRi~tt'ntl~· fnik<l to ohje<'t to this long-~tandi11g
pruetice of rlaim settlement by ex0eut in· agn•(•Jlll'Jlt, ev0n wiH'll it has
had au opportunit)' to do so. In l 972. CongrP~~ Pnt<·rtainl'd IPI-(i::-:la t ion
relating to congre~;;ional oversight of Ruth agr<'t'llH'llf~. But Congre~s took
only limited nrtion, rrquiring that the text of ~ignifi<"allt rxPeutive agreement~ be trun;;mittpd to Congre;;~. 1 U. S. C. § 112b. Ju Jlaig v. Agee,
- - U. S . - (19i:il), w0 not0cl that "D~pite the long~tamliug aud ofli<:iully promulgated view that the Exe<"utiw lw~ the powPr 1o withhold
pas:sport, for reaHon~ of national ~e(·urit~·, Cor1gre~~ in Hl78, 'though it
once again pnart!'d lPgi:slation relating to pa~~port~, left comp](•ft'ly uutouched the broad rule-making authority grauted iu the carliPr Ad.'"
ld., at 20, quoting Zernet v. R,·usk, 381 U. S. 1, 12 (1965). Likewi~e iu
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In addition to congressional acquiescence in the President's
power to settle claims, prior cases of this Court have also
recognized that the President does have some measure of
power to enter into executive agreements without obtaining
the advice and consent of the Senate. In United States v.
Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942), for example. the C'ourt upheld
the validity of the Litvinov Assignment. which was part of an
Executive Agreement whereby the Soviet Union assig11ed to
the United Sta.tes amounts owed to it by American uationals
so that outstanding claims of other American nationals could
be paid. 'l"'he Court explained that the resolution of such
claims was integrally connected with normalizing Uuited
States' relations with a foreign state.
"Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition
as settlement of claims of our nationals ... certainly is
a modest implied power of the President. . . . No such
obstacle can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of
relations between this country and another nation, unless
the historic conception of his power and responsibilities ... is to be drastically revised." ld., at 229-230.
Similarly, Judge Learned Hand recognized:
"The constitutional power of the President extends to
the settlement of mutual claims between a foreign govthis case, Congres,, thougl1 lrgisl11ting in the area, has left "untouelJed" the
authority of the Pre;;ident to enter into settlement agreements.
'l'he lcgi~lativc hi>~tory of 1 U. S. C. § 112b furthPr revPals that Congre~:,; ha~ accepl(·d the Pre;;idmt':; authority to settle claims. During the
hearings on tlw bill, Senator CaJ<e, thr sponsor of the Act, stat('d wilh
reRpPct to executive rlnim f<ettlementR that:
"I think it is a most intem;ting [nrea] in which we have accepted the
right of the Pn·sideut, one individual, acting thrm1gh his diplomatic
force, to adjudicate and l:iettlc claims of Ameri<'an national~ agaiui:it foreign
COlmtrirl:i. But it is a fuel."
'fran:;mittal of Executive Agreements to Congre~:;s: Hearings before thuScnatc Committee on :Foreign Relations, 92cl Cong., 1st Sess., 74 (1971) .
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ernment and the United States, at least when it is an
incident to the recognition of that government; and it
would be umeasonable to circumscribe it to such controvcrsie8. The continued mutual amity between this nation and other powers again and again depends upon a
satisfactory compromise of mutual claims; the necessary
power to make such compromises has existed from the
earliest times and been exercised by the foreign offices of
all civilized nations." Ozanic v. United States, 188 F. 2d
228, 231 (CA2 1951).
Petitioner raises two arguments in opposition to the proposition that Congress has acquiesced in this longstanding practice of claims settlement by executive agreement. First, it
suggests that all pre-1952 settlement claims, and corresponding court cases such as Pink, should be discounted because of
the evolution of the doctrim' of sovereign immunity. Petitioner observes that ))rior to 1952 the United States adhered
to the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity. so that absent
action by the Executive there simply would be no remedy for
an United States uational a~ainst a foreign govemment.
When the Uuited States in 1952 adopted a more restrictive
notion of sovereign immunity, by means of the so-called
"Tate" letter, it is petitioner's view that Unitetl States natioHals no longer ueeded Executive aid to settle claims alld
that, as a result. the President's authority to settle such
claims in some sense "disappeared." Though petitioner's argument is not wholly without merit, it is refuted by the fact
that since 1952 there have been at least 10 claims settlements
by executive agreement. Thus, even if the pre-1952 caees
should be disregarded, congressional acquiescence in settlement agreements since that time supports the President's
power to act here.
Petitioner next asserts that Conp:ress divested the President
Qf th(;) ~uthority to settl~ c}ftim~ when it enacted the Foreign
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Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (hereinafter "FSIA"), 28
U.S. C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq. The FSIA g-ranted personal and
subject matter jUI'isdiction in the federal district courts over
commercial suits brought by claimants against those foreign
states which have waived immunity. 28 U. S. C. § 1330.
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA. a foreign government's
immunity to suit was determinecl by the Exrcutive Branch
on a case-by-case basis. According to petitioner, the principal purpose of the FSIA was to dcpoliticize these commercial lawsuits by taking them out of the arena of foreign affairs-where the Executive Branch is subject to tlw prt'ssures
of foreign states seeking to avoid liability through a grant of
immunity-and by placillg them within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts. Petitioner thus insists that the President, by suspending its claims. has circumscribed the jurisdiction of the United States courts in violation of Art. Ill of the
Constitution.
We disagree. In the first place. we do not believe that
the President has attempted to divest the federal courts of
j urisdictior1. Executive Order No. 12294 purports only to
"suspend" the claims, not divest the federal court of "jurisdiction." As we read the Executive Order, those claims not
within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal will "revive't
and become judicially enforceable in United States courts.
This case, in short. illustrates the difference between modifying federal court jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply
a different rule of law. See United States v. Schooner Peggy,
5 U.S. 1, 103 (1801). The President has exercised the power,
acquiesced in by Congress, to settle claims aml, as such, has
simply effected a change in the substantive law governing the
lawsuit. Indeed, the very example of sovereign immunity
belies petitioner's argument. No one would suggest that a
determination of sovereign immunity divests the federal
courts of "jurisdiction." Yet, petitioner's argument, if accepted, would have required courts prior to the enactment

'
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of the FSIA to reject as an encroachment on their jurisdiction
the President's determination of a foreign state's sovereign
immunity.
Petitioner also reads the FSIA much too broadly. 'l'he
principal purpose of the FSIA was to codify conU>mporary
concepts concerning the scope of sovereign innnuuity aml
withdraw from the President the authority to make binding
determinations of the sovereign immunity to be accorded foreign states. See Chas. T. Main Tnt'l, lnc. v. Khuzestau Water
& Power Authority,- F. 2d. at-; American lnt'l Group,
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,- F. 2d, at-. The },S[A
was thus designed to remove one particular banier to suit,
namely sovereign immunity; and cannot be fairly read as
prohibiting the President from settliug claims of United
St,ates nationals against foreign governments. It is telliug
that the Cougress which enacted the FSIA considered but
rejected several proposals designed to limit the power of the
President to enter into executive agreements. incl11ding claims
settlement agreements. 11 It is quite unlikely that the same
Co11gress that rejected proposals to limit the President's authority to conclude executive agreements sought to accomplish that very purpose sub silentio through the FSIA. And,
as noted above. just 1 year after enacting the FSIA, Congress enacted the IEEPA, where the legislative history
stressed that nothing in the IEEP A was to impede the s<>ttlement of claims of United States citizens. It wonld be
surprising for Congress to express this support for settlement
The rejected legislation woultl typically have n•quirPd COJH!I't'~~ioual
approval of executivr agre(·mrut~S before they woulu !Je cou~idered rffective. Ser Con~re~S~Sional Over~Si!l;ht of Executiw Agrernwnt~: Htaring~S
on S. 632 and S. 1251 ])('fun· flw ~u!Jc·onuniftN· ou St'IJai'Htion of Powers
of the Senate Commit1PP on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., bt se~~., 243-261,
302-311 (1975): Congre:::~innal n(•Vi(:'W of Jntemational Agn•(•lll('lltb:
Hearing~ b(>fore the Sub('ommiltc•p ou Tnt('rnatiomd Serurit.'' and Srit·ntific
Affnir~ of the House Comlllittee on Iuternational Relations, 94th Cong.,
2d se~~ ., 167, 246 (1976).
11
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agreements had it intended the FSIA to eliminate the Presi~
dent's authority to make such agreements.
In light of all of the foregoing-the inferences to be drawn
from the character of the legislation Congress has enacted
in the area, such as the IEEP A and the Hostage Act. and
from the history of acquiescence in executive claims settlement-we conclude tha.t the President was authorized to suspend pending claims pursuant to Executive Order No. 12294.
As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Youngslow11, 343 U.S.
at 610-611, "a systematic, unbroken executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power~
vested i.u the President by ~ 1 of Art. II." Past practice
does not, by itself, create power. but "long-contiuued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a
presumption that the !'action] has been [taken] in pursuance
of its consent. . . ." United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236
U. S. 459, 469 (1915). See Haig v. Agee, -- U. S .. a t - ,
- . Such practice is present here and such a presmnJ)tion
is also appropriate. In light of the fact that Congress may
be considered to have consented to the President's action in
suspending claims, we cannot say that action exceeded the
Presideut's powers.
Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the means
chosen by the President to settle the claims of American
natiouals provided an alternate forum, the Claims Tribunal.
which is capable of providing meaningful relief. The Solicitor General also suggests that the provision of the Claims
Tribunal will actually enhance the opportunity for claimants
to recover their claims, in that the Agreement removes a uumber of jurisdictional and procedural impeuiments faced by
claimants in United States courts. Brief for United States. at
13-14. Although being overly sanguine about the chances of
Uuited Rtates claimants before the Claims Tribunal would
require a degree of naivete which should not be demandPd
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eVl'n of judges, the Solicitor Generals' point cannot be discounted. Moreover, it is .i mportant to remember that we
have already held that the President has the statutory authority to nullify attachments and to transfer the assets out of
the country. The President's power to do so does not depend
on his provision of a forum whereby claimants can recover on
those claims. The fact that the Presid<>nt has provided such
a forum here means that the claimants arc receiving something in return for the suspension of their claims. namely. access to an in ternatioual tribunal before which they may well
recover something on their claims. Because there tloes appear· to be a real "settlement" here. this case is more easily
analogized to the more traditional claim settlemcllt cast's of
the past.
Just as importantly. Congress has not disapprowd of the
action taken here. Though Cougress has held hearings on
the Iranian Agreement itsel£, 1'-! Congress has Hot enacted legislation , or eve11 passed a resolutiou. indicating its displeasure
with the Agreement. Quite the COlJtrary, the relevant Senate Committee has stated that the establishme11 t of th e Tt'ibuual is "of vital importance to the United States." S. Rep.
No. 97- 71 , 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1981). 13 We are thus
on the Iranian Agreem ent ~ heforP lht> Seuatl• Committee
97th Con g .. l ~t Se~s. (1981) ; Hra ring~ on the Trailian A ~~e;; t l:i Set t lt>men t before the Sena Ie Comm iIPPe on Banking, Hom;i ug
unci Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., bt Se~s . (Hl~1) ; Ht-aring~ on tlw Algerian
D ec!Hralions before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cung.,
M Sess. (1981) .
1 3 Contra~ t e ongre~sional reaction to thr Irnui:lll Agr~:>t•ment s with eongrc~sional reaction to a 1973 Executive Agreement with CzPchoHlovakia .
There the Presid(:'nt sought to srttle over $105 million in claim;,; against
C z echo ~lovaki a for $20.5 million .
Congresl:i quickly d e mo11 ~ trated it ~ di:,plea ~ ure by enaeting legi~ lation requiring that t hr AgrPemcnt he renegotia ted . Ser Lillich, supra , ut 839-840. Though Congre~s has ~hown i t ~elf
('apahle of objecting to executive agreements, it has rn reJ~r dune ~ o am{
bas not doue so in thi~; case ..
12
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clearly not confronted with a situation in which Co11gr·ess has

in some way resistRd the exercise of presidential authority.
Finally, we re-emphasize the narrowness of our decision.
We do not decide that the President possesses plenary pow<:'I'
to settle claims. even as against foreign governmental entities. As the C'ourt of Appeals for the First Circuit str<'ssed,
"the sheer magnituue of such a power. considered against the
background of the diversity and complexity of modl'l'll inkrnational trade, cautions against any broader construction of
authority thau is uecessary." Chas. 'P. Main hd'l, Inc. v.
Khuzestan Water & Power Authority,- F. 2d. at-. But
when•, as here, the settlement of claims has been dPtennined
to be a necessary i11cident to the rPsolution of a major foreign
policy dispute between our country and anoth(·r, a])(l where.
as here, we can conclude that Congress aequiesced in the
President's action, we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle such claim .

v
We do not think it appropriate at the presPnt tiHH' lo address petitioner's contention that the suspension of claims, if
authorized, would constitute a taking of property in violation
of the Fifth Amendment to the Pnitcd Rtates Constitution
in the absence of just compensation. 11 Both pditionpr· autl
the Government concede that the question wlwtlwr the suspension of the claims constitutes a taking is not ripe for r·pview. Brief for Petitioner. at 34. n. 32; Brief for rnited
Rtates, at 65. Accord, Chas. '1'. Main Tnt'l, l11c. v. Khuzestan
Water & Power Authority, supra, at - ; ,1mericau lnt'l
Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of !ran, F. 2<1, at - -.
However, this contention, and the possibility that the Presi14 Though we couclude that the Pre~itleJJt has settled wtitiun\~r·~ ('lairn~
agaiusL Iran, we tlu nut snggrst that the ~ettlem<'ut lw~ termiuatl'tl petitioner'::; J>UI'~ible taking claim agaiu::;t the Uuited Sbtes. \Ye expre::;s 110
views on pl:!litioner'i::i claim::; that it hm; suffered a takiug.
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dent's actions may effect a taking of petitioner's property~
makes ripe for adjudication the question whether petitio11rr
will have a remec.ly at law in the Court of Claims unde>r the
Tucker Act. 28 U. R. C. § 1491 , in such a.n event. That the
fact and extent of the taking in this case is yet speculat,ive
is inconsequf'ntial because "there must be at the time of LakiHg 'a reasonable, certain anc.l adequate provision for obtaining compensation.'" Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 124-125 (1974), quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 659 (1890);
Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330. 335- 336 (1952);
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Bnvironrnental Study Group, 438
U. R. 59, 94. JJ. 39 (1978).
It has been contendec.l that the "treaty exception " to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 28 U. R. C. ~ 1502, might
precluc.le the Court of Claims from exercising jurisdiction over
any takings claim the petitioner might bring. At oral argument, however, the Government conceded that ~ 1502 would
not act as a bar to petitioner's action in the C'ourt of C'laims.
Tr. of Oral Arg .. at 39-42. 47. We agree. Ser United States
v. Weld, 127 U. S. 51 (1888); United States v. Old Settlers,
14S U. S. 427 (1893); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
534 :F'. 2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Accordingly. to thr Pxtcnt p<"titioner believes it has suffered an unco11stitutional takiug by
the suspension of the claims. we sec 110 jurisclictioJlal obstaelc
to an appropriate action in the United States Court of Claims
unc.ler the Tucker Act.
The judgment of the D1stl'ict Court is accordingly affirmed,
~tH.l the mandate shall issue forth with.

.!

~J

•

..

J 'h' '\

; '1 ;J{! ;:.:

Ct-:itd.'

tJ.r. Ju:·tl...:u
Mr. JutJ t ~ ne
!ir . Justice
i':Jr. J us t ice
inr . Justice

.: :-u:~""~.'ln
Ste·.I.Jarr;
·,j(li tA

:h:cshall'
Bl::>..cz:uun
i-1 r . J u.n t ice R::- h!lr:J.ll i a -c'
.8:r . Jus t i ce Sta'Jons

lb:'ofn;:·

Mr. Justic e Powoll

CinmUa~:

JUL
~,c.f.l o
__________
wol

ilGcirouletod:

No. 80-2127

Iran National Airlines v. The Marschalk Co.

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom Justice Marshall and
Justice Stevens join, dissenting.
I would dismiss the certificate, citing Dames &
Moore v. Regan,

u.s.

(1981), announced today.

The

Court's opinion in that case provides the only answers that
this Court should give to the questions certified to us by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Having

rendered an opinion on the subject of those questions, we
should not answer them in monosyllables nor attempt a
syllabus of a portion of the Court's opinion.

We recently

have dismissed certification of questions where the Court
has addressed the subject of the questions in a full
opinion.

u.s.

Foley v. Carter,

United St a tes v. Will,

u.s.

(1981) •
(1981).
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